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On February 23rd, 2019, I logged on to Youtube to watch the introduction of humanitarian aid 
into Venezuela, organized by the Venezuelan Opposition, Colombia, and the United States, 
across one of the numerous bridges that connect Colombia and Venezuela. An endless mass of 
citizens, led by dozens of workers in humanitarian vests, various reporters, and a few white-
collared politicians marched towards the Venezuelan side, its entry blocked by Venezuelan 
soldiers with expressionless faces, behind plastic anti-riot shields. The marchers, draped in 
yellow, blue, and red––the colors of both the Colombian and the Venezuelan flags-–sang the 
Venezuelan national anthem in bursts. Tiny American flags were also visible in the crowd. When 
the protesters reached the Venezuelan blockade, none of their pleas, poems, or prayers could 
provoke a reaction from the soldiers. I quit the video and refreshed the live stream, hoping for 
new results. Dozens of new videos depicting violence, chaos, and confusion flooded the sidebar 
of my screen. In one video, Venezuelan army trucks rammed into civilians attempting to cross 
into their country to support the entry of humanitarian aid. Another depicted frantic civilians 
surrounding a semi-truck engulfed in flames, but the white-collared politicians and professional 
cameras were gone; teenage boys in improvised facemasks and shirtless, nameless men pulled 
cardboard boxes marked “USAID” out of the rubble and smoke. Onlookers filmed the drama on 
their cellular phones, and––briefly––the world watched. Soon, new videos began to circulate on 
the internet, filmed on the Venezuelan side. Young protesters, gathered to support the entry of 
humanitarian aid into their country, disappeared under clouds of tear-gas, and shots rang from 
Venezuelan security forces. From a window in an unknown border town, a few individuals 
captured footage of a truck––allegedly carrying humanitarian aid––barreling down a dirt road, 
pursued by Venezuelan army trucks. The soldiers cornered the aid truck, a flurry of shots could 
be heard, and the onlookers exclaimed “they killed him, they killed him!” Prominent members of 
the Venezuelan Opposition promptly reposted the video––as evidence of the regime’s brutality. 
That night, Venezuelan presidential hopeful, Juan Guaidó, tweeted asking the international 
community to consider “all options to achieve the liberation of the Motherland.” One minute 
later, US Senator Marco Rubio added, “the grave crimes committed today by the Maduro regime 
have opened the door to various potential multilateral actions not on the table just 24 hours ago.” 
Thousands of online accounts began to post the hashtag #IntervencionMilitarYa 
(#MilitaryInterventionNow). For a brief moment, many seemed convinced that army defections 
in Venezuela would tilt the balance of power in the country against Maduro. In the days 
following these events, much of the international news coverage reflected this anticipation––that 
Maduro’s frequent accusations of assassination plots, a US-backed coup, even a military 
invasion from Colombia, would materialize. Soon, some media outlets and social media 
discussions began to indicate, rather, that the failed attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into 
Venezuela was a reflection of Maduro’s grip on power––that the regime had emerged from this 
period of instability stronger than before.  
 
In the days and weeks that followed, I became aware of significant discrepancies in the 
representations of these events within local and international media, as well as the digital, 
transnational spheres of public opinion. Narratives denouncing US Air Force planes, carrying 
humanitarian aid, as a thinly-veiled cover for regime change in Venezuela coexisted with 
characterizations of humanitarian efforts as legitimate manifestations of international solidarity–
–or even a solution to hunger and poverty in Venezuela. Furthermore, I grew interested in the 
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experience of these events by the residents of Colombo-Venezuelan border communities. Their 
homes became the launching point for a months-long international humanitarian campaign, a 
global spectacle that included even an all-day concert, “Venezuela Aid Live,” organized by 
British billionaire Richard Branson to support the humanitarian effort, which drew hundreds of 
thousands more––filling store shelves, hotel rooms, and restaurants unlike any moment in local 
history. From halfway across the world, it was even more difficult to establish a clear picture of 
the consequences these events––and their aftermath––had for border communities. Had they 
welcomed the international attention, the foreign military planes and ambassadors, the politicians 
from Caracas and Bogotá? Would these communities also be recipients of food and medical 
supplies? Had the events and visitors presented new opportunities, or undue burdens? How had 
they experienced the moment when the tiny town of Cúcuta was briefly on the covers of major 
international newspapers? How did these communities feel afterwards, as the international news 
pivoted quickly towards the next crisis, the next tragedy? The media offered no clear answers, no 
complete narratives––only conflicting constructions of the same events.  
 
My effort to understand these events and their context reflects an acute version of the dissonance 
I often felt as a transnational subject of Venezuelan descent myself. All my life, my struggle to 
understand dominant media constructions of events in Venezuela has been accentuated by my 
physical distance to the country that was briefly my home––and filtered through the ideologies, 
emotions, and nostalgia of immigrant parents who never wanted to leave. My undergraduate 
studies of Latin American Literature and History provided new frameworks and reference-points 
for understanding what were, indeed, increasingly fictional spaces and reconstructed memories.  
 
These experiences led me to undertake this project, a discursive analysis of the dominant 
coverage of the Colombo-Venezuelan border in the Colombian national press. With the support 
of a Latin American Studies Research Award, and under the mentorship of Professor Nadia 
Celis, during the summer of 2019 I conducted research in Colombia, primarily in Bogotá. By 
looking at archival editions of El Espectador and El Tiempo, and scholarship on the history of 
the Colombo-Venezuelan relations, I sought to examine the extent to which border crises gain 
periodic attention in the Colombian press. In particular, I grew interested in the ways that 
national press coverage might include, exclude, or reconfigure the priorities of border 
communities. I tracked the changes and continuities in national press coverage of border 
relations from the start of the Chávez presidency (April 2002-March 2013) to the year 2019, and 
I scrutinized the extent to which dominant press coverage of the border may promote, or reflect, 
the narratives of the Colombian state, the geopolitical interests of the United States, or economic 
powers. Furthermore, I interrogated the conceptions of national identity articulated by media 
narratives concerning border relations, and I sought to contrast these visions with the 
perspectives and experiences presented by border communities.  
 
Additionally, I interviewed local scholars and consulted local scholarship in media studies and 
international relations, hoping to establish continuity between, evolution from, or the 
transformation of their observed trends. Academic work in communications and media studies, 
detailing the historical links between political and economic power and the Colombian media, 
the concentration of media ownership, and the themes and trends in media representation, 
confirmed my initial intuitions regarding the interplay between the Colombian media and 
political and economic power. I became interested in the ways that media coverage engages in 
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the cyclical production of crises, which are constructed in ways that divert public attention away 
from “central” national issues towards the periphery––the border––constructing external 
“enemies,” such as the Venezuelan state, rather than highlighting the fissures within Colombian 
society. These interests led me to travel to the border city of Cúcuta, Colombia, where I held a 
series of conversations with local government, industry leaders and members of the chamber of 
commerce, labor union leaders, the editor of La Opinión, and citizens. My time in Cúcuta 
suggested a profound discrepancy between the representation of the Colombo-Venezuelan border 
within the national press vs. the lived experience of border communities, as well as the counter-
representation of the border by the local press. Conversations with local sources at the border and 
a review of relevant coverage indicated that the dominant representations of the border region in 
major Colombian press outlets prioritized themes of violence, militarization, and conflict, while 
local perspectives were often secondary to, or excluded from, the coverage. These experiences 
informed my perceptions of the border––from the perspective of those most affected by ongoing 
border crises––before the interrogation of dominant media representations through textual and 
visual analysis.  
 
Upon my return, I undertook a closer examination of the primary and secondary sources 
collected in Colombia, looking in particular to the news sections of El Tiempo and El 
Espectador, the major newspapers in Colombia, in addition to opinion pieces, editorials, and 
photo galleries. Subsequently, a review of relevant theoretical background and an updated 
methodology gave rise to the questions that drive the chapters that follow: 
 
- What narratives about the Colombo-Venezuelan border are constructed by the national 
press? And how are these narratives legitimated as “true”? 
- How does the press construct and “imagine” communities, and who are, within these 
imagined communities, the protagonists and antagonists, heroes, enemies, and friends, 
offenders and defenders? 
- How do narrative techniques and rhetorical strategies, including syntaxis, paratextual 
elements, imagery, repetition, dramatization, and emotions operate to suggest culpability, 
construct victimhood, and justify state violence? 
- How does newspapers implicitly “construct” their audience? 
- How does the press coverage function to mobilize and construct notions of national 
identity?  
- How do border subjects mobilize the discourse on Colombo-Venezuelan relations for 
their own ends? 
- How do the “realities” constructed by the dominant press differ from those presented by 
border communities? 
 
The process of answering these questions began to reveal divergent editorial lines and dominant 
narratives within each newspaper’s construction of the relation between the Colombian and 
Venezuelan nations, states, and their people. Moreover, the combined conceptual background 
relevant to this study helped reveal that El Tiempo and El Espectador construct different “truths” 
through divergent constructions of similar events in a manner coherent with the ideological 
affinities and conceptions of national identity held by their respective audiences and the editorial 
leadership of each newspaper, constrained further by economic factors and pressures. The 
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narratives and strategies used to promote each newspaper's vision of the Colombian nation, 
through their coverage of binational tensions, became the primary focus of this thesis. 
 
Antecedents and Historical Context 
 
The history of the Venezuelan and Colombian nations and people is one of kinship and 
interdependency, particularly in the border region. This historical bond has been invoked 
recently by officials such as President Duque, who has described Venezuelan migrants to 
Colombia as “brothers and sisters” with whom Colombia will always be “united by fraternity.” 
Indeed, the rapid acceleration of Venezuelan migration to Colombia has not elicited an 
exclusionary response from the Colombian state. Between 2018-2019 alone, Colombia accepted 
nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants––amounting to 1.7 million by December 2019 and 
expected to reach 2.4 million by the end of 2020.1 In 2017, the Colombian government began to 
offer free healthcare and education to Venezuelan migrants; in 2019, the state granted citizenship 
to all children of Venezuela refugees, a measure to last through 2021; in 2020, the state sought to 
integrate Venezuelans into the formal economy by offering work permits to hundreds of 
thousands of migrants who entered the country before November 29, 2019.2  
 
Conversely, the relationship between the Colombian and Venezuelan states has become 
increasingly marked by distrust, growing militarization, and the threat of conflict. The recently 
sharpening divide between the two countries may be traced to the intersection of the presidencies 
of Álvaro Uribe (August 2002-August 2010) and Hugo Chávez (April 2002-March 2013). 
During this period, the drug war became a pretext for Colombia to strengthen its relationship 
with the United States, and Colombia became the closest ally of the United States against the 
leftist government of Venezuela. Under the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (August 2010-
August 2018), Uribe’s successor, Colombia and Venezuela renewed diplomatic relations, which 
had been frozen since July of that year. Although numerous incursions into Colombian territory 
by the Venezuelan military, under Chavez’s successor Nicolás Maduro (April 2013-present), 
renewed binational tensions, the Santos administration pursued peaceful negotiations with an 
explicit rejection of militaristic rhetoric. Fears of military conflict at the border were renewed, 
however, under the subsequent administration of President Iván Duque (beginning in 2018), 
which strengthened Colombia’s relationship with the United States, advocated for regime change 
in Venezuela, and cooperated with the Venezuelan Opposition to introduce humanitarian aid into 
the country––largely of US origin––in violation of Venezuela’s national sovereignty. These 
efforts fueled fears of military conflict or intervention in Venezuela. Subsequently, border 
commerce strained under the suspension of diplomatic relations and border closures.  
 
Moreover, the political and economic priorities of the interior have increasingly silenced those of 
border communities, the ultimate victims of tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, the movement patterns of transnational individuals persist; these dynamics 
 
1 Migracioncolombia.gov.co, Migración Colombia, February 2020, accessed May 11, 2020, 
https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/251-febrero-2020/mas-de-un-millon-setecientos-setenta-y-un-mil-
venezolanos-estan-radicados-en-colombia-migracion-colombia. 
2 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Jenny Carolina González, “Colombia Offers Citizenship to 24,000 Children of 
Venezuelan Refugees,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/colombia-citizenship-venezuelans.html. 
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continue to contest growing nationalist sentiment on both sides of the border. The transnational 
economies and dynamics upon which border communities depend, while compromised gravely 
by the effects of binational tensions in Bogotá and Caracas, continue to adapt to these new 
conditions. Hyperinflation, scarcity in foodstuffs, and shortages in medical supplies still draw 
Venezuelans to border-towns such as Cúcuta, both through formal and––increasingly––informal 
passages. Colombians continue to depend upon Venezuelan migrants as consumers and laborers. 
Moreover, transnational familial and kinship networks link communities across both sides of the 
border. 
 
The Contemporary Colombian Media Landscape 
 
Contemporary scholarship on the Colombian media demonstrates that the print media play an 
increasingly active role in Colombia’s public diplomacy and foreign policy, often in alignment 
with the priorities of the Colombian state. Furthermore, the political and economic structures of 
the Colombian media are significant factors to the media tendencies observed in this study: 
sensational journalism appealing to emergent nationalisms––and constructing their own 
nationalistic discourses––the marginalization, misrepresentation, and mobilization of border 
communities’ concerns, a demonstrated commitment in the discursive production and 
reproduction of crises, and a redirection of popular attention towards external enemies.  
 
In the 20th and 21st centuries, the relationship between the media and neoliberal interests has 
increased around the globe. As a consequence of high production costs, the news has become 
highly oligopolistic, which presents a fundamental challenge to the right to diverse and 
independent communication. Particularly when media production models have become 
increasingly dependent upon advertising revenue, media consumers must be homogenized and 
information standardized in order to appeal to a more general audience and, in turn, increase 
sales3,4 Moreover, the transition of media ownership from political to economic groups entails a 
reformulation of “the news” from strictly social knowledge––ideology––into a commodity 
directed by market factors; thus, the information presented in the current news media is not only 
directed and constrained by socially accepted knowledge criteria, it must also be consistent with 
profitability. Consequently, the mass media are no longer only producers of socially significant 
information, rather, they engage in a productive activity that must satisfy consumer demands.5,6  
 
This neoliberal reformulation of the mass media affirms María Teresa Herran’s thesis in her 
political economy of the Colombian media, La industria de los medios de comunicación en 
Colombia (1991): 
 
mass media have been understood as tools to generate consensus...whose materialized 
products contribute to the creation of the social contract necessary for the production of 
the system. Nevertheless, and without questioning the latter proposition, such 
 
3 Bagdikian, Ben. El monopolio de los medios de difusión. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica), 22. 
4 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2002), 15. 
5 Teun A. Van Dijk. Discourse and Knowledge: A Sociocognitive Approach. (Cambridge;New York: Cambridge 
University Press), 39. 
6 David Felipe Jara Arevalo. “Neoliberalismo y su relación actual con los medios masivos de comunicación en 
Colombia.” (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana): 177. 
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frameworks [dismiss] the consideration of information as a product in itself, of the mass 
media as a productive process and the means of communications as an industry.7 
 
Yet, mass media must also satisfy social and political demands. In capitalist societies, mass 
media function increasingly as hegemonic apparatuses, displacing education as the primary arena 
of consensus and socialization for members of civil society and becoming the institutions 
wherein individuals relate to reality.8,9 Thus, the centralization of ownership over the mass media 
by dominant economic groups is no coincidence; ownership over strategically important 
apparatuses of social and political control, even if they are not the most viable mechanisms of 
wealth production, presents a key avenue through which to legitimate prevailing political and 
economic paradigms.10 
 
In Colombia, the neoliberalization of the dominant national press is not only demonstrated 
through the concentration of media ownership, but also aggravated by the explicit family ties of 
media owners and directors to political and economic powers.  Historically, the Colombian mass 
media has existed in tension between the twin poles of deregulation and absolute state 
intervention. Within the neoliberal era, media concentration in the hands of corporate and 
political interests has contributed to the erosion of the “right to information” dictated in the 1991 
Colombian constitution, 
 
Every individual is guaranteed the freedom to express and diffuse his/her thoughts and 
opinions, to transmit and receive information that is true and impartial, and to establish 
mass communications media. The latter are free and have social responsibility. The right 
to make corrections under conditions of equity is guaranteed. There shall be no 
censorship.11 
 
The Colombian press exhibits not only the economic pressures above mentioned, but is also 
compromised by the links between editorial staff––and controlling family or economic groups––
to the country’s political leadership. These dynamics may help explain why Colombia is one of 
the most dangerous countries for journalists. Dominant news coverage of the border must be 
understood in the context of these internal pressures and dangers, compounded by local and 
foreign economic and political interests.  
 
El Tiempo, the most widely read newspaper in Colombia was founded in 1911 by Eduardo 
Santos, and the Santos family remained main shareholders between 1913 to 2007. A history of 
strong links between the Santos family and El Tiempo evidence the concentration of political 
power, economic groups, and the dominant mass media characteristic to the Colombian context. 
Enrique Santos Calderón served as director of El Tiempo from 1999-2009. Luis Fernando 
Santos, his brother, was the president of Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A from 1996-2010. During 
 
7 María Teresa Herrán, La industria de los medios masivos de comunicación en Colombia (Bogotá: Fundación 
Friedrich Ebert de Colombia, 1991), 32. 
8 Javier Esteinou Madrid, Los medios de comunicación y la transformación de la sociedad civil (Ciudad de México: 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 1985), 8-12. 
9 Germán Rey and Javier Dario Restrepo, Desde las dos orillas (Bogotá: Ministerio de Comunicaciones, 1996), 31. 
10 Jara Arevalo, 177. 
11 “Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015” Constituteproject.org, accessed May 12, 
2020, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015.pdf?lang=en. 
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this period, their brother, Juan Manuel Santos, served as Minister of Defense under President 
Álvaro Uribe from 2006-2009. Later, Juan Manuel Santos became President of Colombia from 
2010 to 2018. Francisco Santos Calderón, Juan Manuel Santos’ cousin served as Vice-President 
under President Álvaro Uribe and would later join Uribe’s conservative “Centro Democrático” 
party after Uribe and Santos became political rivals. In turn, Francisco Santos would become 
ambassador to the United States under President Iván Duque, Uribe’s political protégé.  
 
During the past two decades, however, the country’s leading newspaper has not only been 
intertwined with political leadership, but also economic powers. In 2007, Luis Carlos Sarmiento 
Angulo, a business mogul who is also the richest man in the country, became the primary 
shareholder of El Tiempo. Ownership over El Tiempo’s parent company, Casa Editorial El 
Tiempo S.A., became divided between Inversiones Vistahermosa S.A.S. (a company that 
belongs to Grupo Aval of Luis Sarmiento Angulo), Inversegovia (which also belongs to the Aval 
Group, and of which Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo owns 64.17% of shares), and Seguros de 
Vida Alfa S.A. (also under controlling ownership by Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo).  
 
Furthermore, strong links between El Tiempo and elite political families persist. Adriana María 
Santos Calderón, sister of former Vice-President and current US ambassador Francisco Santos 
Calderón and cousin of former President Juan Manuel Santos, is currently the sister-in-law of 
Roberto Pombo, editor-in-chief of El Tiempo. Luz Angela Sarmiento, daughter of Luis Carlos 
Sarmiento, is married to the current ambassador to the United Kingdom, Antonio José Ardila–– 
the son of Carlos Ardila Lülle, whose Organización Ardila Lülle (OAL) also owns the largest 
radio network, RCN, and the television channel with the second-largest audience in the country, 
Canal RCN.12 
 
El Espectador, the oldest newspaper in Colombia, was founded in 1887 by the Colombian 
journalist and politician, Fidel Cano Gutiérrez. Since its inception, the newspaper has been 
defined by its opposition to officialist discourses, marked by the denouncement of powerful 
financial groups and its commitment to highlighting marginalized voices. El Espectador has 
weathered sanctions, censorship, and violent opposition by military dictatorships, democratically 
elected presidents, and Colombian drug cartels. El Espectador has also faced retaliation in the 
form of publicity boycotts by Colombian companies, pressured by financiers under investigation 
for the illegal loans and financial irregularities.13 Journalists and editors at El Espectador have 
faced death threats, kidnapping, and assassination for their criticism of national drug trafficking 
cartels and investigative reporting highlighting human rights violations perpetrated by members 
of the Colombian military, as well as right-wing paramilitary groups such as the AUC (United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), with alleged ties to President Álvaro Uribe Velez.14  
 
Political pressures have had continued financial impacts upon the El Espectador, which, 
compounded by a national economic crisis, contributed to the newspaper’s near financial 
 
12 FECOLPER and Reporters Without Borders, “Media Ownership Monitor Colombia,” accessed May 11, 2020, 
https://colombia.mom-rsf.org/en/media/detail/outlet/el-tiempo/. 
13 Andrés Osorio Guillott, “Las armas del periodismo: el Grupo Grancolombiano,” El Espectador, June 02, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/cultura/las-armas-del-periodismo-el-grupo-grancolombiano-articulo-864013. 
14 Reporters Without Borders, “Colombia - 2003 Annual Report,” accessed May 11, 2020, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071030184409/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6191. 
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collapse in 1997. That year, the founding Cano family lost its position as primary shareholders to 
the Bavaria Industrial Group, owned by the wealthy Santo Domingo Family. Subsequently, the 
Santo Domingo Group replaced all editorial leadership. El Espectador became a key asset to the 
Santo Domingo Group, with majority stake in Bavaria Brewery, with a holding company, 
Valorem S.A., that maintains significant direct and indirect ownership across media and 
communications channels, including Colombia’s largest private television channel, Caracol 
Television, and the main radio network, Blu Radio.15  
 
The acquisition of El Espectador by the most powerful economic group in the country, the Santo 
Domingo Group, affirms the tendency of media concentration under neoliberal economic 
structures. Furthermore, this transition illustrates the political consequences of concentrated 
media ownership in the Colombian context. Indeed, bought under financial distress, the 
newspaper held primarily social and political value. Subsequently, the newspaper’s editorial 
leadership was directed to voice unconditional support to political candidates favorable to the 
Santo Domingo Group. Notably, in 1998, the director of the newspaper was fired after his refusal 
to voice support for a conservative presidential candidate. He was replaced by a close friend of 
the Santo Domingo family.16 The concentration of media ownership not only presents barriers to 
liberty of expression and freedom of information, but also has a direct impact upon the media’s 
construction of events. 
 
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
 
The discourse analysis portion of this study is limited in scope to the period of August 2018 
through November 2019, tracing the development of the discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan 
border and migration from the start of the Duque presidency. During the period that concerns this 
study, the Colombian government suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, worked 
closely with the United States to facilitate the introduction of American humanitarian aid into 
Venezuela, and closed the border with Venezuela––after the Maduro government had done so in 
response to the humanitarian efforts––dramatically altering the lives of border communities. 
Furthermore, this period is marked by the escalation of the Venezuelan Migration Crisis, as 
millions of Venezuelan migrants entered Colombia, which placed further strains upon local 
resources that accentuated tensions between Colombian citizens and the Colombian state. 
 
The period under study presents a concrete moment through which to examine the confluence of 
media and power in Colombia, which this analysis undertakes through an examination of 
representative articles selected after the review of three key themes in the narrative of Colombo-
Venezuelan border relations established in El Espectador and El Tiempo: incursions by 
Venezuelan forces at the border, Venezuelan migration to Colombia, and the humanitarian 
efforts of February 22-23, 2019.  
 
The analytical process began by the determination of the key “semantic blocks,” or themes, 
relevant to the discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan border, identified following an overview 
 
15 Redacción El Tiempo, “Vendido El Espectador,” El Tiempo, November 13, 1997, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-695273. 
16 Javier Dario Restrepo, “El Espectador de Colombia: agonía de un periódico,” Revista Latinoamericana de 
Comunicación CHASQUI, no. 076 (2001), https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/160/16007604.pdf. 
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of both El Tiempo and El Espectador’s coverage. Within each semantic block, a series of 
representative articles were chosen for analysis, to determine their respective discursive patterns 
and structures. When studying each article, I considered actors, spaces, grammatical structures, 
contextual conditions, paratextual conditions, character of headlines and leads17, implications 
and presuppositions18, use of metaphors, lexical expression19, and leading imagery. 
 
The conceptual frame of this study is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a 
multidisciplinary research approach that primarily studies how discursive structures of text and 
talk within a given socio-political context function to “enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or 
challenge relations of power and dominance in society.” CDA is anchored in the notion that 
“power relations are discursive…[that] the link between text and society is mediated [and] 
discourse is a form of social action” within discursive platforms such as conversations and news 
reports. My approach is also informed by CDA’s commitment to performing analyses “in 
solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups.”20 This study seeks to examine the nature and 
implications of the images, narratives, and constructed realities that characterize the Colombian 
press’ representation of the border through the analysis of discourse. This theoretical background 
informed my analysis of numerous articles presented in El Tiempo and El Espectador, all of 
which relate to the diplomatic crises at the Colombo-Venezuelan border from 2008-2019 and 
were compiled during my summer archival research or accessed within the online archives of 
both publications.  
 
At the theoretical level, this study dialogues with theories of nation, power and representation 
that demonstrate how discourse and representation are key to the construction of not only 
“imagined communities” but also the everyday expressions of citizenship by the individuals 
interpellated by those discourses. Althusser’s concepts of ideology and ideological state 
apparatuses, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman’s propaganda model of the mass media, 
Sara Ahmed’s political theories concerning emotions, representation, and the nation, and 
Benedict Anderson’s reflections on the relations between print technology and nationalism, 
among other texts, have offered useful background and guidance.  
 
The framing, emphases, sourcing, and imagery that characterize much of the coverage of the 
Colombo-Venezuelan border region within El Tiempo function to accentuate and legitimate the 
exercise of state violence, construct exclusive notions of national identity, and justify violence 
against “secondary” border residents and Venezuelan citizens. Moreover, the newspaper 
functions under the implicit assumption of an ideal audience that excludes border communities 
and their residents. Nonetheless, within El Tiempo’s coverage, border residents mobilize 
dominant narratives for their own benefit––to articulate material needs and seek political 
recognition. There is a tension between the narratives and forms of representation constructed 
within El Tiempo and those constructed by El Espectador. El Espectador’s coverage of the 
border emphasizes the victimhood of Colombian citizens––specifically, Colombian border 
communities––at the hand of the Colombian state and de-emphasizes conflict at the border. 
 
17 titles, subtitles, picture descriptions, bolded sections 
18 which semantic properties function to legitimate truths 
19 which opinions are given a platform and to what effect 
20 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourses.org, accessed May 12, 2020, 
http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Critical%20Discourse%20Analysis.pdf. 
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During the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela in February of 2019, for 
example, El Espectador’s coverage de-legitimates violent or military solutions to regime change 
in Venezuela, reaffirming its characteristic appeals to national identity rooted in liberal-
democratic ideals, and the coverage also legitimates the perspectives and concerns of Colombian 
border communities, whose perspectives are mobilized to facilitate criticism of the Colombian 
state. 
 
El Tiempo tends to provide a platform for state narratives through limited sourcing practices, 
which depend upon sources from the Colombian state, such as President Duque, ambassadors, 
diplomats, and military officials. Its coverage is also characterized by the repetition of charged 
imagery and the emotionalization of coverage to invoke a conception of national identity rooted 
in military strength, against which the Venezuelan state is characterized as a threat to national 
sovereignty and security. These narratives reflect the newspaper’s alignment with the Colombian 
Right Wing, affirmed by the character of its audience and editorial leadership. Moreover, El 
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates violent or military solutions to regime change in Venezuela and 
emphasizes the economic and military benefits of a strong US-Colombia partnership.  
 
Conversely, El Espectador less consistently reflects state narratives, or at least adheres to more 
diverse sourcing practices, highlighting the perspectives of academics and analysts from national 
and international think-tanks and universities, members of truth commissions, representatives of 
the Lima Group and the European Union, and members of the Colombian political opposition to 
the Colombian government, sources which are cited less frequently in El Tiempo’s construction 
of similar events. El Espectador also covers “Social issues / Labor / Poverty,” including many 
stories about “violence against peasants/social leaders” in its coverage of the border, greater 
coverage of “paramilitary” violence, in addition to guerrilla violence, which has a left-wing 
association; El Espectador more consistently highlights both left and right-wing violence. Its 
coverage includes more instances of violence by the Colombian military and security forces, who 
are presented also as perpetrators of violence, rather than purely defensive forces. Moreover, El 
Espectador constructs an alternative nationalist discourse based upon commitments to 
multicultural inclusion and liberal-democratic ideals. Therefore, the newspaper frames the rise of 
xenophobia by Colombian citizens as a moral crisis, rather than class conflict. Moreover, El 
Espectador’s appeals to a national conception rooted in liberal-democratic ideals are 
demonstrated by the newspaper’s calls for inclusion in its coverage of Venezuelan migration, 
reflected ultimately by the scrutiny of US-Colombia relations and the rejection of violent or 
military solutions to regime change in Venezuela,” characteristic to its coverage.  
 
Chapter 1 analyzes key trends in the representation of military and sovereignty crises at the 
Colombo-Venezuelan border by El Tiempo, during the period of August 2017-2019. The chapter 
highlights the use of imagery to further national hostility, the transformation of vocabulary to 
emphasize conflict, and the functions of paratextual elements such as tweets, videos, and web 
links as spaces through which to affirm nationalistic discourses in El Tiempo. These tendencies 
are then contrasted to El Espectador’s coverage, which reveals the newspaper’s comparatively 
diverse and cautious representation of militarization and sovereignty crises at the border.  
 
The first chapter draws heavily from the psychological variant of CDA developed by Teun A. 
van Dijk in Discourse and Knowledge, marked by his observations of the socio-cognitive 
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processes that underpin the construction of real-world events through language, a domain which 
he characterizes as necessarily influenced by ideologies and power relations. Specifically, 
Chapter 1’s examination of social media commentary––reader’s reactions to imagery that insists 
upon Venezuelan aggression––demonstrates the manner in which the events and communicative 
situations described by newspaper articles demands a level of congruity with readers’ pre-
existing beliefs. In this case, the “common ground” of El Tiempo’s readership is not only 
reproduced by the coverage, but readers understand the discourse put forth insofar as it confirms, 
or activates, their pre-existing assumptions about a specific situation or event––assumptions from 
which leading imagery, headlines, and the editorial line do not strongly diverge.21  
 
Drawing from Althusser’s discussion of interpellation in Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses (1970), Chapter 1 also examines the imposition of leading images to sustain 
narratives of Venezuelan aggression upon El Tiempo’s readership. The chapter demonstrates the 
ways in which these impositions both correspond to the internalized assumptions of Venezuelan 
hostility held by the newspaper’s audience––affirmed early on by the character of the social 
media commentary––and imply the validity of these assumptions through photographic evidence, 
although this “evidence” does not depict the actual events in question, rather it functions to 
sustain dominant narratives of Venezuelan hostility. By conditioning the audience response in 
this way, leading images interpellate individuals as national subjects according to a conception 
of the Colombian nation that neglects the transnational character of border life and redefines the 
border as a site of hostility and the Venezuelan state as permanent threat to Colombian citizens.22 
 
Ahmed’s theories concerning multiculturalism, victimhood, and nationhood in Strange 
Encounters (2000) and The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) have also been influential to this 
study, which examines the construction of ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ victims in the context of 
mounting diplomatic tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, in addition to the Venezuelan 
Migration Crisis.  
 
The transformations of vocabulary to emphasize conflict and the placement of value upon the 
emotions of Colombian and Venezuelan citizens, suffering at the hands of the Venezuelan state–
–to emphasize its illegitimacy––is a tendency observed throughout this study, in both El 
Espectador and El Tiempo’s coverage of border relations and migration. This study’s 
examination of the various configurations and mobilizations of victimhood within each 
newspaper affirms Ahmed’s claim that certain narratives of victimhood have greater value in a 
global market of pain.  
 
Chapter 1, in particular, examines the ways in which the pain of border subjects provides a 
platform upon which Colombian identity may be superimposed; this pain may be appropriated as 
a collective “loss” and mobilized to affirm nationalist discourses.23 In Chapter 3, El Tiempo’s 
centralization of Venezuelan victimhood––over that of Colombian border communities––
functions to a similar effect. 
 
21 Van Dijk, Discourse and Knowledge, 62, 66. 
22 Louis Althusser, On The Reproduction Of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (London;New 
York: Verso, 2014), 174-175. 




Moreover, the proliferation of appeals calling for migrant inclusion, which originate from the 
Colombian state, are echoed by both El Espectador and El Tiempo. The affirmation Venezuelan 
migrants and Colombian border citizens as victims functions––in both newspapers––to appeal to 
divergent conceptions of national identity marked, nevertheless, by the marginalization of other 
groups––notably, the Colombian working class by El Espectador, an issue undertaken in Chapter 
2, and Colombian border citizens by El Tiempo, examined in Chapter 3. In sum, victimhood 
operates to affirm state narratives and displace discussions of economic inequality, which affirms 
Ahmed’s insight that: 
 
[the] commodification of suffering does not mean that all narratives have value or even 
equal value...some forms of suffering more than others will be repeated, as they can more 
easily be appropriated as ‘our loss’. The differentiation between forms of pain and 
suffering in stories that are told, and between those that are told and those that are not, is 
a crucial mechanism for the distribution of power24 
 
This framework informs the examination of repeated images, actors, and stories that 
make up the bulk of the following chapters.  
 
In Chapter 1, the presence of vulnerable Colombians––women and children, members of 
indigenous communities––within leading images and videos functions to construct the would-be 
victims of Venezuelan aggression: isolated, vulnerable Colombians who require the protection of 
the Colombian state. The possible pain of these vulnerable subjects, presumably at the hands of 
the Venezuelan military, may therefore be “viewed” or “imagined” by the reader.25 This pain, 
constructed by the images, represents a transgressive force that allows the border and, in turn, the 
nation to be felt––only when something is felt “against” them. This transgression––against the 
Colombian subject––confirms Colombian subjectivity and nationality as distinct from 
Venezuelan counterpoints.26 Thus, the repetition of certain forms of suffering functions to 
consolidate exclusive notions of national identity.  
 
Moreover, the character of the readership response, observed within El Tiempo, affirms Ahmed’s 
insight that “it is necessary to look towards social landscapes for the origins and production of 
feelings.”27 Throughout El Tiempo’s coverage of actual and alleged violations of national 
sovereignty by Venezuelan forces at the border, the repetition of forms, signs, objects, and 
images works to invest subjects in structures––in this case, the Colombian nation.28 Emotions, 
Ahmed argues, accumulate through such repetition; the “sticking” of signs, such as “hateful,” 
onto others––in this case, the Venezuelan state––depends upon “past histories of association,” 
manifested in the repetition of imagery throughout El Tiempo’s coverage of Colombo-
Venezuelan border relations.29 This repetition represents a “past [history] of contact, unavailable 
in the present, which allows the [situation in the current article] to be apprehended as 
 
24 Ahmed, 32. 
25 Ahmed, 20-21 
26 Ahmed, 26-27 
27 Ahmed, 11 
28 Ahmed, 12 
29 Ahmed, 13 
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fearsome.”30 Thus, the emotional response elicited by the readership is necessarily a “social and 
cultural practice,” rather than simply a “psychological state.”31  
 
Chapter 2 situates the migration crisis in the context of mounting tensions between Colombian 
citizens and their state, reflected by the intersection of the Colombian armed conflict and the 
official articulation of Colombia as a multicultural nation. This discussion provides background 
relevant to the project of nation-building to which the driving narratives that characterize El 
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis contribute. El Espectador’s coverage 
of the Venezuelan migration crisis constructs an alternative nationalist discourse, which appeals 
to a conception of the Colombian nation grounded in a commitment to the concepts of 
multiculturalism and liberal democratic ideals. This appeal functions through the affirmation of 
Colombia as a democratic nation, distinct from its Latin American neighbors, and an emphasis 
upon the economic benefits of migration. Nevertheless, this appeal is burdened ultimately by the 
fundamental tensions inherent to contemporary Colombian society: rising economic inequality 
and the legacy of the Colombian conflict, significant factors behind popular opposition to the 
migrant presence. Thus, the aspirational constructions of the Colombian nation and state within 
El Espectador conflict with the reality of a fragmented nation, in which ongoing state violence 
and political exclusion have engendered distrust between many Colombian citizens and their 
state. While El Espectador invokes a conception of the Colombian nation as democratic and 
inclusive, a portion of the Colombian citizenry is not compelled by this discourse.  
 
El Espectador’s affirmation of Venezuelan migrants as victims occurs also through the 
“sticking” of emotions––suffering, sadness, and fear––unto Venezuelan migrants to Colombia, 
as well as neighboring countries, which functions through the repetition of imagery that 
emphasizes the pain and poverty experienced by migrants at the hands of the Venezuelan state, 
as well as neighboring states and their citizenry. Although the attachment of these signs and 
emotions unto migrants accords also with “past histories of association”––the construction of 
Venezuelan migrants as victims throughout El Espectador’s coverage, which extends beyond the 
period under study––this attachment enters into conflict with the comparative lack of emphasis 
upon Colombian citizens as victims of their own state, in the aftermath of the Colombian conflict 
and the context of economic insecurity aggravated by migration. 
 
Ahmed’s notion that “the stranger appears...as a way of containing that which the nation is not, 
and hence as a way of allowing the nation to be,” reflects the manner in which the coverage of 
Venezuelan migration functions, in part, to construct an alternative nationalist discourse in El 
Espectador’s coverage of migration. The Colombian nation is configured in a narrow fashion; 
communities in Colombia’s exterior provinces and, more broadly, neighboring nations, are also 
cast in a critical light. These reconstructions of the nation in terms of “who or what does not 
belong” forestall inevitable demarcations of assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures, 
whose eligibility within the nation is not presented––initially––as a point of contention.32 Indeed, 
not all migrants are “stuck” with similar signs or emotions; not all “belong” equally. The 
newspaper’s coverage indicates a prioritization of “professional” migrants, a racialized term that 
 
30 Ahmed, 7 
31 Ahmed, 9 
32 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (London;New York: Routledge, 2000), 
99. 
 17 
indicates a preference for migrants of higher social status. This appeals to a conception of 
national identity rooted not only in technocratic proficiency and economic prosperity, but also in 
whiteness. In this way, the subject––the Colombian nation––is constituted, or comes into 
existence through its “encounter” with the other: the arrival of the migrant figure, whose 
“existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered.”33 Nevertheless, 
assimilable migrants include also the most vulnerable Venezuelans: women, children, and the 
elderly––while men willing to enter the labor force are implicated in this group. Certain 
migrants, however, are characterized inevitably as unassimilable: drug dealers and violent 
criminals, who are established nonetheless as a minority group within El Espectador’s coverage.  
 
Chapter 3 centers upon divergent constructions of the humanitarian aid efforts at the border in 
February 2019, within the coverage of both El Tiempo and El Espectador. The chapter situates 
the events of February 2019 in the historical context of mounting tensions between Colombia 
and Venezuela, and the legacy of Plan Colombia, manifested by the growing proximity between 
the Duque administration, the United States, and the Venezuelan Opposition. In their coverage of 
the February 2019 humanitarian efforts, each newspaper reaffirms the commitments to 
conceptions of national identity presented in earlier chapters, for which the chapter registers new 
discursive constructions of victimhood within each newspaper. While El Tiempo affirms the 
benefits of Colombia’s relationship to the United States, invoking a national conception rooted in 
militarism, El Espectador centers the victimhood of Colombian border communities as a result 
of the humanitarian efforts and casts doubts upon the US-Colombia partnership. 
 
In Chapter 3, Ahmed’s thesis is manifested more explicitly: Venezuelan citizens, fleeing their 
state, ask El Tiempo’s viewers to “tune in to El Tiempo’s internet...YouTube channel...Instagram 
and Facebook pages”34 to watch its coverage of the humanitarian concert and relevant events. 
Considering the growing dependence of media platforms upon internet traffic and social media 
platforms, such mobilizations of narratives of victimhood affirm Ahmed’s claim that “collective 
suffering is a core component of the global political economy. There is a market for suffering: 
victimhood is commodified.”35  
 
In these ways, both El Espectador and El Tiempo construct divergent “truths,” with respect to 
similar events. Both newspapers articulate different nationalistic discourses and engage in broad 
criticism of the Venezuelan state; in El Tiempo, the Venezuelan state is presented as an enemy, 
which appeals to a national conception rooted in militarism and legitimates Colombia’s 
alignment with the United States; in El Espectador, criticism of the Venezuelan state functions 
within an appeal to a moralistic, inclusive conception of national identity rooted in commitments 
to multiculturalism and liberal-democratic ideals. However, for each newspaper to sustain its 
respective appeal, it must ultimately engage in exclusive constructions of victimhood; neither 
newspaper resolves these tensions successfully. While El Tiempo highlights the concerns of 
Colombian border communities to legitimate conflict with Venezuela, these communities are 
marginalized in its coverage of humanitarian aid efforts; conversely, while El Espectador 
highlights the concerns of Colombian border citizens, to criticize Colombia’s alignment with the 
 
33 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 7. 
34 “Venezolanos invitan al concierto Venezuela Aid Live,” YouTube video, 03:25, posted by “El Tiempo,” February 
22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdnRinMnT-M. 
35 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 7.  
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United States and denounce militarism, the concerns of Colombian citizens become secondary to 
those of Venezuelan migrants during its coverage of migration. Within both newspapers, the use 
of discursive techniques that function to affirm the victimhood of different actors––Venezuelan 
citizens, the Colombian state, Colombian citizens, and border communities on both sides––
facilitates the formulation of appeals coherent with the ideological affinities and conceptions of 
national identity held by their respective audiences. These observations affirm not only the 
consequences of market pressures upon the media under neoliberal economic structures, but also 








































CHAPTER 1: EL TIEMPO AND THE COLOMBIAN STATE AS A PROTECTOR 
 
This chapter analyzes key trends in the representation of military and sovereignty crises at the 
Colombo-Venezuelan border by El Tiempo. First, a review of the significant historical 
antecedents to the ongoing border crisis situates the analysis of articles within the chosen time 
frame. Subsequently, the analyses of a series of key articles demonstrate the use of imagery to 
further national hostility, the transformation of vocabulary to emphasize conflict, and the 
functions of paratextual elements such as tweets, videos, and web links as spaces through which 
to affirm nationalistic discourses in El Tiempo. These tendencies are then contrasted with an 
overview of the coverage regarding alleged incursions at the border from El Espectador, to 
highlight its comparatively diverse and cautious representation concerning issues of 
militarization and sovereignty at the border. 
 
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and United States President Bill Clinton signed a 
strategic military and economic agreement, Plan Colombia, to combat Colombian drug cartels 
and left-wing insurgent groups. The agreement presents a key historical antecedent to the 
contemporary construction and characterization of the US-Colombia relationship, observed in 
the media coverage. Initially, the US government sought to support Plan Colombia in order to 
facilitate the training of military and paramilitary organizations, primarily to combat the FARC 
organization and end the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics.36 While 
Colombia has sought to strengthen its relationship with the United States, in the aftermath of 
Plan Colombia––under the pretext of fighting drug cartels and left-wing guerillas––this 
relationship has compromised its relationship to neighboring countries. Indeed, in 2008, 
President Álvaro Uribe sanctioned the presence of US troops on Colombian soil––to combat 
terrorism and narcotrafficking activities. This functioned to aggravate hostilities and anxieties 
over sovereignty between Ecuador and Venezuela, as the arrival of US troops took place after 
Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador to assassinate Raul Reyes, the leader of the FARC.37  
 
The Colombian military’s incursion into Ecuador and assassination of Raúl Reyes, the FARC’s 
second-in-command, inaugurated many of the themes and discourses that characterize El 
Tiempo’s current representation of Colombo-Venezuelan relations, through the lens of the border 
region: Venezuela as an “offensive” actor, the connections between the Venezuelan state and the 
FARC, and the introduction of Venezuelan militarization as a discursive theme. The 2008 crisis 
was also marked by the proliferation of sensational headlines, implying the possibility of 
conflict, and discursive structures that legitimated the narratives of the Colombian state. These 
remain characteristic to the current discursive constructions of border issues within El Tiempo. 
Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador escalated military tensions with Venezuela, led by Hugo 
Chávez, who sought to defend against similar actions at the Colombo-Venezuelan border. The 
crisis introduced the connection between the FARC and the Chávez regime, which persists in the 
national press coverage today and functions to justify Colombian militarization and de-legitimize 
the Venezuelan state.  
 
36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security 
Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008. 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf. 
37 Morales, Mario and Maryluz Vallejo, Las bases de la discordia: el acuerdo militar de Colombia con Estados 
Unidos en la prensa nacional (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2011), 11. 
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In the aftermath of this moment of tension, a local media observatory study, Las bases de la 
discordia: el acuerdo militar de Colombia con Estados Unidos en la prensa nacional, noted that 
the character of the media coverage in El Tiempo, El Espectador, and Semana centralized Bogotá 
as the informative epicenter of news articles and privileged official sources such as presidents, 
ministers, media platforms and experts, and official communications (over civilian actors, 
NGOs, and labor unions). The study found that 83% of the narration within articles originated 
from the Colombian state (in contrast to 63% distributed between the governments of Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and the US). Consequently, 50% of all articles presented the Colombian state 
as a protagonist, while 39% of all articles aligned with neighboring countries; in turn, the latter 
were framed primarily as the antagonists of the narrated events.38 
 
These tendencies appear consistent with the media coverage today, specifically in relation to the 
discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan border, wherein the Colombian press coverage has been 
essential to the shaping and public perception of border relations. Since the advent of Chavismo, 
in particular, the Colombian media has exaggerated diplomatic tensions at the border, which 
functions to legitimate state policies of exclusion, militarization, and violence.39 Contemporary 
media scholarship insists that the national press has had a decisive role in Colombia's foreign 
policy, reflecting the impact of media ownership that has become concentrated in the hands of 
elite families, national conglomerates, and dominant political parties.40  
 
In addition to the 2008 Andean Diplomatic Crisis, the 2015 Venezuela-Colombia Migrant Crisis 
presents another key example of the interplay between state and elite interests, media coverage, 
and the everyday predicaments of border communities. In 2015, due to the killing of three 
Venezuelan soldiers in the border region, the Venezuelan government closed sections of the 
border and deported thousands of Colombians. These actions became the focus of the Colombian 
national press, in which the transnational character of border life was negated through an 
emphasis on two communities, not one. El Tiempo’s coverage legitimized Colombian 
militarization and echoed hawkish rhetoric, predominantly from the Colombian interior.  
  
The 2008 and 2015 cases both present important antecedents to the ongoing crises at the border 
and the phenomenon of Venezuelan migration to Colombia, which have gained international 
attention since the February 2019 attempt to introduce US humanitarian aid to Venezuela 
through the Colombian and Brazilian border, leading to the subsequent closure of the border and 
suspension of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela. 
 
On July 22, 2010, Venezuela froze diplomatic ties with Colombia following President Álvaro 
Uribe’s accusation before the Organization of American States that Venezuela was harboring 
leftist guerillas across the Colombian border––an accusation that compounded outstanding 
tensions over President Uribe’s decision to grant the United States access to seven Colombian 
military bases under the pretext of countering terrorism and narco-trafficking. Following the 
 
38 Mario Morales and Maryluz Vallejo, 32. 
39 Carlos Manuel Jiménez Aguilar, “La frontera Colombo-venezolana: una sola region en una encrucijada entre dos 
estados,” Reflexión Política 10, no. 20 (2008): 258-272. 
40 Julie Billorou, “La inclusión de la diplomacia en la palestra mediática: el caso colombo 
venezolano,” Desafíos 12, no. 20 (2005): 283-325. 
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inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos, however, the fractured relationship between 
Colombia and Venezuela was temporarily resolved, as President Santos and President Hugo 
Chavez renewed diplomatic relations.41 
 
By President Santos’ second term, however, Colombo-Venezuelan relations deteriorated further 
when Chávez’s successor, President Nicolas Maduro, provoked Colombia by heightening 
militarization at the border and violated Colombian national sovereignty through numerous 
incursions by the Venezuelan military into Colombian territory. Nevertheless, President Santos’ 
response was––by contrast to President Uribe––restrained, defined by a focus on dialogue and 
peaceful negotiations. In March of 2017, when a group of 60 Venezuelan soldiers set up camp on 
the Colombian side of the border––according to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
due to the altered course of [the] Arauca River shifting the physical location of the border––
President Santos urged a diplomatic resolution, a position which led President Maduro to order 
the troops’ prompt return to Venezuela and their payment of reparations to Colombians affected 
by the incident.42 Even in the aftermath of this incident, and considering the increasingly 
aggressive, authoritarian character of the Venezuelan regime, President Santos affirmed that “the 
possibility of a military intervention shouldn't even be considered" to affect regime change in 
Venezuela, stating that "America is a continent of peace. It is the land of peace."43 Thus, the 
inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos, initiated a temporary détente in the mounting 
hostility that defined relations between Colombia and Venezuela under President Uribe––
renewed subsequently under Santos’ successor, President Iván Duque.  
 
Colombo-Venezuelan relations shifted dramatically during the Duque presidency; his close ties 
to ex-President Uribe were reflected in the renewal of a confrontational attitude towards the 
Venezuelan state. On the topic of Venezuelan regime change, President Duque’s ambassador to 
the United States, Francisco “Pacho” Santos stated in 2018, “there is talk of unilateral military 
operations...all options should be considered.”44 In February 2019, President Duque met with 
President Trump in Washington, where President Duque did not protest against Trump's 
statement that “all options,” even a military intervention, were “on the table” to facilitate regime-
change in Venezuela.45 Rather, during his Washington visit, President Duque stated, “it is our 
moral duty to end the dictatorship in Venezuela,” and he declined to comment on––or reject––
US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s note suggesting that 5000 American troops might 
 
41 “Venezuela Resumes Relations It Severed with Colombia,” Latin American Herald Tribune, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=362587&CategoryId=10717. 
42 Nick Miroff, “Venezuelan troops invaded Colombia this week. But just a little bit.,” Washington Post, March 24, 
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/24/venezuelan-troops-invaded-colombia-
this-week-but-just-a-little-bit/. 




44 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “‘Todas las opciones deber ser consideradas en crisis venezolana’,” El Tiempo, September 
18, 2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/francisco-santos-habla-sobre-opcion-militar-para-venezuela-
270052 
45 United States, White House Office, Remarks by President Trump and President Duque of Colombia Before 
Bilateral Meeting (Washington, DC: GPO, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-president-duque-colombia-bilateral-meeting/. 
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be deployed in Colombia against Venezuela.46 Further, President Duque consistently paired his 
commitment to a diplomatic blockade against Venezuela with calls for the Venezuelan military 
to “turn”––that is, to carry out a military coup––against the Maduro government, “for the 
liberation of the Venezuelan people.”47 
 
This foreign policy shift frames the coverage of Colombo-Venezuelan border relations during the 
period of interest for this study, in which the representation of the border in the Colombian 
national press––particularly El Tiempo––became newly politicized to serve the interests of the 
Colombian right-wing. The interpersonal links between political leadership and El Tiempo––
notably, Francisco Santos Calderon’s wife, Adriana María Santos Calderón’s relationship to 
Roberto Pombo, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief––help to contextualize the alignment between 
state narratives and the editorial line observed within the coverage of the Colombo-Venezuelan 
border put forth by El Tiempo. These family relationships are significant; El Tiempo’s coverage, 
which sensationalizes conflict at the border, not only constructs a nationalist discourse in which 
Colombia and Venezuela are presented as two distinct––and opposed––communities, but also it 
serves the interests and foreign policy goals of political leadership, particularly the strengthening 
of bilateral relations with the United States, which depends in part upon the perpetuation of 
conflict with the Venezuelan state. 
 
The Construction of an Enemy: Venezuela in El Tiempo’s Coverage of the Border 
 
The following articles in El Tiempo, concerning actual and alleged Venezuelan incursions into 
Colombia during the period of August 2017-2019, reflect the various ways in which the 
newspaper constructs and works to sustain the narrative that Colombia’s sovereignty is at risk as 
a consequence of aggression by the Venezuelan state, examples of which are highlighted in its 
coverage of the border. These narratives constructed––and sustained––through a dependence 
upon sources from within the Colombian state, a tendency which facilitates an empathetic 
representation of the state and its priorities. In particular, Colombian militarization is cast in a 
favorable light, legitimated by Venezuelan aggression. Furthermore, the inclusion of border 
communities as sources functions to imbue the coverage with the perception of events through 
dramatic and emotional representations, which often highlight the Venezuelan state as a hostile 
actor. Yet, border subjects also mobilize dominant state narratives regarding Venezuela for their 
own material and political goals; they are not passive recipients of discourse, but rather 
discursive actors.  
 
In El Tiempo, the Colombian military is more often presented as a “defensive” actor, while 
military escalation by the Venezuelan state is depicted as evidence of “aggression.” Within El 
Tiempo’s representation of border relations with Venezuela, the systematic repetition of similar 
events––possible invasions, clashes with Colombian civilians, military escalation––conditions 
 
46 “Duque aboga por el cerco diplomático a Venezuela,” YouTube video, 01:43, posted by “Voice of America,” 
February 14, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRBWgXzgtSY. 
47  “Duque no descarta acoger tropas de EE.UU. ante crisis venezolana,” YouTube video, 15:56, posted by “Voice of 





and legitimates “generic” knowledge of Venezuela, which functions as a foundation for readers 
to understand the discourse of Colombo-Venezuelan relations at the border.48 This process of 
conditionalization is accomplished, in particular, through a dependence upon sources from 
within the Colombian state to construct articles that pertain to the Colombo-Venezuelan border: 
ministers, state functionaries, officials, army personnel, and the President––not to mention 
official state communications, press-releases, and direct quotes, which occupy the 
disproportionate space within El Tiempo’s coverage. 
 
Image Repetition and the Construction of National Difference 
 
The repeated utilization of photographs that depict the Venezuelan state as an aggressive actor 
appeals to the reader's memories of past instances of Venezuelan hostility. Leading images of 
this kind, and their accompanying headlines, are accompanied by narratives that do not always 
reflect the content of actual articles; such images assert “facts” that may not be true.49 
Specifically, the narratives of Venezuelan aggression that they sustain overpower the actual 
content of the articles under study. Consequently, El Tiempo’s coverage facilitates the 
construction of national differences and justifications for hostility between Colombia and 
Venezuela. Furthermore, its broad focus upon violence produces effects of feeling that 
accentuate and justify the exercise of violence by the Colombian state, which gets considered 
legitimate. Within El Tiempo’s coverage, other kinds of violence are also justified, such as the 
marginalization and making-secondary of border residents or Venezuelan citizens; exclusive 
conceptions of national identity are constructed. 
 
The article, Governor denounces incursion of Venezuelan guard in Colombia50 (26 August, 
2017), introduces a photograph that later becomes central to El Tiempo’s coverage of military 
escalation and issues of sovereignty at the border. The photograph becomes the leading image 
not only for the subsequent articles under analysis in this chapter but also for numerous articles 
in El Tiempo’s coverage of binational tensions at the border. This frequent repetition functions to 
constantly re-appeal to past incidents of Venezuelan aggression throughout the border coverage; 
the constant imposition of such imagery allows readers to “attach” new, even unrelated articles 
and events to the dominant narrative of Venezuela as a national enemy.  
 
 
48 Van Dijk, Discourse and Knowledge, 473 
49 Ibid. 







The photograph included above depicts two members of the Venezuelan military, armed and 
presumably facing towards Colombia. Their positionality confirms the narrative set up by the 
article’s headline and leading image: that Venezuela is incurring upon or violating Colombian 
sovereignty––or at least is prepared to do so. However, the main source cited by the article––a 
local governor––fails to sustain the narrative imposed by the leading image; the article excludes 
direct evidence of the Venezuelan “incursion” alleged by the title. Furthermore, the article then 
shifts course and begins to recount a wholly unrelated event: a skirmish between a right-wing 
paramilitary group, Los Rastrojos, and the Venezuelan military that took place in Venezuelan 
territory: effectively, a Colombian incursion into Venezuela. In this manner, leading images and 
headlines function to sustain narratives that do not always reflect the content of actual articles––
to “assert ‘facts’ that may not be true.”51 
 
Indeed, an observation of the article’s social media comments demonstrates that readers 
respond not to the actual content of the article, but rather to the narrative of Venezuelan 
aggression imposed by the leading image. The article links to the governor’s tweet regarding the 
alleged incursion by Venezuelan forces, and the most popular comment states “the governor 
[does nothing], takes no action against those venecos who come fuck over here,” followed by a 
critique of local (border) government’s failure to respond to the alleged incursion––reflecting the 
internalization of Venezuelan hostility set up by the leading photograph. Furthermore, the critical 
use of venecos––referring to the inhabitants of the Colombo-Venezuelan border––construes the 
transnational identity characteristic of border communities as a threat. Subsequent comments 
continue this trend: “Let’s see if we can kill some [Venezuelan soldiers]...and see what the fuck 
MADURO would say,” followed by “The Colombian army, which supposedly protects our 
sovereignty, is where?” and “it does not surprise me, those armed monkeys.” Such comments 
criticize the absence of an armed response by the Colombian government and racialize national 
difference between the Venezuelan and Colombian people. 
 
51 Van Dijk, Discourse and Knowledge, 473. 
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The decision to repeat the image above––an expanded version of the photo that appeared 
originally in the 2017 article––may not necessarily be a conscious editorial choice; nevertheless, 
its implications delimit the possible understandings that readers may have, before any factual 
confirmation of the facts specific to the case in question are presented. The repetition of this 
photograph suggests––again––that, irrespective of the facts to the contrary that emerge, this 
incident presents another violation of Colombian sovereignty by the Venezuelan military––
although the current articles present allegations to that effect which are never confirmed.  
 
Figure 1.3  




Venezuelan incursion in Colombian territory, denounced53 (01 December, 2017) 
 
 
52 Efe, “Gobernador Denuncia Incursión De Guardia Venezolana En Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 26, 2017, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/gobernador-denuncia-que-guardia-venezolana-estuvo-en-
colombia-124114. 
53 Justicia and Bucaramanga, “Denuncian nueva incursión venezolana en territorio colombiano,” El Tiempo, 









Venezuelan Military would have stripped elderly in Colombia55 (23 August, 2018) 
Figure 1.7 
Ministry confirms new incursion of Venezuelan troops in Colombia56 (07 November, 2018) 
Figure 1.8 
Ministry confirms Venezuelan military incursion in Cúcuta57 (May 08, 2019)
 
Figure 1.9 
Incursion by Venezuelan soldiers in outskirts of Cúcuta, denounced58 (8 May, 2019) 
 
54 Justicia, “Denuncian en Arauca nueva incursión de la Guardia venezolana,” El Tiempo, December 01, 2017, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/se-investiga-nueva-incursion-de-la-guardia-venezolana-en-la-
frontera-157490. 
55 Bucaramanga, “Militares venezolanos habrían desnudado a ancianos en Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 23, 2018, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/denuncian-incursion-de-guardias-venezolanos-en-territorio-
colombiano-258442. 
56 Política, “Cancillería confirmó nueva incursión de tropas venezolanas en Colombia,” El Tiempo, November 07, 
2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/cancilleria-confirmo-nueva-incursion-de-tropas-venezolanas-en-
colombia-290742. 
57 Cúcuta, “Cancillería confirmó incursión militar de Venezuela en Cúcuta,” El Tiempo, May 08, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/confirman-incursion-militar-de-venezuela-en-cucuta-358790. 










Crash between Colombians and Venezuelan guards in a river60 (25 June, 2019) 
Figure 1.12 
Alleged incursion by Venezuelan guard in Cúcuta investigated61 (03 August, 2019) 
Peripheral Citizens and the Nation 
 
On June 23rd, 2019, a group of Colombians traveling from Cocui, Brazil, on the Rio Negro river, 
intercepted a boat carrying members of the Venezuelan military. Significantly, this encounter 
took place in the Lower Guainía and Rio Negro region, the autonomous territory of the 
Kurripako indigenous people, situated between Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Members of 
the Colombian crew denounced the presence of the Venezuelan boat, yelling “you’re in 
Colombia!” and ramming into the Venezuelan boat. Later, the Colombian crew made the 
 
59 Eltiempo.com, “Armada advierte posible incursión de Guardia venezolana en Guainía,” El Tiempo, June 25, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/armada-advierte-posible-incursion-de-guardia-venezolana-en-
guainia-380182. 
60 Eltiempo.com, “Video: El choque entre colombianos y guardias venezolanos en un río,” El Tiempo, June 26, 
2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/habitantes-de-frontera-denuncian-intimidacion-de-
militares-venezolanos-380774. 
61 Cúcuta, “Investigan presunta incursión de guardia venezolana en Cúcuta,” El Tiempo, August 03, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/investigan-presunta-incursion-de-venezuela-en-cucuta-396828. 
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accusation that the Venezuelan “soldiers shot into the air and sought to forcibly detain them.” In 
the aftermath of this incident, El Tiempo published two articles: Navy warns of possible 
incursion by the Venezuelan guard in Guanía (25 June, 2019) and Crash between Colombians 
and Venezuelan guards in a river (26 June, 2019). These articles affirm the ways in which the 
dominant representations of the Venezuelan state by El Tiempo not only function to legitimate 
the priorities and foreign policy goals of the Colombian state, but also function as a discursive 
platform for peripheral border-citizens to negotiate their own material and political interests. 
Moreover, just as Colombian media consumers are more than passive receptors of the ideology, 
or particular worldviews and assumptions legitimated through repetition, framing, and sourcing 
by newspapers like El Tiempo, so too are border subjects conscious, agentive participants who 
recognize the dominant narratives regarding Colombo-Venezuelan relations, which they in turn 
assimilate into their own articulations of demands. Peripheral citizens at the border recognize and 
appeal to nationalist discourses regarding Venezuela to mediate their relationship to the 
Colombian State and facilitate local priorities of material extraction, territorial integration, 
security, and development. These concerns are presented through the frame of Colombo-
Venezuelan relations, a discourse which provides the platform for local subjects to formulate 
appeals to the Colombian state and nation. These observations affirm that discourses in the press 
are no longer only constructed by journalists; rather, the press also becomes the recipient of 
discourses––from the State and popular opinion––set by others.  
 
The original article recounting the altercation between the Colombian crew members and the 
Venezuelan military boat, Navy warns of possible incursion by the Venezuelan Guard in 





Here, the image functions to a similar effect, affirming the idea of violated sovereignty––even 
though the article subtitle, “The incident would have taken place this Sunday,” suggests that the 
allegation of Venezuelan hostility affirmed by the leading image is, in this case, still under 
investigation.  
 
The article cites a source from the Colombian Navy who paraphrases the crew members’ claim 
that the “National Bolivarian Guard, carrying weapons...intimidated them with shots in the air, 
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forcing them to stop.” As such, the article depends upon these subjects' perception of the events 
in question––yet, without factual confirmation of their claims. The article also includes a tweet 
by Javier Zapata, governor of Guainía, in which he states having “solicited the presence of 
military forces at the [border] from president Iván Duque.” The combination of the leading 
image and this paratextual link sustains the narrative of a hostile the Venezuelan state, which 
legitimates militarization at the border by the Colombian state and heightens perceptions of 
national difference between Colombia and Venezuela: “the [Colombian] crew...made [the 
Venezuelans] respect national territory,” states the Navy source. 
 
Ongoing coverage, such as Crash Between Colombians and Venezuelan guards in a river (26 
June, 2019), reaffirms how El Tiempo’s discursive construction depends upon the perceptions of 
events by people in contentious border zones, to a similar effect. The video included in this 
article, titled Intimidation of the Bolivarian Guard against Colombian citizens62 (26 June, 
2019), begins from the point of view of the Colombian crew, taken on a cellphone as they motor 
towards a small boat carrying Venezuelan soldiers. The first text of the video states, “the 
(Colombian) Navy ratified a new incursion of the National Bolivarian Army into Colombian 
territory. The event presented itself in the sector of La Guadalupe, Guainía.” Here, the use of 
“new” implies that there have been “old” incursions; this functions to imply persistent violations 
of Colombian sovereignty by the Venezuelan state.  
 
Subsequently, the video introduces a member of the Colombian crew, an inhabitant of the Rio 
Negro region, titled a “Colombian citizen,” to comment on the situation. The crew member 
himself appears to be of indigenous heritage. Indigenous paintings and paraphernalia occupy the 
background of the frame; the peripheral citizen is Colombian first and indigenous second.  
 
The statements included by the crew member reveal how the discourse of Venezuelan-
Colombian relations provides a broader platform for border residents to appeal to the Colombian 
state and military to increase its regional presence and control; local residents mobilize these 
narratives to acquire material assistance and political recognition. Thus, the man states, 
 
“I want to make a call to the Ministry, to the Ministry of Defense...We have a [defensive] 
presence in this area [a] public force in the border area but...each time these controversies 
happen between the centers of power we the citizens who live in the border region, 
especially those who are in the river communities, like our indigenous communities and 
local villages, also non-indigenous communities [are affected]...we call for attention and 
support...to find a solution because this is worsening...in the regional assembly we have 
even had multiple reunions...and we don’t see the results. Please, before worse things 
happen.”  
 
These statements highlight regional divisions between indigenous and non-indigenous people; he 
appears to associate himself with the latter and casts doubt upon the capability of the local 
assembly when he asks the Colombian government to step in. The secondary inclusion of “non-
indigenous” communities emphasizes that this group is also important, or sometimes sidelined; it 
must also be considered. This characterization of non-indigenous communities appeals to the 
 
62 “Intimidación de Guardia Bolivariana a ciudadanos colombianos,” YouTube video, 1:52, posted by "El Tiempo," 
June 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUoookUwWBg. 
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empathy of El Tiempo’s readership; thus, their approval of Colombian military intervention in 
the region may be framed as in the service of vulnerable border subjects––while understating the 
historical marginalization of indigenous communities by the Colombian State, as indigenous 
people are framed as a dominant group, while non-indigenous people are framed as victims who 
require State support and political recognition.  
 
The Mobilization of Local Sources to Dramatize Conflict 
 
In August 2019, a Colombian miner named Jorge Iván was detained and his excavator was 
impounded by the Venezuelan military near the Colombo-Venezuelan border zone, after having 
been already implicated in a previous investigation regarding illegal mining activity at the 
border, formulated by the district attorney’s office for San Antonio del Táchira, Venezuela, 
across the border from the Colombian town of Cúcuta. After days of detention, Jorge Iván was 
charged with illegal mining in a Venezuelan court and released from detention, with an 
injunction for his appearance in the Venezuelan court every 30 days. Ultimately, the Venezuelan 
court ruled that members of the Venezuelan military had not violated Colombian sovereignty in 
the process of Jorge Iván’s detention. 
 
The following articles, which concern this alleged incursion into Colombian territory by the 
Venezuelan military, exhibit the tendency of El Tiempo’s coverage to cling to the notion of 
Venezuela as an aggressive actor. Again, the repetition of charged imagery functions to appeal to 
reader’s collective memory of past incidents of Venezuelan aggression; the leading imagery for 
the initial article, Alleged incursion by Venezuelan guard in Cucuta is investigated (3 August, 
2019) utilizes the same image as the first article analyzed in this chapter, regarding another 
alleged incursion into Colombian territory, which implies the status of Venezuelan state as a 
danger to Colombian citizens. 
 
In its coverage of the border during the observed period, El Tiempo demonstrates a significant 
interest in the case of Jorge Iván, which is covered in a total of five articles: 1. Alleged incursion 
by Venezuelan guard in Cucuta is investigated (3 August, 2019), 2. The moment when 
Venezuela would have captured a conational in Colombia63 (4 August, 2019), 3. The drama 
lived by the family of Colombian detained in Venezuela64 (5 August, 2019), 4. Uncertainty over 
situation for Colombian detained in Venezuela65 (6 August, 2019), and finally 5. Colombian 
detained in Venezuela liberated66 (8 August, 2019). These articles evidence a mobilization of 
local sources––family members and border citizens proximate to Jorge Iván––to affirm the 
 
63 Cúcuta, “El momento cuando Venezuela habría incursionado en Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 04, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/venezuela-habria-capturado-a-un-connacional-en-colombia-
397092. 
64 Cúcuta, “El drama que vive la familia de colombiano retenido en Venezuela,” El Tiempo, August 05, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/colombiano-es-retenido-en-venezuela-tras-violacion-de-
soberania-397134. 
65 Cúcuta, “Incertidumbre por situación del colombiano retenido en Venezuela,” El Tiempo, August 06, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/audiencia-de-jorge-cetina-colombiano-retenido-en-venezuela-
397914. 




implications of Venezuelan aggression established by the leading article in the series. Moreover, 
the citation of these local sources––a prioritization of the language they use to describe the 
situation, particularly from family members––functions to dramatize and emphasize the 
perception of Venezuelan hostility, contrary to the facts that emerge. 
 
Through these articles, the transformation of vocabulary to emphasize conflict––the action shifts 
from detain to capture to kidnap, the final turn dependent upon a family source close to the 
individual––sustains the dominant narrative of Venezuelan aggression affirmed throughout El 
Tiempo’s broader coverage. Article 1 paraphrases local community members, “neighbors [who 
assure] that a group of ten [members of the Venezuelan military] would have crossed the 
dividing line” to decommission an excavator and capture its Colombian driver––implying that 
the Venezuelan military did, in fact, violate Colombian national sovereignty, a claim that has not 
otherwise been confirmed (emphasis added). Furthermore, while the first article describes the 
Colombian driver’s “apprehension” and “detention” by the Venezuelan authorities, the third 
article includes language from the driver’s family members––who claim that, “[Jorge Iván] was 
kidnapped by those military members always pointing their weapons at him.” The bolding of 
this section further dramatizes the situation and highlights a claim based on emotions, without 
factual confirmation, and contrary to the implications of earlier descriptions of the same actions. 
Thus, the citation of local sources close to the miner shifts the description of the action taken by 
the Venezuelan military from detention––which implies the possibility of wrongdoing on the 
miner’s part––to kidnapping. 
 
Yet, while the Article 3 leads in this way, with emotionally charged allegations of violent 
kidnapping and a possible “new military incursion staged by Venezuela”––it ends by 
clarifying that the miner had been cited by Venezuela for “illegal mining activity” and that “the 
Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations continues...to corroborate whether or not 
[Venezuela] violated national sovereignty”; the article clings to the dominant narrative of 
Venezuelan hostility. Article 4 recounts the detention of Jorge Iván in a Venezuelan court, yet 
excludes the fact––noted in Article 3––that he has been cited for illegal mining activity; rather, 
the article only includes language from Jorge Iván’s legal defense, alluding to “image and video” 
proof that the Venezuelan military “committed an irregularity”––although the content of this 
evidence is never detailed––while quoting Jorge Iván’s brother, who claims “we are 
awaiting...all information and documentation necessary to corroborate that he [was on the 
Colombian side] and did not commit any crime.” Similarly, Article 5 reiterates the existence of 
“photos and mediums [that] prove [the] incident occurred in [Colombian territory]”––when in 
fact the outcome of the earlier court decision had established this was not the case; yet, the 
allusion to this unspecified evidence, in conjunction with the title––Colombian detained in 
Venezuela liberated––functions to imply that Jorge Iván’s detention and the seizure of his 
excavator were still, somehow unwarranted––that the Venezuelan military did, in fact, violate 
Colombian sovereignty.  
 
Diverse Sourcing and De-escalation in El Espectador: 
 
Within El Tiempo’s “Venezuelan Border” section, nearly half––five out of eleven articles, during 
the first two weeks of August 2019––report on the apprehension of Jorge Iván by the Venezuelan 
military for illegal mining activity. Conversely, El Espectador does not insist upon, nor 
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sensationalize, the Jorge Iván incident. El Espectador only publishes two articles regarding the 
incident: Army and Ministry investigate alleged incursion by the Venezuelan guard to North 
Santander67 (3 August, 2019) and Ministry calls for the liberation of Colombian captured by 
Venezuelan military at the border68 (4 August, 2019). Moreover, El Espectador’s coverage is 
comparably diverse during the same timeframe, with articles devoted to the disappearance of 
civilians at the hands of guerilla and paramilitary forces, the hunger faced by Venezuelan 
migrants at the border, the internal state of Venezuela, and multiple pieces reporting on US 
sanctions against Venezuela.   
 
El Espectador’s commitment to diverse sourcing practices challenges the construction of a 
binary between Colombia and Venezuela as two distinct national identities and peoples––
countering the nationalist discourse sustained by El Tiempo’s coverage. Furthermore, El 
Espectador’s coverage of Venezuelan militarization at the border does not utilize imagery 
repetition to sustain a discourse that highlights Venezuelan aggression. The newspaper constructs 
similar events in a less sensationalistic manner; its coverage does not depend upon local sources 
in a manner that highlights the emotional perception of events.  
 
Thus, the leading image for Article 1 depicts unarmed Colombian and Venezuelan border 
guards; this functions to suggest that violent incursions are more accidental than intentional. 
Furthermore, both articles emphasize the “confusing” character of the situation; they do not 
attribute blame to one party or another. Both articles even go so far as to construct the subject of 
culpability as the situation itself: “a confusing situation that left an excavator immobilized and its 
operator detained” (emphasis added). All the while, both articles clarify that the incident took 
place in a “neutral” space––not necessarily within Colombian territory, as the El Tiempo 





67 Efe, “Ejército y Cancillería investigan presunta incursión de la guardia venezolana a Norte de Santander,” El 
Espectador, August 03, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/ejercito-y-cancilleria-investigan-
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Articles in El Espectador also more consistently and explicitly denounce calls for the Colombian 
state to respond with violence against Venezuela’s provocations at the border. This is 
accomplished, in particular, through the citation of Colombian Opposition party members and 
official representatives from border communities as sources. 
 
Diverse sourcing practiced by El Espectador resists the essentialization of Colombia and 
Venezuela as two distinct and mutually hostile nations. Rather, by comparison to El Tiempo, the 
coverage in El Espectador affirms the transnational character of border communities, for whom 
an armed conflict between Colombia and Venezuela would have the most negative impact. Thus, 
El Espectador publishes an interview with the Governor of the State of Arauca, in which he 
denounces ex-president Uribe’s call to invade Venezuelan territory to capture guerilla members, 
emphasizing the transnational character of border communities: “Us Araucans share last names, 
families. Many of us have our brothers, cousins and other family members on the other side of 
the border.”  
 
The article, Incursion in Venezuela: risks and implications69 (13 September, 2019), reflects 
these discursive themes, observed through El Espectador’s coverage concerning crises of 
sovereignty and militarization at the border from August 2018-November 2019. The article 
explicitly denounces the declarations of ex-president and current senator Álvaro Uribe––which 
do not appear in the El Tiempo coverage of the same timeframe––and senator Paloma Valencia 
of the Centro Democrático party suggesting that the Colombian military should enter Venezuelan 
territory to capture the leadership of the FARC dissidence. Notably, the article cites members of 
opposition parties who critique the Duque government’s response to Venezuela’s provocations. 
Senator Luis Fernando Velasco of the Liberal Party argues that “Colombia cannot lend itself to a 
global geopolitical game...for economic reasons by ‘oil investors’ who long for Venezuela...we 
cannot offer Colombian blood so that others can do business,” and Senator Roy Barreras of the 
Social Party of National Unity affirms that a confrontation with Venezuela would “remake 
Colombia into a theater of war, in which the people will die.” Similarly, Antonio Sanguino of the 
Green Alliance denounces an armed conflict while senator Rodrigo Lara of the Radical Change 
Party concurs that “it is irresponsible to propose military actions against another country.” Later, 
Barreras cautions against President Duque heeding Uribe’s calls for aggression, noting the 
importance of “diplomacy and multilateralism, over weapons.” Further, the article cites a 
political scientist who affirms that for the Colombian government to play into Maduro’s 
provocations would only function to legitimate Venezuelan state’s criticism of the United States’ 
role in Latin America––implying that a confrontation between Venezuela and Colombia would 
necessarily involve the United States on Colombia’s behalf. Another political scientist states, 
“what Uribe is really looking for is to gauge the reaction of public opinion.” The coverage in El 
Espectador with respect to militarization at the border during this period is also balanced by the 
prominent inclusion of sources from the Venezuelan state who assert their actions as defensive––
as warranted by Colombian aggression and attempts to infiltrate the Venezuelan military and 
intelligence forces. President Maduro is quoted insisting that “Colombia conspires to [attack 
Venezuela’s] public services [and] civil and military objectives...that in the last three months 42 
 
69 Redacción Política, “Incursión en Venezuela: riesgos e implicaciones,” El Espectador, September 13, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/incursion-en-venezuela-riesgos-e-implicaciones-articulo-880786. 
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actions ‘to attack Venezuela’ were detected, by Venezuelan civilians and soldiers paid by the 
Colombian government.”70 
 
Similarly, in articles such as Maduro orders military exercises at the border with Colombia (3 
September, 2019), the inclusion of President Maduro’s statement “lamenting the rearmament of 
the FARC…[that] Venezuela has always sought the pacification of the conflict [in] Colombia” 
functions to construct a more ambiguous representation of the relationship between the 
Venezuelan state and guerilla groups at the border. This contrasts with El Tiempo’s coverage, 
which insists upon––or implies––the links between the Venezuelan state and Colombian guerilla 
and narcotrafficking organizations. Moreover, the article includes a link to another article that 
presents the Venezuelan government’s position that “the rearmament of the FARC is Duque’s 
responsibility.”71  
 
The character of El Espectador’s construction of tensions at the border as such reflects the 
newspaper’s broader rejection of Colombian militarism and its affirmation of border 
communities as victims of binational tensions––supported by nationalistic discourses on both 
sides of the border and exacerbated by Colombia’s deepening relationship to the United States, 
issues discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the newspaper’s criticism of Colombian militarism and 
binational confrontation reflects its attachment to a national conception rooted in 
multiculturalism and liberal-democratic ideals. This national conception forms the basis of 
numerous appeals for inclusion––grounded also in economic terms––that characterize the 
newspaper’s coverage of migration, in which Venezuelan migrants are constructed as victims. 




















70 Jorge Mantilla, “El conflicto creciente entre Colombia y Venezuela,” El Espectador, September 30, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-conflicto-creciente-entre-colombia-y-venezuela-articulo-883714. 
71 Redacción Internacional, “Maduro ordena ejercicios militares en frontera con Colombia,” El Espectador, 
September 03, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/maduro-ordena-ejercicios-militares-en-
frontera-con-colombia-articulo-879367. 
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CHAPTER 2: EL ESPECTADOR AND THE INCLUSIVE, DEMOCRATIC NATION 
 
This chapter situates the migration crisis in the context of mounting tensions between Colombian 
citizens and their state, reflected by the intersection of the Colombian armed conflict and the 
official articulation of Colombia as a multicultural nation. This discussion provides background 
relevant to the project of nation-building to which the driving narratives that characterize El 
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis contribute. While El Tiempo’s 
coverage concerning border activity invokes a strong state grounded in military supremacy, El 
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis constructs an alternative nationalist 
discourse, which appeals to a conception of the Colombian nation grounded in a commitment to 
the concepts of multiculturalism and liberal democratic ideals––and burdened by the 
fundamental tensions which these concepts and ideals engender, in practice, in contemporary 
Colombian society.  
 
The Venezuelan migration crisis occurs in the context of a Colombian nation grappling with the 
open wounds of a conflict that left 9 million displaced people and established a relationship of 
distrust between many Colombian citizens and their state. During the Colombian conflict, 
distrust in the Colombian state and its institutions was aggravated by the fact that security forces 
failed to confront paramilitary forces, while the Colombian military and police also committed 
violations of human rights. In 2000, Human Rights Watch detailed links between “half of 
Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units...to paramilitary activity,” which reflect the broad, 
national scope of official collaboration between state and paramilitary forces. While Plan 
Colombia was established by the United States and Colombia to support counterterrorism and 
anti-drug trafficking efforts, US funds were utilized to support the operations of paramilitary 
groups; military units receiving US military aid provided weapons, logistical support, shared 
intelligence, and carried out joint operations with paramilitary groups.72 Many of these joint 
operations targeted innocent civilians, trade unionists, members of the political opposition, 
journalists, and human rights workers, which affirms that US military assistance strengthened 
paramilitary actors and fueled the Colombian conflict.73 These tendencies persist in the aftermath 
of the Colombian conflict. Following the demobilization of the FARC––a goal of the Plan 
Colombia partnership––paramilitary groups, which retain ties to the Colombian military, have 
carried out assassinations of more than 3,000 members of the left-wing UP party, including two 
presidential candidates.74 
 
Under President Álvaro Uribe, the internal armed conflict in Colombia was “systematically 
denied,” perhaps due to the fact that, during his administration, a majority of displaced people 
were fleeing violence by paramilitary groups, which emerged out of the demobilization of the 
right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).75 In 2012, the Colombian 
 
72 "COLOMBIA, The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links," Human Rights Watch, accessed 
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73 Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets and Ballots: the Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political 
Conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (2015): 249-267. 
74 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Murder of hundreds of Colombian activists casts shadow over peace process,” Reuters, 
August 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-feature/murder-of-hundreds-of-colombian-
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75 “Colombia: Victims Law a Historic Opportunity,” Human Rights Watch, accessed May 13, 2020, 
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Prosecutor General reopened an investigation into Uribe’s ties to the AUC, after testimonials by 
former ex-paramilitary leaders indicated that he had been a founding member and key supporter 
of the group, ordering massacres and assassinations during his tenure as president.76, Under the 
presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, millions of displaced Colombians were systematically 
excluded from official land restitution projects; even under more liberal leadership, the 
enforceability of institutions and official constructions of victimhood were shaped demonstrably 
by the economic interests of the powerful political and landowning classes.77  
 
Since the year 2000, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) have not been a priority in the political 
agenda.78 Reparations to victims of paramilitary violence have been slow, and official 
characterizations of displacement have been largely based on “depoliticized conceptions of the 
forced displacement itself.”79 Specifically, no administration thus far has recognized the 
Colombian conflict as a class conflict––precipitated by an uneven distribution of resources and 
power. Moreover, political leaders in Colombia have continued to articulate official 
commitments to multiculturalist policies and rhetoric––in the context of deepening economic 
inequality, widespread violence, and persistent racism.80 
 
By contrast, the Colombian state response to Venezuelan migration has been swift––and deeply 
politicized. In a speech before the United Nations, President Duque described Venezuelan 
migrants as “brothers and sisters” with whom Colombia would always be “united by fraternity”–
–a position that serves to direct public attention towards the political and economic crisis in 
Venezuela and discredit the regime of President Maduro, Duque’s political enemy.81 Moreover, 
the rapid acceleration of Venezuelan migration to Colombia did not elicit an exclusionary 
response by the Colombian state––unlike neighboring governments. Rather, between 2018-2019 
alone, Colombia accepted nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants––amounting to 1.7 million by 
December 2019 and expected to reach 2.4 million by the end of 2020.82, Furthermore, as early as 
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2017, the Colombian government began to offer free healthcare and education to Venezuelan 
migrants; in 2019, the state granted citizenship to all children of Venezuela refugees, a measure 
to last through 2021; in 2020, the state sought to integrate Venezuelans into the formal economy 
by offering work permits to hundreds of thousands of migrants who entered the country before 
November 29, 2019.83  
 
Yet, the rhetoric of fraternity and practices of inclusion by the Colombian state, echoed by El 
Espectador, have not been fully embraced by all Colombians. Throughout the country, the rapid 
pace of migration has deepened pre-existing conflicts over space and resources, leading to 
clashes between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants––met with increased calls for 
inclusion and solidarity by state institutions.84 These tensions contextualize the discourse on 
Venezuelan migration constructed within El Espectador, which supports state rhetoric of 
multicultural inclusion through numerous appeals to reader’s empathy and the invocation of 
economic justifications for the integration of Venezuelan migrants into Colombian society. This 
chapter’s examination of the tensions between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants, 
which surface gradually throughout the coverage in El Espectador, is framed by the 
contradictions between the official response to Venezuelan migration and the reality of 
Colombian citizen’s ongoing contestation for resources and recognition from the Colombian 
state. 
This chapter traces the development of three key moments within El Espectador’s coverage of 
Venezuelan migration, from August 2018-November 2019. In the first moment, the coverage 
affirms state policies of inclusion, invoking a national conception aligned with democratic 
values. Articles express consistent support for state initiatives for migrant inclusion, and a 
negative characterization of the xenophobic responses to Venezuelan migration undertaken by 
states and citizens in neighboring Latin American countries––particularly Brazil, Peru, and 
Ecuador––functions to legitimate the response of the Colombian state, promote inclusion by 
Colombian citizens, and affirm Colombia’s moral superiority. The coverage supports examples 
of cooperation between Colombia and European nations to facilitate Venezuelan migration––a 
dynamic which affirms preexisting national “social, economical, as well as political hierarchies 
that are constructed in relation to whiteness and Europeanness.”85 El Espectador’s coverage 
supports the alignment between Colombia and European nations, as well as organizations such as 
the United Nations. These examples are used to further the narrative of Colombian nationhood 
rooted in democratic values and reject Colombia’s alignment with countries such as the United 
States. 
The moralization of the Colombian state functions through the mobilization of the “good” and 
“innocent” migrant figure, to appeal to readers’ empathy, and the repetition of articles 
highlighting the responses to migration taken by neighboring Latin-American states and their 
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citizens, which are depicted as xenophobic or insufficient; these responses are presented as 
antithetical to the successful, inclusive policies of the Colombian state. Of the 154 articles 
examined, 21.4% highlight xenophobia by citizens in neighboring countries and/or the failed 
policies, or outright antagonism towards migrants by neighboring states. The remaining articles 
support the inclusive response of the Colombian state, depicted as morally superior, and offer 
moral and economic justifications for Colombian citizens to align with this official response. 
Secondly, the coverage denounces isolated cases of xenophobia within Colombia, particularly by 
citizens and fringe political figures. This narrative turn depends upon the citation of state 
officials, who appeal to inclusion and emphasize the victimization of Venezuelan migrants. The 
few cases of xenophobia against Venezuelan migrants within Colombia, which appear in the El 
Espectador’s early coverage, are presented as exceptions; they do not preclude, but rather, 
function to highlight the moral superiority of the Colombian state and its citizens, in contrast to 
neighboring nations, where Venezuelan migration is depicted as having elicited a mass 
xenophobic response from the public and anti-migrant policies at the state level. Sources from 
within the Colombian state also affirm the technocratic proficiency of state institutions––their 
ability to integrate Venezuelans into Colombian society and resolve tensions with Colombian 
citizens during that process. Numerous articles highlight the efficient provision of humanitarian 
aid and the successful facilitation of employment for migrants by the Colombian state. Not only 
do these examples reflect an official commitment to democratic values, coherent with the 
conception of national identity affirmed throughout El Espectador’s coverage, but also they 
invalidate isolated examples of opposition within the country, which lack compelling 
justifications––beyond xenophobia. 
Thirdly, although the coverage continues to assert the notion of an Colombian exceptional 
response––highlighting the work of the Colombian state and its institutions to welcome and 
integrate migrants into Colombia––evidence of growing hostility between Colombian citizens 
and Venezuelan migrants begins to destabilize the prior characterizations of the Colombian state, 
citizen, and society. When the reality of mounting opposition to Colombian citizens against 
Venezuelans is recognized as a significant barrier to migrant inclusion, this begins to fracture the 
ideal of an inclusive Colombian society, to which the coverage has appealed thus far. 
Consequently, the coverage undertakes a renewed emphasis on the economic benefits of 
migration, drawing heavily from sources within the academic and business sectors for 
legitimacy. Thus, El Espectador’s characterization of Venezuelan migration to Colombia 
reflects––and fails to resolve––the tensions which become apparent throughout the migration 
crisis.  
This discursive tension initiates the demarcation of admissible migrants––victims worthy of 
assistance by state institutions, whose generosity affirms the technocratic proficiency, moral 
superiority, and inclusive character of the Colombian state––and inadmissible migrants who, 
particularly from the perspective of citizens and law enforcement personnel, threaten public 
goods, health, and security.  
Yet, these demarcations also fail to resolve the tensions between citizens and the 
aspirational, democratic national identity supported by political and economic elites––who 
continue to assert the economic and moral justifications of inclusion. In turn, a latent narrative 
throughout the coverage––the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state––becomes the dominant 
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justification for migrant inclusion. This argument for inclusion rests upon the condemnation of 
the Venezuelan state––an avowedly Socialist state defined by its opposition to the United States, 
a key Colombian ally. El Espectador’s coverage insists upon the fractured nature of the 
Venezuelan state and economy as a condition––attributed to the project of Chavismo––that will 
outlast the current Venezuelan regime––noting, by contrast, the presence of liberal-democratic 
freedoms and economic prosperity in Colombia.  
In sum, the discourse concerning migration within El Espectador appeals to a conception of 
Colombia as a civilized, democratic nation––even in the face of popular opposition to official 
appeals for inclusion, by citizens who reject the migrant presence. The discourse within El 
Espectador is marked by numerous strategies and techniques that aim to interpellate Colombian 
citizens as “democratic” citizens––to accept and incorporate Venezuelan migrants into the 
Colombian nation––which ultimately fail to resolve the tensions fundamental to the conflict 
between Colombian citizens and migrants––a conflict over resources and recognition from the 
state, not a conflict of identity. El Espectador frames the rise of popular opposition––primarily 
by Colombian citizens––to Venezuelan migrants as a moral crisis, rather than class conflict, as 
immigration engenders and exacerbates pre-existing competition over scarce resources––and 
rights––in the context of political and economic inequality. While the coverage denounces 
xenophobia explicitly, there is no comparable rejection of the economic conditions that may 
underpin the opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens––nor an attribution of 
blame for these conditions, upon the Colombian state. Moreover, El Espectador’s coverage––as 
it constructs an “alternative” nationalist discourse based upon commitments to multicultural 
inclusion and liberal democratic ideals––reflects an unwillingness to face the root of popular 
opposition to Venezuelan migrants: a monopoly over resources and power, which may be 
resolved through a redistribution and restructuring of property relations.  
Worthy Citizens, (Un)Worthy Nations 
 
The technical and policy failures of neighboring states, in their reception of Venezuelan 
migrants, as well as the xenophobic responses of their citizens, are narratives central to El 
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis. These narratives are supported by 
numerous articles that highlight the successful reception of migrants in Colombia, facilitated by 
the underrepresentation of tensions between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants within 
Colombia. 
 
Critiques of regional responses to migration occur frequently, through articles such as 
Xenophobia mounts against migrants in Perú86 (29 September, 2019), which highlight the 
xenophobic response against migrants by citizens in neighboring countries. The article begins,  
 
with messages like ‘out with the venecos’ or ‘Maduro take out your trash,’ a group of 
Peruvians marched [against] ‘foreign delinquency’ and the entry of Venezuelans to the 
country. This adds to a number of grave episodes of xenophobia in Perú (emphasis 
added).  
 





The last sentence implies that such incidents are part of a pattern, and the subsequent 
inclusion of twitter videos depicting xenophobic protests affirms immediately the climate of hate 
described in the opening paragraph: one video shows an endless line of anti-migrant protesters 
marching in the streets of the Peruvian capital, chanting racist epithets and shouting “Maduro, 
take out your trash!” A second video, taken in a Peruvian classroom, shows children being asked 
“what do Venezuelans do?”––to which they respond “they kill, steal!”  
 
The article not only portrays Peruvian citizens as xenophobic, but also suggests that the Peruvian 
state is to blame for creating the conditions behind these popular attacks through shortsighted 
and discriminatory immigration policies. Thus, the article states, “the measures taken by the 
Peruvian government to detain the exodus have not had an effect and in the country attacks 
against [migrants] have surged” (emphasis added). The article also notes the poor policy choices 
of the Peruvian state, which “would be incentivizing [the killing and enslavement of migrants by 
imposing] stricter [visa] requirements for Venezuelans who seek to enter the country,” indicating 
that such requirements may stimulate human trafficking (emphasis added).  
 
Articles such Why do so many Venezuelan migrants lack a passport87 (22 August, 2018) insist 
that the imposition of a visa requirement––by neighboring states––both endangers migrants and 
reflects a technical ignorance of conditions in Venezuela: in a dire economic situation, many 
Venezuelans have had to sell their passports on the black market. Such articles also highlight the 
bureaucratic incompetency of the Venezuelan State: another significant obstacle that migrants 
must overcome. The article insists that even if Venezuelan migrants wanted to acquire official 
migration documents, the Venezuelan state “has made excuses [that] there is no paper to deliver 
[passports].” Furthermore, the article notes that the Venezuelan state has sought to annul the 
passports of government critics, such as Opposition “politicians, journalists, [and] artists.” 
Therefore, the imposition of visa requirements upon Venezuelan migrants by neighboring states–
–in the case of this article, Ecuador and Perú––is not only impractical, but also harms the most 
vulnerable Venezuelans, as well as those most committed to democratic ideals of free expression 
and action. 
 
Similarly, articles such as The dilemma of Roraima with Venezuelan migration88 (29 August, 
2018), legitimate the response of Colombian state and its citizens to Venezuelan migration 
through the negative characterization of the substandard, anti-democratic, and reactionary 
response to migration taken by the Brazilian state and citizenry. Colombia is presented as a more 
welcoming destination, where liberal-democratic freedoms, economic opportunity, and physical 
security may be found. Thus, the first sentence states, “days before the poorest state in Brazil 
would solicit the suspension of migration to avoid overpopulation, fears abound that the 
Venezuelan government will retaliate” (emphasis added). The use of “poorest,” here––following 
the image of suffering migrants in a makeshift shelter of cardboard and plywood––suggests that 
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while migrants flee economic depression and lack of opportunity in Venezuela, Brazil presents 
only similar circumstances. The violence and persecution that Venezuelan migrants are 
understood to flee from is highlighted also as an obstacle present in Brazil: “hundreds of 
Brazilians, singing their national anthem while they expelled thousands of Venezuelan migrants 
from the border town of Pacaraima [evidenced] a crisis in Brazil." In this way, Brazil is 
presented as a setting no less substandard than Venezuela––equally dangerous, too. Moreover, 
while Brazilian citizens are depicted as chauvinistic––oblivious to democratic principles of 
inclusion and equality––the Brazilian state response to immigration is presented as no less 
violent; the Brazilian military “deployed troops to the border to contain the crisis in Roraima.”  
 
The article highlights also the technical incompetence of the Brazilian state, which “lacks the 
funds to attend the migratory crisis.” Furthermore, the article notes also that Roraima, “the 
poorest state in Brazil...depends 100% upon Venezuela” for its energy consumption; 
consequently, the border state is vulnerable to retaliation in the form of energy-stoppages by the 
Venezuelan state. Thus, Brazilian institutions appear no less deficient than their Venezuelan 
counterparts; that Brazilian border communities depend upon Venezuela for public services 
further aligns both countries as substandard.  
 
Similarly, articles such as The good and bad of regional migration89 (30 October, 2018) cast 
doubt upon the ability of neighboring states to integrate and support Venezuelan migrants. The 
leading image depicts migrants in Brazil pleading for food and individuals distributing small 
packages in plastic bags atop a civilian vehicle; it does not appear as the humanitarian response 
of the state, rather of concerned citizens responding to the migrant presence. In this article, the 
actions of Brazilian citizens function to condemn the response of the Brazilian state, presented as 










The Brazilian state is absent; there is no evidence of a calculated, official response to migration–
–only disorder, hunger, and uncertainty. The article even draws a parallel between the “strong 
policies of migratory containment” practiced by the United States government against Latin-
American migrants and “the grave problems lived by some Latin-American countries and their 
effects on intra-regional human mobility,” implicating Brazil in this latter group. In this way, the 
article notes: “strong tensions are replicated...in Ecuador, Perú, Chile and even [Brazil]...other 
governments''––ostensibly not Colombia––“center their attention more on the costs, rather than 
the opportunities of human mobility” (emphasis added). Subsequently, the article supports a 
commitment to inclusion by the Colombian state and its citizenry. The article notes, 
 
the acceleration of migration [to Colombia] in just three years for a country 
inexperienced with migration management...implies large economic, operational and 
legal challenges in terms of humanitarian assistance, social integration, providing 
employment and access to health and education. 
 
At this early stage in the migration crisis––when Colombia is only receiving 40% of the 
Venezuelan diaspora––the article makes an appeal to the Colombian state and its citizens to 
welcome Venezuelan migrants. This appeal indicates an implicit assumption that––unlike 
neighboring countries––both the Colombian state and its citizens are committed to inclusion. 
 
This appeal for inclusion is supported by the recurrent assertion that migration brings economic 
benefits to Colombia, affirmed already within the first sentence of the article: “from 2000 to 
2017 more than $1B have entered by concept of Venezuelan direct investment.” Later, the article 
also notes, “[migration] has contributed to the growth of the GDP...migrants are a valuable labor 
force, who nurture...consumption.” These claims are confirmed by a credible source, the director 
of the Colombo-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, Germán Umaña, who states, “migration 
creates economies of scale and may complement [various] productive sectors.” In turn, the 
article declares that migration presents “a grand opportunity that, without proper management, 
could lose its potential––a risk Colombia cannot run.” In due course, the article concludes that 
the Colombian state must “dialogue with its neighbors in favor of Latin-American social 
integration,” implying again that these neighbors cannot be trusted to pursue inclusive migration 
policies without pressure from leading states such as Colombia, presented as the forward-
thinking, democratic actor in regional politics. 
 
This notion––that neighboring countries are “not doing their part”––is affirmed through the 
citation of state sources, such as President Iván Duque, who assert the exceptional nature of 
Colombia’s response to Venezuelan migration. Thus, the article Duque asks that response to 
Venezuelan exodus not be “only from Colombia”90 (2 September, 2018) highlights the 
Colombian state’s commitment to democratic values and inclusion––vis-a-vis neighboring 
countries which, it is implied, are not doing their part to embrace Venezuelan migrants––unlike 
Colombia. The bolded statement, “Iván Duque called upon other Latin-American countries 
to embrace Venezuelan migrants, as, he affirms, Colombia has done” supports this assertion 
 
90 Redacción Política, “Duque pide que respuesta ante éxodo venezolano no sea ‘solo de Colombia’,” El Espectador, 
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from the first paragraph. Similarly, quoting President Duque, the article notes: “the President 
assured that ‘Colombians have reacted with grandeur and fraternity, never blocking access to 
our brothers who flee the terrible night of a dictatorship and an economy in ruins.” The 
subsequent inclusion of another quote by President Duque, “this effort cannot be only 
Colombia’s,” serves to further construct a distinction between Colombia’s effort to embrace 
migrants, supported by the article, and neighboring Latin-American countries’ comparative 
failure to do so. The inclusion of President Duque’s tweet, with the hashtags, “#Building the 
Country” and “#ReliefBuilds,” further legitimates the Colombian state’s handling of the migrant 
crisis. The article not only moralizes the Colombian state through an emphasis upon its inclusive 
response to migration, but also aligns the Colombian state with European nations––Spain, in this 
case––and the United Nations, who are presented as partners with whom the Colombian state 
will work to direct the Latin American migration response. The article supports these efforts, 
which reflect the alignment of Colombia with European nations and international bodies. The 
emphasis placed upon this cooperation appeals to the notion of the Colombian nation as distinct 






In Duque’s tweet, the words “Building the Country” also reflect the function of the discourse 
constructed within El Espectador: its coverage of Venezuelan migration appeals to, and therefore 
contributes to the construction of, a conception of the Colombian state and citizen that contrasts 
both the xenophobia and policy failures characteristic to neighboring nations, but also the 
repressive, illegitimate Venezuelan government––from which migrants flee. 
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However, as the coverage progresses, it becomes clear that the presence of migrants in Colombia 
does not elicit an entirely inclusive response from Colombian citizens. This growing tension––
between Colombian citizens and their state––deepens as migration surges within Colombia, 
particularly in urban centers like Bogotá. Therefore, a competing discourse emerges with respect 
to Venezuelan migration, beyond the discourse of inclusion supported and constructed by El 
Espectador. The second, emergent discourse, which originates primarily from Colombian 
citizens, reflects a rejection of Venezuelan migrants, whose presence exacerbates pre-existing 
conflicts over resources and attention from the Colombian state. 
 
As evidence of Colombian citizen’s opposition to Venezuelan migration grows, El Espectador’s 
coverage continues to affirm the moral imperative of inclusion and begins to assert, increasingly, 
the economic justifications for welcoming migrants into Colombian society. This justification is 
supported by a frequent emphasis upon the technical proficiency of Colombian institutions, 
whose ability to integrate migrants into Colombian society––particularly, as productive workers–
–the coverage insists upon. 
 
Articles such as Each Venezuelan adds91 (30 April, 2018)  support the claim that migration 
facilitates economic growth––and assert that state institutions are prepared to facilitate 
Venezuelan migrant’s transition into the Colombian workforce. The article begins: “the positive 
effects of migration for the economy will be visible in the short and long run, as xenophobic 
flares diminish, professionals are taken in without glancing at their passport, and errors in 
migration policy are corrected” (emphasis added). Thus, the article appeals to the economic 
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However, the notion that the process of migration should be facilitated for “professionals” 
suggests that not all migrants are equally worthy of inclusion, or of equal economic benefit to 
Colombian society. The article presents statistics about Venezuelan companies investing almost 
$1B in Colombia in the last decade: evidence of Venezuelan wealth fueling the Colombian 
economy. Subsequently, the article notes that Venezuelan migrants foment “the generation of 
employment, entrepreneurship, new productive unities, sectoral competency, diversification of 
the market, and pay taxes,” citing an academic source––Alexandra Castro, member of the 
Migration Observatory of Externado University––who notes that these benefits “demonstrate that 
not all Venezuelans are a burden for the state...qualified professionals stand out, given that for 
many years Venezuela had higher quality public education than Colombia...for Castro, every 
Venezuelan contributes” (emphasis added). Despite the final claim that “every Venezuelan 
contributes,” Castro has noted that certain, qualified migrants are the most valuable; thus, her 
final claim obscures the underlying assumption throughout the article, affirmed in the first line, 
that the integration of professional migrants in particular is most beneficial. Yet, not all migrants 
fall into this ideal group. By failing to properly scrutinize the extent to which this ideal group 
actually reflects the actual majority of migrants, the article conceals significant social differences 
within a heterogenous migrant population.92 
 
In conclusion, the article notes that beyond the economic opportunities available to migrants in 
Colombia, they also stand to benefit from: 
 
readapting to a free world, in democracy, with constitutional order, with legitimate 
institutions, and as such settle the idea of returning to their country [without] a similar 
system...before Colombians fled to other nations searching for a better future, now we are 
the destination of hope for millions of Venezuelans. 
 
In this way, while the article first legitimates migration by citing its economic benefits to 
Colombia, the ultimate justification for accepting certain, ideal migrants functions through an 
appeal to Colombia’s political and economic superiority. Thus, the migrant is mobilized as a 
discursive figure to construct an imagined Colombian nation, whose construction depends upon 
the encounter with such “strange” figures. 
 
Similarly, articles such as District presents route to employment for Venezuelan population in 
Bogotá93 (18 September, 2019) suggest that the Colombian state––unlike its neighbors––
recognizes the compatibility of democratic inclusion and economic growth. In the article, state 
institutions such as the Secretary of Economic Development (SDE) and municipal institutions 
such as The Public Agency of Employment, “Bogotá Works,” serve as examples of Colombia’s 
successful management of the migration crisis, accomplished again through a reliance upon state 
sources––functionaries from the Bogotá Mayor’s office. Thus, the leading image for the article 
shows a group of migrants waiting in line to seek employment. Their white-collar clothes imply 
that these individuals will contribute to the most productive sectors of the Colombian economy. 
In turn, the article supports the notion that migration stimulates Colombian economic 
 
92 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 4. 
93 Redacción Bogotá, “Distrito presenta ruta de empleo para población venezolana en Bogotá,” El Espectador, 
September 18, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/distrito-presenta-ruta-de-empleo-para-
poblacion-venezolana-en-bogota-articulo-881701. 
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development. That the line does not appear too long or crowded suggests, further, an easy 




Thus, the article asserts that Colombian institutions are poised to facilitate migration and 
economic development, with technical efficiency. The article notes that “professionals” from the 
SDE and The Public Agency of Employment assist citizens who seek to obtain “formal work,” a 
goal which takes “five phases:” registration, orientation, formation, intermediation, and 
bonding. The use of such bureaucratic language both affirms the new role of Venezuelan 
migrants––as members of the professional workforce––and highlights the technical proficiency 
of the Colombian state agencies engaged in assisting naturalized migrants––new citizens––who 
are in the process of “strengthening their labor profile,” becoming even more valuable and 
productive workers. The article highlights that state agencies will assist migrants with 
 
courses in personal preparation for work interviews...receive formation in specific 
areas...be selected as precandidates for employment vacancies [and candidates will] be 




The notion that the Colombian state is prepared to integrate migrants into Colombian society, in 





The modern graphic design evidences the technical proficiency of the Department of 
Labor and, by extension, the Colombian state. In these ways, the article functions to mitigate any 
concerns, on the part of El Espectador’s readership, not only with the economic impact of 
migration, but also with the ability of the Colombian state to handle the migration crisis. Thus, 
beyond the fact that migrants flee the illegitimate, repressive Venezuelan state, and xenophobia 
throughout Latin America, migrants are presented as worthy of inclusion insofar as they enhance 
the productivity of the Colombian economy. However, the coverage does not yet resolve the 
tension within this thesis: while most migrants flee economic hardship and political repression, 
not all are professional, highly productive workers; the presence of millions of migrants in 
Colombia not only increases strains upon local resources, but also intensifies competition––with 
the poorest Colombians––within the informal labor sector. 
 
The Conflict of Co-habitancy 
 
Throughout the coverage thus far, El Espectador has made consistent appeals to the notion of an 
exceptional, inclusive, and democratic Colombian nation, for which examples of xenophobia 
against migrants in neighboring countries, whose governments have failed to adequately address 
the migration crisis, serve as a point of contrast. The coverage of Venezuelan migration within El 
Espectador thus supports and serves as a platform for official discourses from the Colombian 
state that call for regional and national solidarity with migrants. At the same time, the coverage 
depends upon the citation of academic sources and economic experts, who offer evidence for the 
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economic benefits of migration: an additional rationale for inclusion, beyond moral 
justifications. These discursive tendencies are intensified when evidence of Colombian 
opposition to the Venezuelan migrant presence, primarily from citizens and fringe political 
figures, begins to occupy greater space in the coverage. While early examples of internal 
opposition to inclusion are presented as marginal, or exceptional, as these incidents become more 
frequent, El Espectador sustains its appeal to an inclusive conception of the Colombian nation 
and reaffirms the ability of Colombian institutions to integrate and support migrants. 
 
This discursive turn is reflected by articles such as Mayor of Bucaramanga affirms that 
Venezuelan [women] are ‘factories to make poor little children’94 (8 February, 2019), which 
denounce a case of xenophobia by a Colombian politician, whose actions are also presented as 






94 Redacción Nacional, “Alcalde de Bucaramanga afirmó que venezolanas son "fábricas de hacer chinitos pobres",” 
El Espectador, February 8, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/alcalde-de-bucaramanga-afirmo-
que-venezolanas-son-fabricas-de-hacer-chinitos-pobres-articulo-838724. 
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Referring to xenophobic comments made by Rodolfo Hernández, the mayor of 
Bucaramanga, the article notes “this would not be the first time that [he] makes these types of 
comments,” followed by “he is again in the eye of the storm” and, again, in the article’s 
conclusion, “It is fitting to remember this would not be the first time Hernández makes 
these types of comments.” The repetition of these points implies that the mayor, Hernández, has 
a history of racist remarks. This functions as resistance to the interpretation of his remarks as 
indicative of a general response to current migration; rather, his response is presented as that of a 
singular, reactionary politician––whose racism precludes the current migration crisis. 
Consequently, the possibility of a general xenophobic response by the Colombian people is 
displaced. 
 
Subsequently, the article highlights the official rejection of xenophobia by citing a tweet from 
the attorney general, Fernando Carrillo, which appears in the article as the following bolded 
statement:  
 
machismo, xenophobia and aporophobia are bad judgements by public officials who 
should set the example. These are coarse attacks against women, against 
Venezuelans who are victims of dictatorship and against children. 
 
The legitimacy of the attorney general’s statements is reinforced further by the inclusion 
of a retweet by the journalist Daniel Samper. As a columnist for the center-left publication, 
Semana, his affirmation of the attorney general’s position suggests that, facing the migrant crisis, 
there exists a shared moral commitment to inclusion––at least between Colombia’s political and 






The citation of opposition journalists like Samper, who in this case show support for the 
state response to migration, serves to further legitimate the Colombian state––differentiated from 
that of fringe, reactionary politicians in the exterior provinces. This implication supports a 
centralist notion of Colombian nationhood––wherein not all Colombians are equally admissible. 
As such, the article concludes: “What to do in Bucaramanga? We cannot kill nor shoot at 
[migrants], we must take them in, just as Venezuela took in more than four million Colombians 
[when] there were no job opportunities” (emphasis added). The “we,” here is in fact a they: the 
Colombians at the fringes of the country, to whom the appeal for inclusion is directed––and, by 
extension, upon whom blame for xenophobic sentiment is placed. This representation of 
xenophobia against migrants as a marginal, or exceptional phenomenon functions to affirm the 
moral superiority of the Colombian state and interior, which in turn contributes to a notion of 
Colombian identity as one within which not only certain strange––or unproductive––newcomers, 
but also certain citizens may not belong. The displacement of the migrant figure, here, 
demonstrates the ways in which the presence of new “strangers” facilitates the construction of 
the nation, in terms of those who “belong” and those who do not. However, this (re)construction 
forestalls the inevitable demarcation of assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures, whose 
eligibility within the nation is, broadly, not yet presented as a point of contention.95 
 
Eventually, the conflict generated by the presence of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia becomes 
more difficult to deny, and the original dominant narrative within El Espectador––of solidarity, 
inclusion, and empathy with migrants on the part of the Colombian state and its citizenry––
becomes increasingly untenable. At this point in the discourse, attempts to distinguish between 
assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures become much more apparent, and the 
representation of Colombian citizen’s opposition to the presence of migrants begins to occupy 
greater space; yet, such opposition is still presented as marginal, and in a critical light. This shift 
is followed by increased discursive work to legitimate Colombian institutions––evident in a 
series of articles which, building upon earlier themes, insist upon the alignment between the 
Colombian state and international humanitarian efforts and highlight the technical proficiency of 
Colombian humanitarian organizations––and such organization’s commitment democratic values 
of inclusion and equality. 
 
In November 2018, public outcry against an improvised migrant encampment in Bogotá, near the 
transport terminal “del Salitre,” reflects the emergent conflict between the Colombian state and 
its citizenry, who appear to diverge on the issue of migration. This incident introduces key 
tensions to El Espectador’s discursive construction of the Colombian response to migration. The 
article, Images: how the move of Venezuelans to a new site in Bogotá took place96 (13 
November, 2018), indicates these tensions between state, citizen, and migrant through its leading 
image, the first in a slideshow of individual images that follow. Ultimately, the structure of these 
images––which end with a smiling migrant mother and child––suggests that in Colombia, unlike 
in neighboring countries, the state has the capacity to resolve mounting tensions between citizens 
and migrants. Furthermore, within the article, Colombian citizen’s opposition to the migrant 
 
95 Sarah Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 99. 










The first, top-left square, demonstrates the occupation of public lands by Venezuelan migrants: 
improvised tents, arranged in a disorderly fashion, surrounded by scattered trash, firewood, and 
even a stray gasoline canister demonstrate dangerous, unhygienic and disorderly conditions––
which pose a threat to migrants and neighboring residents alike. In turn, the top-right image 
presents a group of migrants standing together and holding a Venezuelan flag. Here, the seven 
stars on the flag are politically significant; as the traditional flag of Venezuela, before it was 
changed to contain eight stars under Chávez, the reader is reminded that these migrants flee 
economic and political crisis in Venezuela––attributed throughout the coverage to the country’s 
political and economic transformation under Chavismo. This association functions to give 
justification for migrants’ presence in Colombia––where the coverage affirms that they will find 
political and economic freedoms unavailable in Venezuela.  
 
Yet, the opposition to migrants in Colombia––depicted by the bottom-left image in which two 
women hold a sign in protest against a new migrant encampment established by Colombian 
authorities––demonstrates a point at which El Espectador is unable to fully sustain the narrative 
of general Colombian “solidarity” with migrants, nor the alternative explanation of opposition to 
Venezuelan migrants as “isolated” expressions of xenophobia; citizen’s growing discontent with 
migration becomes evident. Nevertheless, the depiction of citizen’s opposition to migrants is, 
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again, downplayed; these Colombians are shown criticizing the location of the migrant camp, 
which contrasts the numerous depictions of mass xenophobia in neighboring countries––a focus 
in much of the early coverage.  
 
Finally, the final, bottom-right image represents the institutional response to migration, which 
functions ultimately to mitigate public opposition to and fear of migrants. This image, which 
depicts a migrant woman and child sitting in front of a new, clean yellow tent furnished by the 
Colombian state, reflects the discursive turn taken by El Espectador, in the context of growing 
evidence of opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens. Articles begin to insist 
upon the efficient and effective response of the Colombian state and its humanitarian 
institutions––whose commitment to assisting migrants functions to affirm the country’s 
inclusive, democratic character. The indicated recipients of institutional assistance––women, 
children, and the elderly––function to appeal to readers’ empathy through an emphasis on the 
inclusion of migrants who can only be understood as victims. As such, the first image in the 





The next image depicts children sitting on a sidewalk, cold and in tears. Since this image 
precedes the image of the disorderly, dirty camp (shown in the leading image), an emphasis is 












The background of this image offers evidence that the Colombian state is committed to the 
assistance of these vulnerable migrants––uniformed humanitarian workers consult with migrants, 
apparently inquiring into their needs and concerns––and appeals to reader’s empathy, affirming 
the moral imperative of inclusion. 
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In turn, the following image illustrates the efficacy, scale, and professional nature of the official 
humanitarian response taken by the Colombian state. Uniformed workers, large sacks of food, 
and safety precautions such as gloves and masks highlight an official commitment to the health 













The caption for the image on the right notes, 
 
but the group of neighbors also demonstrated xenophobic reasons for impeding the arrival of the 
foreigners. They also said that Venezuelans bring problems of health and insecurity, 
 
which reflects earlier attempts to formulate popular opposition to migration as motivated 
by xenophobia––rather than conflicts over resources.  
 
Indeed, another photograph, in which the article notes that citizens are concerned with health and 
safety, depicts citizens holding a sign that indicates they reject the migrant presence upon local 
land; this affirms that popular opposition to migrants is motivated by conflicts over physical 






Subsequently, the final two images emphasize the successful provision of humanitarian 
assistance by state institutions, which functions to resolve these tensions and legitimate the 





Here, the state response to the migration crisis reflects efficiency, security, and cleanliness. The 
emphasis placed upon efforts by the state to pursue this inclusive and humanitarian response 
functions to affirm its democratic character and moral commitment––and mitigate concerns by 
citizens. 
 
The notion that, facing the migrant crisis, Colombian institutions are committed to inclusion, 
public health and safety, and human rights is echoed throughout the coverage following this 
period. Articles such as Municipal attorney calls to reinforce attention to Venezuelan 
population in Bogotá97 (5 February, 2019) legitimate the state response, which serves as 
evidence to dissuade citizens from mounting opposition to migrants occupying public spaces. 
Thus, after citing growing citizen concerns over migrants sleeping in neighborhood parks, the 
article notes how the state successfully resolves such tensions: “officials recently announced the 
possibility of offering temporary refuge.” The article concludes, “the state has determined plans 
of action with UNHCR [The UN Refugee Agency], Migración Colombia and the Ministry to 
attend to the most vulnerable populations,” both highlighting the bureaucratic efficiency of 
Colombian institutions––working together to solve problems for the needy––and establishing a 
 
97 Redacción Bogotá, “Personería pide reforzar atención a población venezolana en Bogotá,” El Espectador, 
February 05, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/personeria-pide-reforzar-atencion-poblacion-
venezolana-en-bogota-articulo-837961. 
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connection between these national institutions and international human rights organizations with 
global legitimacy. 
 
Furthermore, the article downplays probable causes behind such a swift state response––
specifically, mounting opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens––which are 
excluded from the story, focusing instead upon the efficacy of state institutions. The article 
claims that state institutions have been called to “reinforce ongoing work to reduce the growing 
perception of insecurity, with the end of mitigating xenophobia; reduce the risk of contagious 
disease transmission, act upon growing street vendors, the invasion of public space and the use 
of children for begging” (emphasis added). Within this sentence, the fragment “with the end of 
mitigating xenophobia” both attributes a moral character to the actions taken by the Colombian 
state and affirms its commitment to democratic ideals of inclusion, equality, and the protection of 
human rights. Yet, the fragment indicates that the state seeks to mitigate xenophobia by citizens, 
which implies that popular opposition to Venezuelan migrants is rooted in a rejection of their 
cultural identity, over material conflicts. This allows for the legitimation of the state, while the 
material factors behind growing opposition to Venezuelan migrants from Colombian citizens are 
displaced. 
 
Similarly, the article Attention for Venezuelans in Bogotá will be reinforced98 (26 March, 2019) 
under-emphasizes the opposition of Colombian citizens to Venezuelan migrants, while 
highlighting the democratic character of the state response. The first line notes the cooperation 
between the Colombian and Dutch governments, citing the latter’s contribution of $1.4 billion 
dollars to a “Center for Migrant Attention” in Bogotá. The article’s focus on the humanitarian 
center, which will provide “a nursery [and] learning spaces for children [as well as] spaces for 
first aid [and] legal assistance,” centers the moral character and technocratic proficiency of the 
Colombian state, while excluding representations of internal opposition to migrants by 
Colombian citizens. Thus, the article concludes by noting that “the plan by the District to attend 
to the massive arrival of Venezuelans” has been largely successful, alluding to another center for 
migrant attention in Bogotá where, similarly, “600 people received medical attention, migration 
orientation and employment assistance.”  
 
In a similar manner, a previous article on an earlier migrant center, “Another camp will not be 
repeated:” manager for Venezuelans in Bogotá99 (14 January, 2019), affirms the Colombian 
state response to migration as rights-focused, forward-thinking, and ultimately successful. The 
article notes, “The Secretary for Social Integration [and] the Mayorship, have deployed all their 
efforts [and] all of the services [the city] has provided have had positive results.” The 
technocratic proficiency of the state is also invoked: “all measures have been taken in 
advance...the District has already contemplated measures of a permanent and long-term 
measure” (emphasis added). Structured as an interview with María Angélica Trujillo––a lawyer 
tasked to head the “Management of Venezuelans in Bogotá” program––the article quotes heavily 
from this official, who emphasizes the “total tranquility,” “gradual manner,” and, especially, the 
 
98 Redacción Bogotá, “Reforzarán atención para venezolanos en Bogotá,” El Espectador, March 26, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/reforzaran-atencion-para-venezolanos-en-bogota-articulo-846959. 
99 Redacción Bogotá, “‘No se repetirá otro campamento’: gerente para venezolanos de Bogotá,” El Espectador, 
January 14, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/no-se-repetira-otro-campamento-gerente-para-
venezolanos-de-bogota-articulo-834016. 
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“humanitarian character” of the successful delivery of assistance to and integration of migrants 
squatting on public land. Trujillo states, “we want to guarantee the absolute compliance of all our 
obligations and the total respect of the rights of the whole migrant population” and notes the 
“sensibilization of the population” accomplished by the state institutions involved. While this 
latter fragment reveals the growing impatience of Colombian citizens with their state, the official 
affirms that citizens have “understood that the encampment is part of a transitional process.” 
Thus, the growing opposition to migration by Colombian citizens is displaced; the dominant 
narrative of Colombia’s commitment to democratic practices of inclusion––both by the state and 
its citizens––persists. 
 
While the preceding articles depend highly upon sources from humanitarian institutions, state 
migration programs, and municipal governments, numerous concurrent and following articles, 
perhaps due to a greater reliance on security and police officials as sources by some, in turn 
characterize migrant’s presence in public spaces as an “invasion,” or a general threat to public 
security. Thus, in Transfer of Venezuelans, in between contrasts100 (13 November, 2018), the 
second paragraph notes, “with the aim of imposing order and preventing the invasion of 
Venezuelans in a nearby lot...the District advanced the relocation of 38 families (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the image description in Venezuelans who live in the outskirts of the Cali 
transport terminal will be relocated101 (14 January, 2020) states, “The evacuation of migrants 
for the invasion of the public space is a tendency in almost all the cities in the country” 
(emphasis added). In, 400 Venezuelans who invade territories near the terminal will be evicted 
in Cali102 (10 January, 2019), the term “invasion” is also used frequently. Nevertheless, the 
content of these articles affirms the driving narrative of the democratic character of the 
Colombian state and, broadly, its citizenry. 
 
In articles such as The last day of the Venezuelan camp103 (14 January, 2019), for example, the 
description of migrants as “invaders,” or threats to public security, is presented as a concern 
emanating from citizens, rather than security officials, which reflects a point of tension within 
the discourse surrounding the migration crisis in Colombia. The article notes, “the neighbors in 
the sector hope that the process will be peaceful and that new invasions of public space will be 
controlled” (emphasis added). Here, Colombian citizens are presented as fearful of migrant 
“transfers to neighboring properties or potential clashes with authorities.” Such presentation of 
select cases of Colombian citizen’s opposition to and state repression of migrants contrasts 
earlier examples that evidence the moral, democratic, and inclusive response of the Colombian 
state––and repeated appeals calling upon citizens to act accordingly, or characterizations of 
 
100 Mónica Rivera Rueda, “Traslado de venezolanos, en medio de contrastes,” El Espectador, November 13, 2018, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/traslado-de-venezolanos-en-medio-de-contrastes-articulo-823415. 
101 Redacción Nacional, “Reubicarán a venezolanos que viven en los alrededores de la terminal de transporte de 
Cali,” El Espectador, January 14, 2020, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/valle/reubicaran-
venezolanos-que-viven-en-los-alrededores-de-la-terminal-de-transporte-de-cali-articulo-899776. 
102 Redacción Nacional and Efe, “Desalojarán en Cali a 400 venezolanos que invaden terrenos cercanos a la 
terminal,” El Espectador, January 10, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/valle/desalojaran-en-
cali-400-venezolanos-que-invaden-terrenos-cercanos-la-terminal-articulo-833221. 




popular opposition to migrants as isolated examples of xenophobic sentiment. The article insists 
upon the technocratic proficiency of Colombian institutions to resolve these tensions:  
 
functionaries of the mayor’s office advanced the dismantling of the [migrant] camp 
where initially 460 Venezuelans were established...to facilitate their exit from the 
camp...the Secretary of Social Integration [emphasized] that...they sponsored [assistance] 
for Venezuelans to legalize their condition, find work and even a new place to live. 
 
Thus, the article suggests that Colombian institutions are able to moderate tensions that 
may emerge between migrants and Colombian citizens.  
 
Articles such as Shelter for Venezuelans: out of control?104 (19 November, 2018) reflect similar 
tensions within El Espectador’s coverage: not all migrants are configured as victims to be 
welcomed, or tolerated. Allegations of violence and criminal activity reconfigure certain 
migrants as dangerous threats to the public; in turn, the legitimacy of Colombia’s response to 
migration rests not only upon the moral superiority of Colombian society and state institutions, 
but also on a commitment to law and order upheld by state security forces. The article makes an 
effort to legitimate the official application of force by establishing distinctions between 
assimilable and unassimilable migrants. Thus, the article begins: “clashes between 
migrants...provoked the intervention of riot police within the area...weapons and drugs were 
confiscated. The District assured it would reinforce security.” As such, certain, dangerous 
migrants are presented as the cause of instability and crime, while the repressive actions of the 
state are presented as a legitimate response against a troublesome minority:  
 
The unconformity of some Venezuelans...triggered a dispute which ended with the 
intervention of the riot police...the outrage began with the unconformity of the 
Venezuelans and a fight between a few of them...The situation got out of control, at which 
point a group took the camp, destroyed District tents, and stole various supplies found 
there (emphasis added). 
 
The use of “some” indicates that not all migrants are included within this inadmissible 
group; most remain categorized as victims. Furthermore, the repression of certain migrants––
those “who do not comply with the rules of co-habitancy”––remains consistent with the notion of 
a morally superior Colombian state, which protects the rights of the vulnerable and upholds the 
law. Indeed, when the violent outbreak––perpetrated by the problematic minority––leaves “one 
[migrant] in the camp [injured]...the secretary of Security, Jairo García, announced that a legal 
response would follow against those who failed to comply with the rules of the camp” (emphasis 
added). Nevertheless, this selective application of repressive force by the Colombian state––
dependent upon the drawing of moral distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable 
migrants––still contrasts what has been presented as a general reaction against migrants by 
governments––and citizens––in neighboring countries like Ecuador and Perú; here, cases of mass 
 
104 Monica Rivera Rueda and Felipe García Altamar, “Albergue para venezolanos: ¿fuera de control?,” El 




xenophobia and repressive official policies that harm the migrant population, as a whole, occupy 
greater space in the coverage. 
 
Similarly, the article presents the negative response of Colombian citizens towards migrants as a 
specific concern with the conditions of the particular location in question, rather than an 
indication of growing opposition to migrants within the country motivated by conflicts over 
resources and attention from the state:  
 
the inhabitants of the...neighborhood insist that the Venezuelans should be relocated 
immediately, now that the place where the migrants find themselves lacks sufficient 
health and security standards so that neighbors are not at risk (emphasis added).  
 
This rearticulation of Colombian citizens’ response to migration suggests that, unlike 
citizens in neighboring countries who are prejudiced against migrants due to a general sense of 
xenophobia, the opposition of Colombian citizens to migrants––presented already as an isolated 
case––stems from specific concerns over “health and safety.” The representation of citizens’ 
opposition to migrants is not framed as a conflict over physical space when, in fact, the 
Colombian citizens cited have called upon the state to “relocate the Venezuelans immediately” 
from a neighborhood plot of land, a valuable commodity in the urban environment of Bogotá. 
 
Parallel articles continue to displace the root cause of mounting opposition to the migrant 
presence: conflicts over material resources. Furthermore, the appeal made to the Colombian 
citizenry––to accept the migrants in their midst––persists and continues to rest upon the notion 
that state institutions have the technocratic proficiency to assist the migrant population, which 
functions to invalidate popular concerns over inclusion. Thus, the article, The last day for the 
Venezuelan camp (14 January, 2019), which depicts growing popular outcry against migrants in 
Colombia, formulates an appeal to citizens––asking them to entrust the Colombian state to 
resolve the tensions presented by the Venezuelan migrants. This appeal rests upon the 
assumption that the state is able to fulfill the needs of both citizens and migrants, thus it not only 
affirms the moral superiority and technocratic proficiency of the state, but also invalidates fears 
behind xenophobia––for if the state is capable of managing the crisis, why should citizens be 
concerned?  
 
While this article notes that Colombian citizens have grown concerned with the migrant 
population in the country––particularly in the urban center of Bogotá––the article then asks 
citizens to support the humanitarian efforts of the state. First, characterizing citizens’ opposition 
to the migrant presence, the article notes: 
 
various neighbors fear that disorder will take place during the dismantling of the camp, 
just as when the migrants arrived. Some inhabitants of the sector...advise that the 
dismantling may provoke the invasion of nearby land.” (emphasis added).  
 
In response, the article concludes, 
 
the District [will] take all the precautions to avoid the taking of land in the zone, 
guaranteeing an orderly exit [to migrants]...the District indicated it would continue its 
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efforts to attend to [Venezuelans] in the capital, a task in which it is indispensable that 
the citizenry cooperate with their comprehension and solidarity” (emphasis added).  
 
The final sentence affirms, firstly, the technocratic proficiency of the state and, secondly, 
its moral superiority––modeling the solidarity, rather than opposition, that Colombian citizens 
should undertake. Although the conflict over resources and physical space that the migrant 
presence engenders and exacerbates is noted, this conflict is not presented as systemic––
characteristic to a society marked by unequal access to resources; rather, the conflict is presented 
as a new, isolated phenomenon: a direct consequence of recent migration.  
 
In these ways, the affirmation of Colombian exceptionalism depends upon the construction of 
distinctions between worthy (victims) and unworthy migrants (threats)––the former functioning 
as the object of appeals to empathy through which to assert the commitment of the Colombian 
state to democratic values and affirm the technical proficiency of its institutions, the latter 
functioning to affirm its commitment to law and order.  
 
Venezuela, The Unworthy State 
 
Growing evidence of opposition to the migrant presence by Colombian citizens makes it difficult 
for El Espectador to sustain the narrative of broad Colombian solidarity with Venezuelan 
migrants. In turn, the coverage invokes a latent narrative: the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state 
and Venezuela’s economic collapse, which place a responsibility upon Colombian citizens to 
welcome migrants––an appeal that rests upon the assumption of Colombia as, comparatively, a 
democratic and economic success. Moreover, later coverage insists upon the inevitability of 
Colombia’s position as the primary recipient of Venezuelan migration––presented as a 
phenomenon that will only escalate, irrespective of regime change––which represents the final 
appeal to the reader, the citizen. This appeal functions through the frequent citation of experts, 
academics, and members of the business sector. Even at this point, however, the fundamental 
tension between migrants and Colombian citizens––the exacerbation of pre-existing conflicts 
over scarce material resources and growing competition for attention from the Colombian state 
by marginalized groups––remains uncited and unresolved; rather, the coverage continues to 
insist upon the need for Colombian citizens to accept migrants into their society, affirming the 
moral imperative and economic benefits of inclusion. 
 
Thus, the article 400 Venezuelans who invade territories near the terminal will be evicted in 
Cali (10 January, 2019) first presents certain, inadmissible migrants as a danger to Colombian 
citizens––according to a security official, the migrants carry “illicit drugs, ready for sale, and 
also knives and machetes, in addition to other weapons.” Yet, in turn, the article appeals to 
readers’ empathy, noting the difficulties faced by many migrants who Colombian institutions and 
society are under a moral imperative to assist––more worthy victims, such as mothers, children, 
and the elderly––and/or are eager to contribute to the legitimate Colombian economy––those 
migrants who, in turn, are deemed worthy of inclusion by merit of their productive capacity. In 
this way, immediately after noting the danger that migrants pose to Colombian people, the article 
profiles two migrants who counteract the notion that all migrants present similar threats: a 
pregnant 21-year old Venezuelan woman with “no money to buy diapers for the girl…[who has 
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nothing], not even little clothes” and a 28-year old migrant man, who states “we are saving every 
penny and hoping to rent...it is difficult [for a Venezuelan] to find such money.”  
 
Such attempts to appeal to readers’ empathy, however––to demand the inclusion of migrants into 
Colombian society––particularly in light of evidence that certain migrants may pose a danger to 
that society, initiates a second appeal to Colombia’s moral superiority and democratic character. 
This final appeal functions through the delegitimation of the Venezuelan state––from which the 
migrants flee––and serves to attribute victimhood to migrants, in general. The delegitimation of 
the Venezuelan state and society contextualizes the migrant presence and justifies their entry into 
Colombia, represented as the democratic and prosperous society: Venezuela’s antithesis. 
 
In this way, following the earlier passages concerning the threats to public safety that some 
migrants may pose, the article takes an abrupt thematic turn and notes,  
 
The Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro, will take possession this Thursday, January 
10th, of a new mandate not recognized by the Opposition or the international community. 
(Read also: The political panorama facing the ‘illegitimacy’ of Maduro) 
 
Subsequently, the article re-quotes the 28-year old migrant man, who states “they should 
remove [Maduro]...we have had to leave our homes, our lands, because there is no food, no 
nothing, because of that man.” In turn, the article ends by noting that the Lima Group has not 
recognized the new Maduro government and has “called upon Maduro to [transfer], in a 
provisional fashion, Executive Power until new democratic presidential elections are realized.”  
 
This unexpected thematic jump––a new focus upon the illegitimate and undemocratic nature of 
the Venezuelan regime––functions as the ultimate justification of Venezuelan migrant’s presence 
within Colombia. Migrants, in their own words, note that their presence in Colombia is not their 
fault; thus, the article implies that Colombians have a responsibility, which presupposes the 
legitimate and democratic nature of their state and society, to accept migrants––that is, to accept 
those migrants who are not deemed a threat. 
 
This ultimate justification for accepting migrants within Colombia within El Espectador’s 
coverage––the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan regime and the country’s economic collapse––
depends upon the assumptions that regime change in Venezuela is not only immoral, but also 
beside the point given that dire economic conditions will outlast changes in political leadership.  
 
This assertion, which functions to stress the necessity of inclusion––while at the same time 
affirming Colombia’s commitment to democratic ideals––sets up the final appeal to the 
Colombian citizen, put forth in articles such as What will happen to Venezuelan migrants in 
Colombia? This is what some experts say105 (23 May, 2019). This appeal affirms the moral––
and practical––imperative of inclusion. Academics and business leaders are key to the 
affirmation of this message; they reject the notion that regime change in Venezuela will resolve 
 
105 Efe, “¿Qué va a pasar con los migrantes venezolanos en Colombia? Esto dicen algunos expertos,” El Espectador, 
May 23, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/migrantes-venezolanos-regresaran-su-pais-esto-
dicen-algunos-expertos-articulo-862323. 
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the migration crisis and, in turn, assert the inevitable nature of Venezuelan migration––which 
can only, in turn, be met with an inclusive response. Thus, the first paragraph states,  
 
according to professors and experts it is difficult that Venezuelans return in the case of a 
possible fall of Nicolás Maduro, in part due to the difficult economic condition 
experienced by the country.  
 
The second paragraph notes, “experts at a panel of Latin American business leaders 
affirm” that the majority of the 3.7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country’s political and 
economic crisis will not return to Venezuela––even if Maduro leaves power (emphasis added). 
Subsequently, the article notes that a group of Colombian academics, at the “Business Future of 
the Americas” conference, confirm that few migrants––especially the most underprivileged 
migrants––will return to home, irrespective of changes in Venezuela’s political leadership.  
 
Following the perspectives of these academic and business sources, the article then cites 
Colombian President Iván Duque, who describes Colombian migration policy as “fraternal and 
orderly.” Yet, in contrast to the panel, Duque affirms the need for Maduro’s “dictatorship...to 
fall.” The utilization of President Duque as a source, here––following the assertions of academics 
and business leaders––makes the perspective of the Colombian state secondary; the state appears 
unable to grasp the more complex vision of the crisis articulated by “experts.” By comparison to 
business leaders, who present economic solutions to the Venezuelan problem––namely, the 
stimulation of free enterprise within Venezuela––and academics, who highlight the inevitable 
character of migration––thus, the irrelevance of regime change to significant social and 
economic progress in Venezuela––the citation of President Duque’s hawkish focus on the ouster 
President Maduro presents him as ignorant of the complexity of the situation. 
 
The critique of militarism, here, and the affirmation of Colombia’s democratic and economic 
successes represent the broader themes, ideological commitments, and conceptions of the 
Colombian nation articulated within El Espectador’s coverage. These factors culminate in an 
appeal best summarized by the following article, Analysis: Venezuelan migration is a 
Colombian problem106 (10 December, 2019), which asserts Colombia’s democratic 
qualifications while emphasizing the broken nature of the Venezuelan state and society––
antithetical to Colombia, characterized by democratic freedoms and economic prosperity. 
Although the article is a news piece, it is written solely from the perspective of an academic, 
Ronal Rodríguez; it is not deemed “opinion.” With such legitimacy, Rodriguez proceeds to indict 
the Venezuela state, affirm Colombia’s duty to democratic inclusion, and note the inevitable 
nature of migration as reason enough to accept the integration of migrants into Colombian 
society. Rodríguez argues, “the complex and prolonged humanitarian emergency, into which 
Chavismo dragged Venezuela, will not be resolved through the toppling of Nicolás Maduro” 
(emphasis added). If a military intervention in Venezuela will not resolve the political and 
economic crisis in Venezuela, the Colombian state––and its citizens––can only accept migrants; 
no other course of action is justified, nor practical. 
 
 




Unlike previous coverage––which insisted upon Colombia’s ability to resolve the migrant crisis 
and suggested a broad commitment to inclusion, in light of the capability of the state to integrate 
migrants into Colombian society––Rodriguez does not offer a clear solution; rather, he highlights 
the numerous barriers to migrant’s inclusion within Colombian society. Rodríguez notes that 
sectors of the Colombian working class may oppose migration, as an influx of cheap labor that 
may further informalize the economy and introduce job competition; that members of the 
Colombian upper class may speak out against Venezuelan migration as part of “the strategy of 
castrochavismo to destabilize Colombia and the region.” In sum, he states, “there is no lack of 
voices who urge the immediate expulsion [of migrants] from the country, or...the closure of the 
frontier [to prevent] the entry of any more Venezuelans,” a statement which fractures the 
previously dominant narrative of an exceptional Colombian response to migration––or a broad 
commitment to inclusion from both the state and its citizens (emphasis added). Furthermore, 
Rodríguez notes that migrants will be victimized either for their identity as Venezuelans or for 
their poverty––destabilizing the assumption, found in earlier appeals to the reader, that 
Colombians may be able to overcome their aversion to the migrants in their midst. 
 
Nevertheless, Rodríguez ultimately affirms that inclusion is the only way forward. He continues 
to emphasize that border closures are ineffective, military interventions are immoral and, 
crucially, that Venezuelan migration will persist for years to come––at an unstoppable scale. 
Also, he notes, given that 3.4 million Colombian citizens live in Venezuela, a repressive 
response by the Colombian state may influence a similar, likely harsher response from dictators 
like Maduro; thus, Colombians should––and practically must––take the moral “high ground” and 
“prepare [themselves] to receive the many millions of people who will become part of the 
Colombian citizenry,” one way or another. 
 
Thus, even the lack of a clear solution to the migrant crisis and the open admission of the barriers 
rendering the total acceptance of migrants into Colombian society unlikely, the assumption 
persists that Colombian institutions––the humanitarian arms of the state and the business sector, 
in particular––will be able to temper any strains that migrants may pose, and that citizens must, 
in turn, accept the inevitable integration of migrants into their Colombian society. In this way, 
the assumption that Colombia is somehow exceptional, or more committed to democratic 
principles––by comparison to neighbors such as Venezuela or other Latin American countries 
whose failed handling of the migration crisis has occupied great space in the coverage––persists, 
even when the character of Colombia’s response, both from citizens and the office of the 
President, is called into question. 
 
At this moment, El Espectador again attempts to appeal to the best of the Colombian nation, 
supporting the inclusion of Venezuelans into Colombian society––while forestalling the 
inevitable discussion of the consequences this may have upon the Colombian working class, who 
now face greater competition for jobs and for resources from the state in the context of increased 
migration. Thus, the construction of the Colombian nation and state within El Espectador reveals 
the unresolved relationship between Colombian citizens and their own state. While El 
Espectador aims to construct a conception of the Colombian nation as democratic and inclusive, 
evidently a portion of the Colombian citizenry is not compelled by this discourse. By pleading 
with citizens to embrace inclusion, El Espectador reveals the fractured nature of Colombian 
society; those Colombians in conflict over resources with Venezuelans are not predisposed to 
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respond to the conception of an inclusive, democratic Colombian nation imagined by elites––
perhaps because the lived experiences of lower class Colombians have been characterized by 
exclusion and discrimination. Further, in the context of the Colombian conflict, the nation itself 
has been divided into groups who view the battles of the Left as illegitimate or legitimate; the 
latter stance conflicts with the negative characterization of the Venezuelan state upon which El 
Espectador’s appeals often depend, marked by an implicit rejection of the political and economic 
goals characteristic to the Colombian Left. In this way, the dominant narrative of Colombia’s 
democratic and economic success––upon which appeals for migrant inclusion depend through El 
Espectador’s coverage––clashes with the lived realities and ideologies of many Colombians who 
feel that the Colombian economy does not work for them. Indeed, the class conflict inherent in 
working class Colombians’ opposition to inclusion is articulated in the final article, when 
Rodriguez notes,  
 
“out with the venecos,” “the strike is for Colombians”, “the Venezuelans aren’t brothers” 
are some of the signs and graffitis which have appeared along with social demands during 
the days of the national strike, including in the social unrest lived by the country that 
rejects the Venezuelan population in Colombia. 
 
Rodriguez notes that sectors of the Colombian working class may view Venezuelans, 
who could exacerbate conflicts over resources in a context of already steep inequality––and 
mounting labor organization––as a tool in the state’s plan to fracture working class solidarity 
and, in the ensuing chaos, “justify the use of force.” Yet, Rodriguez does not pursue a deeper 
examination of these concerns and, thus, the economic roots of mounting popular opposition to 
migrants; rather, the narrative that Colombians have a duty to accept Venezuelans persists: 
  
Rather than demand the expulsion of Venezuelans or the closure of the border, it should 
be demanded of the Colombian state, as much as the government, but also the Opposition 
and civil society to resolve the problem. 
 
This final line suggests that the state, civil society, and the Colombian Opposition must resolve 
their differences and work together in the face of the migration crisis. In this way, the dominant 
narrative of inclusion conflicts with––and thus reveals––the fractured character of Colombian 
society. Indeed, the recent influx of Venezuelan migrants has aggravated mounting anxieties 
concerning questions of identity and belonging. Throughout the migration crisis, national 
campaigns led by indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians, peasants, women, students, and workers 
seeking to counter economic inequality, extractivism, sexism, and racism have been largely met 
with state resistance––by the very same political leaders who have made consistent calls for 
solidarity with Venezuelan migrants. Throughout El Espectador’s coverage, however, calls for 
the inclusion of migrants largely fail to consider the magnitude of these contradictions, nor 
suggest––or examine––the conditions of social and economic inequality at the root of popular 







CHAPTER 3: THE BORDER, A GLOBAL SPECTACLE 
 
This chapter traces a series of events that took place at the end of January and February of 2019, 
framed by the consolidation of mounting efforts to affect regime change in Venezuela, led by the 
Venezuelan Opposition, with the support of Colombia and the United States.  Following a failed 
military coup attempt against Maduro’s government on January 21st, on January 23rd, Juan 
Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly declared himself acting president of 
Venezuela urging the establishment of a transitional government until free elections could be 
held. During this time, US president Donald Trump made public statements in support of a 
military overthrow of President Maduro’s government, echoed by officials within the 
Venezuelan Opposition and the Colombian state under President Duque. The consolidation of 
the alignment between the Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition, and the United states 
culminated in an joint attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, largely of US origin, into 
Venezuela, across the Colombo-Venezuelan border on February 23rd. The attempt to introduce 
aid into Venezuela was also preceded by a concert, “Venezuela Aid Live,” organized by British 
billionaire Richard Branson to support the humanitarian efforts, which garnered a global 
audience. These events reflect a moment in which the crises and tensions at the Colombo-
Venezuelan border became globalized––the focus of this chapter, which traces the news 
coverage up to and following these events in the Colombian newspapers of El Espectador and El 
Tiempo. Within each newspaper, the chapter analyzes representative articles that affirm previous 
trends observed in El Tiempo and El Espectador’s coverage of recent border crises. While El 
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates the narratives of the Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition, 
and the United States, highlights the benefits of a strong US-Colombia relationship, and 
expresses confidence in a military solution to Venezuela’s economic and political crisis, El 
Espectador’s coverage casts doubt upon the humanitarian motivations cited to justify the United 
States’ interference in regional affairs, expresses a lack of confidence in the benefits of a strong 
US-Colombia partnership, and rejects a military solution to regime change in Venezuela. 
Furthermore, El Espectador’s construction of events at the border differs significantly due to the 
emphasis placed within its coverage upon the victimhood of Colombian border communities at 
the hands of the Colombian state and its allies, contrasting El Tiempo’s coverage, which 
emphasizes the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of the Venezuelan state. 
 
The intersection of the Duque and Trump presidencies ignited a regional political climate 
marked already by uncertainty, tension, and fear. Exactly one month after Iván Duque assumed 
the Colombian presidency, the Trump administration stoked fears of a military intervention in 
Venezuela by meeting with rebellious Venezuelan military officers in order to “bring positive 
change to a country that has suffered so much under Maduro,” according to a statement given by 
US officials to The New York Times.107 While the clandestine conversations stalled, they 
nevertheless galvanized supporters of President Maduro––who had, for years, accused the United 
States of plotting violent regime change efforts. Later that year––ahead of a meeting with 
Colombian President Iván Duque––Trump indicated support for a military overthrow of the 
Maduro government: “It’s a regime that frankly could be toppled very quickly by the military if 
 
107 Ernesto Londoño and Nicholas Casey, “Trump Administration Discussed Coup Plans With Rebel Venezuelan 
Officers,” The New York Times, September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/americas/donald-
trump-venezuela-military-coup.html. 
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the military decides to do that,” Trump said.108 In 2019, fears of US support for violent regime 
change were invoked by the Maduro government to justify its opposition to Guaidó’s claims to 
the presidency. Moreover, from the outset, the Venezuelan Opposition’s commitment to 
democratic, constitutional change was compromised by a military coup attempt against Maduro’s 
government on January 21st, met with public statements from Opposition lawmakers calling for 
military support to facilitate regime change, such as Guaidó’s claim that growing defections 
amongst low-ranking military personnel reflected a “generalized feeling” within the armed 
forces.109 Following Guaidó’s self-proclamation as acting president, invoking constitutional 
authority, fears mounted of a military coup in Venezuela, as US National Security Advisor John 
Bolton tweeted that the US would consider lifting sanctions “for any Venezuelan military officer 
that...recognizes the constitutional government of Juan Guaidó.”110 Guaidó, in turn, offered 
amnesty to military officials who abandoned Maduro and pledged allegiance to his 
government.111  
 
Following these events, in February 2019, calls for the entry of humanitarian aid, largely of US 
origin––and delivered by the US air force––were met with criticism from the Maduro 
government, who argued that the entry of food and medical supplies constituted a trojan horse 
for a military coup or intervention to topple his government. Guaidó’s calls for the Venezuelan 
military to disobey Maduro’s orders to block the entry of humanitarian aid only exacerbated 
these concerns on the part of the Venezuelan state. In this climate of tension, the United Nations 
called for the “depoliticization” of aid, while the Red Cross and Caritas refused to participate in 
the aid campaign, as the US’ attempt to deliver aid in violation of Venezuelan national 
sovereignty took on the character of interventionism and violated humanitarian principles of 
political neutrality. 
 
The Colombian state played a significant role in the aid campaign, providing the logistical 
facilities for the storage and transportation of humanitarian assistance. President Duque not only 
voiced support for the introduction of aid into Venezuela, but also recognized Juan Guaidó as the 
legitimate president of Venezuela following Guaidó’s self-proclamation.112 Indeed, Colombia 
became the launching point for the attempt of humanitarian aid into Venezuela; on February 
22nd, Colombia hosted the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert organized by British billionaire 
Richard Branson, which called upon Maduro’s government to allow for the entry of aid. That 
 
108 Jim Wyss, Franco Ordoñez, and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump seems to encourage Venezuela military coup amid 
fresh sanctions,” Miami Herald, September 26, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/venezuela/article218984990.html. 
109 Ana Vanessa Herrero, “Venezuela Detains National Guard Members Accused of Turning On Maduro,” The New 
York Times, January 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-national-
guard.html. 
110 John Bolton, Twitter Post, February 2019, 4:06 PM, https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton. 
111 Irwin Cotler and Brandon Silver, “Recognizing Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s Leader Isn’t a Coup. It’s an Embrace 
of Democracy,” Foreign Policy, February 6, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/06/recognizing-juan-guaido-
as-venezuelas-leader-isnt-a-coup-its-an-embrace-of-democracy-nicolas-maduro-sanctions-icc/. 




day, President Duque would embrace Juan Guaidó, alongside numerous high-profile 
conservative Colombian politicians, to rally support for the humanitarian caravan.113 
 
The attempt to introduce US aid into Venezuela and the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert became 
global spectacles. Colombian border communities received visitors from around the world––
members of international governments, humanitarian organizations, and media outlets, 
volunteers and concerned citizens, concertgoers, and individuals seeking to watch the drama 
unfold. In turn, the suffering of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of the Venezuelan state gained a 
global audience. Global news coverage of the mega-concert, framed as an initiative to collect 
funds for Venezuelans, in solidarity with the efforts to introduce humanitarian aid into 
Venezuela, proliferated narratives of Venezuelan victimhood throughout the world; global media 
even functioned as platforms to solicit donations for the concert and the humanitarian efforts. On 
a national level, however, not all media constructions of these events in Colombia aligned with 
these narratives. In the weeks prior to and following the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the 
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, a discursive analysis of El Tiempo and El 
Espectador’s coverage indicates divergent constructions of the same moment. 
 
As my analysis of the articles included in this chapter will demonstrate, El Tiempo’s coverage 
aligns largely with the perspectives of the Colombian state, and the priorities of the United States 
and the Venezuelan Opposition. El Tiempo’s early narration of the events emphasizes the US-
Colombia relationship, temporarily displacing the Venezuelan crisis as the subject of primary 
importance. This early emphasis shares a prioritization, held also by the Duque administration, to 
strengthen US-Colombia relations; El Tiempo stresses the positive implications of this 
diplomatic position. These shared goals reflect the rejection of President Santos’ break with 
conceptions of national identity rooted in military strength, as his administration prioritized 
diplomacy with the Venezuelan state to facilitate the Colombian Peace Process. President 
Duque’s hawkish foreign policy towards Venezuela––from the suspension of bilateral diplomatic 
relations, to open calls for regime change in Caracas––also affirm the centrality of the United 
States within the current priorities of the Colombian state. Therefore, El Tiempo’s stigmatization 
of the Venezuelan state legitimates the political and economic goals of the Colombian state, 
which, presently, views economic prosperity as conditional upon a strong US-Colombia 
relationship. Moreover, these narratives function to further the ongoing (re)construction of the 
US-Colombia partnership in a manner consistent with the priorities of the Colombian right-wing, 
which rejects both the Venezuelan state––used to streamline criticism of the Colombian Left––
and the Colombian Peace Process initiated by President Santos, given that ongoing US economic 
and military support depends upon Colombia’s commitment to an aggressive war against drug 
cartels and left-wing insurgents.  
 
To stress the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state, affirm the benefits of strong US-Colombia 
relations, and fuel confidence in the fragility of Maduro’s hold on power, El Tiempo draws 
largely from sources within the Colombian state, the United States, and the Venezuelan 
Opposition. The views of officials are further legitimated through sourcing practices that 
emphasize the perspectives of Venezuelan citizens, who appear as the “worthy victims” in El 
Tiempo’s coverage. The mobilization of Venezuelan citizen’s victimhood functions to further 
 
113 "El momento en el que Juan Guaidó cruzó la frontera para ir al Venezuela Aid Live," YouTube video, 00:45, 
posted by "El Espectador," February 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aP85KELk8Is. 
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delegitimize the Venezuelan state and, in turn, legitimate Colombia’s relationship to the United 
States, whose commitment to humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people facilitates 
ongoing support for the US-Colombia alliance within El Tiempo’s coverage.  
 
By contrast, El Espectador’s coverage of these events constructs alternative conceptions of 
victimhood that emphasize the perspectives and concerns of Colombian border communities. 
These are built upon broader sourcing practices that include the perspectives of citizens and 
political representatives from the Colombian side of the border. El Espectador’s coverage 
delegitimizes the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the subsequent attempt to introduce 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela as not only politically motivated, but also harmful to the 
transnational dynamics that underpin the social and economic life of border communities. 
Furthermore, El Espectador casts doubt upon the legitimacy of regime change in Venezuela. 
This point reflects both the newspaper’s alignment with democratic values––prioritizing regional 
political transitions affected without external pressure from actors with disproportionate military 
and economic power, such as the United States. El Espectador’s coverage casts doubts upon the 
mega-concert and humanitarian efforts, both supported by the United States, which are presented 
as illegitimate and ineffective measures to affect regime change in Venezuela, demonstrated by 
the newspaper’s emphasis on the practical unfeasibility of such efforts; in particular, the 
newspaper emphasizes the consolidation of power by the Maduro regime, which the coverage 
asserts holds broad support from military leadership.114 These discursive themes are grounded 
upon sourcing practices that also include the perspectives of Colombian policymakers outside the 
Duque administration, members of the Venezuelan state, and analysts from various American 
and Latin-American think-tanks and universities. Furthermore, El Espectador’s coverage 
reaffirms a conception of Colombian nationhood rooted in liberal democratic ideals, which 
rejects Colombia’s deepening relationship with the United States, understood as a regional actor 
that supports non-democratic practices; rather, a more global-facing conception of the 
Colombian nation is affirmed, through the positive characterization of alliances with regional 
states that take more moderate positions towards Venezuela, and with the European Union and 
the United Nations, also cast in a more favorable light. 
 
To evidence the contrasts between El Espectador and El Tiempo’s discursive constructions of 
similar events, this chapter examines three key moments in their coverage: the meeting between 
US President Donald Trump and Colombian President Duque in Washington, DC, held on 
February 12, 2019, which reflects divergent constructions of the US-Colombia relationship 
within both newspapers; the arrival of international aid to Cúcuta, followed by the “Venezuela 
Aid Live” and “Hands Off Venezuela” concerts, which reflects both newspaper’s 
characterizations of humanitarian assistance and begins to demonstrate significant contrasts in 
their respective constructions of “worthy victims”; finally, the attempts to introduce 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, led by Venezuelan protesters at the urging of Opposition 
leaders, and the ensuing narration of these events in both newspapers, which affirm divergent 










February 12, 2019: Duque and Trump meet in Washington, DC 
 
Prior to the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, on February 23rd, 2019, the 
contrast between El Espectador and El Tiempo’s coverage of President Iván Duque’s visit to 
Washington, DC, which took place on February 16th, 2019, reflects broader differences in the 
perception and construction of the US-Colombia relationship within both newspapers. 
 
El Tiempo’s characterization of President Duque’s visit to Washington emphasizes the benefits 
of strengthening the US-Colombia partnership. While El Espectador emphasizes the significance 
of Venezuela as a key factor in US outreach to Colombia, El Tiempo detaches US opposition to 
Venezuela from its characterization of strengthening Colombian relations with the United States, 
which are instead attributed to President Duque’s leadership, as he aims to strengthen 
Colombia’s regional status.  
 
Thus, the first line in Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following 
shift by Duque115 (16 February, 2019) notes: 
  
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the issue of Venezuela, the first official visit of 
President Iván Duque to Washington served to consolidate the strategic relation with 
the United States and as a platform to position Colombia as a regional leader at the 
first level. 
 
In this way, the article frames President Duque’s visit to the United States as motivated 
by an eagerness to strengthen US-Colombia relations; the subject of regime-change in Venezuela 
is, from the start, displaced. Moreover, in contrast to El Espectador’s framing of the event, in El 
Tiempo, President Duque and President Trump are presented as equals; the article notes, “Duque 
acquired the compromise, as much of the [Colombian] Congress as the Trump 
administration, to deepen cooperation” with the United States. President Duque is presented as 
holding significant influence over both Colombian affairs and US foreign policy decisions. 
 
The article also establishes a key theme in El Tiempo’s characterization of the US-Colombia 
relationship: the economic benefits of positive relations with the United States. Thus, early in the 
article––before humanitarian aid to Venezuela or US support for anti-narcotrafficking are 
mentioned––it is noted that, while in Washington, President Duque sought to promote 
“commercial opportunities...to expand cooperation in diverse areas of the bilateral relationship.” 
This thesis persists throughout El Tiempo’s characterization of US-Colombia relations. For 
example, the article provides links to two articles, Promoting investments, Duque’s objective on 
his second day in the United States116 (February 14, 2019) and ‘Colombia is open for business’: 
 
115 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Relaciones entre Colombia y EE. UU. Se fortalecen tras gira de Duque,” El Tiempo, 
February 16, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/balance-de-la-visita-de-ivan-duque-a-estados-
unidos-327810. 
116 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Promover inversiones, objetivo de Duque en el segundo día en EE. UU.,” El Tiempo, 
February 14, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/promover-inversiones-objetivo-de-duque-en-
ee-uu-326846. 
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Duque to business leaders in the United States117 (February 14, 2019)––only then followed by 
The keys to Trump and Duque’s alliance to ‘liberate’ Venezuela118 (February 14, 2019). The 
order of these links reflects another observed discursive pattern within El Tiempo’s coverage 
preceding the events of February 22-23: the representation of Venezuela as a secondary, or 
tangential issue to President Duque’s attempt to strengthen relations with the United States. 
 
Indeed, the article, Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following 
shift by Duque, displaces the subject of Venezuela and implies that the United States are 
reluctant to interfere in Latin American affairs. Yet, this follows the article’s own affirmation of 
President Duque’s successful negotiation of a new bilateral agreement, to replace “Plan 
Colombia and Paz Colombia,” presented as “Colombia-20-23, which will guarantee the support 
of the United States for four more years”––which both presents evidence of the Trump 
administration's willingness to expand its influence in Latin America, contrary to claims of US 
neutrality, and alludes to a previous military and economic partnership, Plan Colombia, through 
which Colombia has received over $6 billion in US aid since the year 2000. Nevertheless, the 
article presents this new agreement as “not a small feat facing an administration like 
Trump’s, which has been reducing its foreign expenditures and avoids expanding its 
footprint in other latitudes.” These bolded statements function to displace concerns about US 
military intervention in Venezuela. Only much later––in the 13th paragraph––does the article 
note the centrality of Venezuela to Duque and Trump’s discussion: 
 
The most relevant role played by Duque was on the topic of Venezuela…[Duque] 
helped to coordinate a massive push by the international community against the regime of 
Nicolas Maduro that will launch this week on multiple fronts. 
 
Subsequently, the character of this “massive push” is clarified as strictly humanitarian: 
“led by the director of USAID [and] US officials led by Senator Marco Rubio.” However, this 
characterization fails to note the presence of the US military, who accompany the delegation––a 
key factor in rising tensions with the Venezuelan state and growing concerns of military 





117 Política, “‘Colombia está abierta para negocios’: Duque a empresarios de EE. UU.,” El Tiempo, February 14, 
2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/presidente-duque-hablo-en-la-camara-de-comercio-de-estados-
unidos-326796. 
118 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Las claves de la alianza de Trump y Duque para ‘liberar’ a Venezuela,” El Tiempo, 
February 14, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/trump-y-duque-sellan-alianza-para-liberar-a-
venezuela-326618. 
119 The first article, included as a link in the article under analysis, is titled, The second of three military planes with 
humanitarian aid arrive to Cúcuta. The title refers to US Air Force planes arriving at the border. 
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In this manner, El Tiempo’s coverage preceding the events of February 22-23 displaces the issue 
of Venezuela and, instead, centers the benefits of strengthening Colombia’s relationship to the 
United States, which emerges as the dominant narrative in its coverage. This neglects the 
interrogation of Venezuela as a key factor in the United States’ willingness to extend financial 
support and strengthen diplomatic ties with Colombia, or Colombia’s foreign policy shift against 
Venezuela as part of its own strategy to retain US economic and military support. All the while, 
the coverage decenters the subject of a possible US military intervention in Venezuela––in fact, a 
key concern that arose out of the Washington meeting between Duque and Trump. This contrasts 
El Espectador’s coverage, which insists upon the subject of possibly violent regime change in 
Venezuela, led by the United States and supported by Colombia, and implies that Colombia’s 
eagerness to support regime change in Venezuela may be part of a strategy to sustain a fragile 
US-Colombia relationship, which may give the United States greater leverage and, in turn, allow 
it to utilize Colombian territory at will.  
 
Earlier coverage from El Espectador not only denounces calls for a military coup or intervention 
in Venezuela, but also casts doubt upon such methods as effective ways to bring about regime 
change in Venezuela. As such, an early article, The true face of power in Venezuela120 (26 
January, 2019) emphasizes the power held by Maduro over the armed forces, whose leadership 
remains unconditionally loyal to the “anti-imperialist and socialist principles of Hugo Chávez” 
and, furthermore, exercise control over core industries and public services: enterprises related to 
agriculture, communications, transportation, digital television, investment, construction, and 
mineral water production, totaling eleven of thirty-two Venezuelan ministries, in addition to a 
key financial institution, the Bank of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces. The article 
concludes that even if Maduro were ousted from power by force, the military––who have already 
rejected an alliance with the Venezuelan Opposition––would be positioned to take control in 
Venezuela. Thus, early coverage in El Espectador frames the violent regime change as 
impractical and casts doubt upon the viability of Juan Guaidó’s presidential ambitions.  
 
Such characterizations of the balance of power in Venezuela contextualize El Espectador’s 
subsequent coverage of President Duque’s visit to Washington, which places a critical emphasis 
upon the possibility of violent conflict that may result from the deepening US-Colombia 
relationship under the Duque administration. Contrary to El Tiempo’s coverage, El Espectador 
frames Colombia’s relationship to the United States as a liability, given a frequent editorial 
focus––highly dependent upon the citation of sources from Washington think tanks and 
academia––on the possibility of US military intervention in Venezuela, in which Colombia may 
play either a cooperative or active role. Moreover, the coverage of President Duque’s visit to 
Washington constructs a notion of the Colombian state as subordinate to the interests of the 
United States––presented as a dynamic that may undermine Colombia’s relationship with 
neighboring countries and contradict official commitments to liberal-democratic values. 
 
120 Redacción Internacional, “El verdadero rostro del poder en Venezuela,” El Espectador, January 26, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/el-verdadero-rostro-del-poder-en-venezuela-articulo-836231. 
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Thus, an article written before the Washington meeting, titled What will Duque find in the 
United States?121 (12 February, 2019) establishes the possibility of Colombia’s support for US 
military action against Venezuela as a key concern, echoed throughout the ensuing coverage: 
  
In Washington, [Duque] receives a recurring question: “President, at what point does the 
United States count with your government before a military intervention in Venezuela to 
topple Nicolás Maduro? 
 
In turn, the article establishes the narrative that Duque’s opposition to the Maduro regime is part 
of a strategy to gain the attention of the United States, whose relationship with Colombia may be 
in jeopardy following the gradual reduction in intensity of anti-narcotrafficking operations by the 
Colombian state. This narrative is legitimated through the citation of an international relations 
analyst at the University of Florida, who states: 
 
The drug war is an important theme, but Duque knows that he has no results to show. So 
from [the] United States there exists interest in knowing how far Duque is willing to go in 
finding a final solution to Venezuela. Would he be willing, for example, to lend the 
territory of his country so that, from there, the United States could launch a military 
offensive? (emphasis added). 
 
This final question implies that, in order to strengthen the US-Colombia partnership, 
Duque may have to allow the expansion of the US military presence on Colombian territory, or 
perhaps play an active role in a future US military intervention in Venezuela. Subsequently, the 
article condemns Duque’s alignment with the United States, voicing support for regional 
alliances, instead, to reduce the risk of violent conflict with Venezuela: 
 
For the analyst, Duque has managed to connect very well with the warmongering faction 
of the Trump administration...which could lead to problems with [US Democrats]...and 
other Latin-American governments who, while they hope Maduro will leave, reject the 
possibility of a military intervention. 
 
Although the article then cites the Colombian ambassador to the United States, Francisco 
Santos, who claims, “our emphasis is on humanitarian aid. We haven’t spoken a word of military 
intervention,” the placement of this claim after the earlier assertion of Colombia’s willingness to 
acquiesce to the priorities of the United States––which has demonstrated an eagerness to depose 
the Maduro government by any means––casts doubt upon the ambassador’s claim. Moreover, the 
placement of the analyst’s interpretation before the Santos’ statements reaffirms a prioritization–
–characteristic to El Espectador––of “experts” and academics, before Colombian state actors. 
 
Indeed, to further erode trust in Santos’ claim that humanitarian aid––not regime change––is the 
central focus of Colombia’s meeting with the United States, the article cites another academic 
source, an analyst from the US think tank, Inter-American Dialogue, who notes that in the event 
of a serious provocation by Maduro, the Lima Group would likely prefer that Colombia and 
Brazil––not the United States––take military action against Venezuela. Nevertheless, the 
 
121 César A. Sabogal, “¿Qué va a conseguir Duque en EE. UU.?,” El Espectador, February 12, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/que-va-conseguir-duque-en-ee-uu-articulo-839307. 
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addition of this interpretation functions to re-center the possibilities of military intervention or 
violent conflict with Venezuela as central concerns surrounding Duque’s visit to Washington. 
 
In conclusion, the article frames Duque’s demonstrated willingness to cooperate with the Trump 
administration––and, in turn, the heightened possibility of violent conflict with Venezuela––as 
part of a strategy to improve Duque’s image with the Colombian public: a member of the interim 
Venezuelan government, based in Washington, states “Duque comes to [pressure] 
Maduro...which will help improve the negative image he has in [Colombia], according to the 
polls.” This concluding statement casts further doubt upon the notion that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan citizens is the true motive of Duque’s visit to 
Washington. 
  
The same day, El Espectador publishes another article, Asking Duque to not make territory 
available for military operations against Venezuela122 (12 February, 2019), which highlights the 
voices of government critics concerned that President Duque’s visit to Washington may 
prefigure military conflict with Venezuela: 
 
22 [Colombian] congress members from different parties in Congress and hundreds of 
people and social organizations [expressed] their rejection of any action that may 
implicate the participation of Colombia in an armed conflict with Venezuela 
[including] the possibility that US military forces may utilize our ground, sea or 
airspace, as a theater for belligerent operations against our brother country. 
 
Thus, El Espectador frames Duque’s upcoming Washington in the context of local, bi-
partisan opposition to “the permissive attitude of the [Colombian] Government” with respect 
to US interests and priorities, which––suggested by the concerns presented by these government 
critics––may include military intervention in Venezuela.  
 
In turn, articles such as What Trump said about Venezuela in his meeting with Iván Duque123 
(13 February, 2019) and What follows the meeting Duque-Trump124 (13 February, 2019) 
characterize the United States as the actor with greater leverage in the US-Colombia relationship; 
Colombia appears subordinate to US interests, as President Duque aims to secure US support by 
demonstrating a stronger stance against Venezuela. Thus, the former article begins, “Trump 
[said]...that all options are on the table on the topic of Venezuela” (emphasis added). Similarly, 
the latter article states, “[Trump] insisted that all options surrounding Venezuela are on the table, 
including a military intervention” (emphasis added). These discursive patterns suggest that the 




122 Redacción Política, Piden a Duque no disponer del territorio para operaciones militares contra Venezuela,” El 
Espectador, February 12, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/piden-duque-no-disponer-de-
territorio-colombiano-para-operaciones-militares-contra-venezuela-articulo-839294. 
123 César A. Sabogal, “Lo que dijo Trump sobre Venezuela en su encuentro con Iván Duque,” El Espectador, 
February 13, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/lo-que-dijo-trump-sobre-venezuela-en-su-
encuentro-con-ivan-duque-articulo-839470. 
124 Lorena Arboleda Zárate, “Lo que quedó de la reunión Duque-Trump,” El Espectador, February 13, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/lo-que-quedo-de-la-reunion-duque-trump-articulo-839546. 
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El Tiempo and El Espectador’s contrasting discursive constructions of the same events result in 
significant part from each newspaper’s choice of sources that hold ideological affinity with each 
newspaper’s editorial leadership and intended audience. While El Tiempo regularly cites high-
level Colombian diplomats––such as Ambassador to the US, Francisco Santos––President 
Duque, President Trump, and members of the United States Congress, El Espectador also 
includes the perspectives of academics, members of various international think-tanks, American 
and Colombian academics, leaders of Colombian social organizations, and opposition members 
of the Colombian Congress. In turn, the discursive construction of events by each newspaper is 
necessarily divergent. However, key omissions, even from trusted sources, function to a similar 
effect. In the case of El Tiempo’s coverage of the Washington meeting, exemplified in the 
Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following shift by Duque (16 
February, 2019) article, Trump’s statements indicating that “all options surrounding Venezuela 
are on the table, including a military intervention,” are noticeably absent; yet, these are included 
in El Espectador’s coverage. When the issue of Venezuela––specifically, the provision of 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, a key subject of discussion at the meeting between the two 
presidents––is finally noted, El Tiempo’s article implies that the aid will be delivered to 
Venezuelans already within Colombia, when in fact the humanitarian aid was to be introduced 
into Venezuela against the wishes of the Venezuelan state, heightening concerns over national 
sovereignty on its part: 
 76 
 
President [Duque] helped to materialize additional [aid] shipments with a value of up to 
150 million dollars to assist the delicate situation which has provoked the entry [into 
Colombia] of 1.3 million Venezuelans in the last year (emphasis added). 
 
The arrival of international aid to Cúcuta and the dueling concerts 
 
As each newspaper traces the events following President Duque’s visit to Washington––the 
“Venezuela Aid Live” and “Hands Off Venezuela” concerts at the Colombo-Venezuelan border, 
on February 22nd, and the attempt by the United States, the Venezuelan Opposition, and the 
Colombian state to introduce international humanitarian aid into Venezuela, on February 23rd––
the key themes established in the early coverage not only persist, but also are deepened. While El 
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates the “humanitarian” character of the food and medical assistance 
that the Venezuelan Opposition, the United States, and the Colombian state seek to introduce 
into Venezuela, displacing concerns about a US military intervention, El Espectador’s coverage 
raises skepticism about these claims, foregrounding instead the material needs of Colombian 
border communities, drawing from sources within the Venezuelan state, government 
representatives from Colombian border towns, and Colombian border citizens to emphasize the 
marginalization of Colombian citizens relative to Venezuelan citizens, whose victimhood 
becomes the central justification for the introduction of humanitarian into Venezuela. 
 
In El Tiempo, articles such as, Second of 3rd planes with help for Venezuela arrive in Cúcuta125 
(16 February, 2019) construct a narrative of friendship between the United States and Colombia, 
a relationship which contributes to the national conception rooted in militarism, supported within 
El Tiempo’s coverage. In turn, the subject of humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans is 
displaced; thus, the article begins: 
 
The first two of three C-17 planes of the US Air Force with humanitarian assistance 
for Venezuela arrived this Saturday to the border town of Cucuta, leaving from a base in 
the state of Florida. 
 
Here, the article bolds “US Air Force”––not “humanitarian assistance for Venezuela”––
centralizing the presence of the US military. Similarly, the following paragraph notes,  
 
The first plane, which left from the air base of Homestead, south of Miami (US), 
landed in the [Cucuta]...with nutritional supplements for nearly 3,500 children who 
suffer malnutrition and hygiene kits for at least 25,000 more [according to] US 
diplomatic sources. 
 
Again, the article bolds the details of the US military presence in Colombia––rather than 
the details of the humanitarian assistance.  
 
 





Following this centralization of US power, the article then both legitimates the humanitarian 
character of US aid––irrespective of the US military presence––and affirms a notion of equality 
and cooperation between US and Colombian leadership. Thus, the article includes a tweet from 
Francisco Santos, Colombian Ambassador to the United States, which states, “The first plane 
lands with humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan brothers. God bless all those who made 
this relief possible. @IvanDuque @realDonaldTrump @AlvaroUribeVel,” which both specifies 
the recipients of the humanitarian aid––vulnerable Venezuelans––and attributes the plan to 
deliver humanitarian assistance to Colombian President Ivan Duque, US President Donald 
Trump, and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe: 
 
 
Figure 3.3  
 
The characterization of Venezuelans as victims is supported by a later quote, also by Santos: 
“The most important thing is to feed Venezuelans and give medicine to the sick;” here, 
Venezuelan citizens are generalized as helpless and sick. This statement is followed by the 
citation of a communication from the US embassy to Colombia, “Additional US military planes 
will take place in the next days to deliver humanitarian assistance to help the most vulnerable 
populations;” here, the presence of US military planes at the Colombo-Venezuelan border is 
once again articulated as motivated strictly by humanitarian concerns. 
 
In turn, the article continues to insist upon the illegitimate character of the Venezuelan state and 
the victimhood of Venezuelan Citizens. Sources from the US embassy claim, “the US and 
Colombia seek to alleviate the crisis in Venezuela caused by the mismanagement of the 
illegitimate regime of Nicolás Maduro...medical emergency packets [and] pharmaceutical 
products could save lives.” 
 






Building upon an earlier theme within El Tiempo’s coverage, this tweet places @IvanDuque and 
@realDonaldTrump on the same line, which helps sustain a notion of equality between both 
leaders.  Indeed, a subsequent paragraph notes, “Iván Duque [has] led the diplomatic blockade 
against the regime of Nicolás Maduro alongside his American peer, Donald Trump” (emphasis 
added). This implication also presupposes an equal cooperation between both actors, while, at 
the same time, the emphasis on US military power affirms the benefit of the bilateral relationship 
to El Tiempo’s audience––with an affinity for a conception of national identity rooted in 
militarism. These characterizations of US-Colombia relations are contrary to those established 
through the interpretation of similar events offered by El Espectador, which suggest that 
President Duque’s alignment with the United States on the issue of Venezuela results from a 
declining US interest––which indicates a power imbalance between the two countries––in 
maintaining financial and military support to Colombia, after a reduction in the intensity of 






Subsequently, the article includes a photograph of President Duque, in which––rather than 
President Trump, Duque appears speaking to Juan Guaidó. Here, a key function of El Tiempo’s 
discourse surrounding humanitarian aid also surfaces: the legitimation of Juan Guaidó’s claims 
to the Venezuelan presidency. Following the image, the article notes, “The United States and 
Colombia were the first countries...in recognizing Guaidó as interim president after...the 23rd of 
January.” Again, the article points to an equivalency between the United States and Colombia; 
both countries act in tandem, with shared goals. 
 
In turn, the article reflects another dominant narrative within El Tiempo’s coverage: the centrality 
of Venezuelan citizens as “worthy victims” of their state. President Duque characterizes the 
arrival of US air force planes as “‘not a doubtful move,’ rather a ‘clear’ gesture of goodwill to 
assist with the needs of Venezuelans” (emphasis added). The inclusion of this quote stresses the 
victimhood of Venezuelan citizens, at the hands of the “illegitimate regime of Nicolás Maduro,” 
which is presented as having “warned [that] it will prohibit the entry of humanitarian aid”––thus, 
to blame for the perpetuation of its citizen’s destitution.  
 
Throughout El Tiempo’s coverage, articles emphasize the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens, 
while the concerns of Colombian citizens are displaced. Articles such as Arrival of aid and 
mega-concert augments pressure over Maduro126 (16 February, 2019) once again foreground 
Colombia’s relationship with the United States and emphasize the victimhood of Venezuelan 
citizens living under Maduro’s government. Its leading image not only depicts humanitarian aid, 
 
126 Redacción Internacional, “Llegada de ayudas y megaconcierto aumentan la presión sobre Maduro,” El 
Tiempo, February 16, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/llegada-de-ayudas-y-megaconcierto-
aumentan-la-presion-sobre-maduro-327816. 
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but also a US Air Force plane landing in the background; the US-Colombia relationship, as a 
factor that contributes to Colombia’s regional supremacy and military strength, remains central 
to the coverage of humanitarian aid. Thus, the first line of the article notes, “three planes of the 
US Air Force arrived carrying a new shipment of humanitarian aid,” after which the article 
stresses the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens, the intended recipients of humanitarian aid: 
“Pressure mounts for the regime of Nicolas Maduro, who faces the challenge of the 
international community to deliver food and medicine to the most vulnerable 
Venezuelans.” The claim that US humanitarian assistance to Venezuela has “international” 
support, however, fails to mention mounting international opposition to the project; at this point, 
both the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European 
Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have 
criticized the politicized character of humanitarian aid for Venezuela and called for stricter 
neutrality.127 Furthermore, the Venezuelan Red Cross has stated it “could not participate in the 
process of introducing aid into Venezuela, arranged by opposition leader Juan Guaidó,” as noted 
in an earlier article by El Tiempo, Venezuelan Red Cross, Willing to Distribute Humanitarian 
Aid128 (05 February, 2019). Indeed, the claim that “the [Red Cross] cannot participate in the 
process of introducing aid into Venezuela”––presented in the second paragraph––contradicts the 
implications of the article title, which fails to clarify that the Red Cross is unwilling to assist in 
the distribution of aid across the Colombo-Venezuelan border, as the efforts to do so, without 
approval from the Venezuelan state, violate “its principles of impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence.” The organization notes its willingness to distribute aid only once already present 
within Venezuela. 
 
El Tiempo constructs a narrative of Branson’s concert as a strictly humanitarian endeavor, 
accomplished largely through a reliance upon sources from the event’s organizing staff and 
Venezuelan attendees. Thus, an article detailing the concert, This is how the ‘Venezuela Aid 
Live’ concert will be this Friday129 (21 February, 2019) stresses its function as “to ask the 
Chavista leader [Maduro] to allow the entry of humanitarian aid into his country.” The article 
cites an organizer for the event, Fernán Ocampo, who notes, “This event will be realized with 
the objective of saving thousands of lives”––citing no evidence to support this figure. In turn, 
the article notes, “The concert will take place one day before the date chosen by the 
president in charge of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, for humanitarian aid to enter his country.” 
Thus, El Tiempo’s coverage of the event also functions to legitimate Guaidó’s claims to the 
Venezuelan presidency. Furthermore, the article notes that “this Thursday a plane with 8.4 
tons of humanitarian aid from Chile will arrive,” again stressing the global character of this 
 
127 Redacción EC, “La ONU pide que la ayuda humanitarian llegue a venezolanos que la necesitan,” El Comercio, 
February 06, 2019, https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/venezuela/venezuela-onu-pide-ayuda-humanitaria-llegue-
venezolanos-necesitan-noticia-605040-noticia/; Redacción Publimetro, “Unión Europea: ‘Ayuda humanitaria a 
Venezuela no debe ser politizada’,” Publimetro.pe, February 07, 2019, 
https://publimetro.pe/actualidad/internacional/venezuela-union-europea-ayuda-humanitaria-no-debe-politizada-
nndc-98148-noticia/. 
128 Efe, “Cruz Roja venezolana, dispuesta a distribuir ayuda humanitaria,” El Tiempo, February 05, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/cruz-roja-venezolana-dispuesta-a-distribuir-ayuda-humanitaria-
323234. 
129 Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Así será el concierto ‘Venezuela Aid Live’ en Cúcuta, este viernes,” El Tiempo, 
February 21, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/asi-sera-el-concierto-venezuela-live-aid-en-cucuta-
329348. 
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event; yet, this bolded section, stressing Chilean support, is followed by, “some 300 tons of 
supplies from the United States and Puerto Rico have arrived”; this demonstrates an attempt to 
construct a notion of broad, international support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to 
Venezuela, whereas the United States remains the main provider of humanitarian supplies. El 
Tiempo’s characterization of Maduro’s “Hands Off Venezuela” concert, however, gives few 
details of what is described as a “concert of Chavismo”; the article includes only one quote from 
a Venezuelan state official who notes, “we will defend our territory.” The inclusion of such 
language, in turn, implies a violent response from the Venezuelan state––to what has been 
insisted upon as a strictly humanitarian event. Specifications of the pro-peace slogans which, in 
fact, characterized the Venezuelan concert are omitted; in turn, the reader is left to conclude that 
the Venezuelan state is prepared for violent conflict. 
 
The article also includes a video, which evidences the sourcing practices characteristic to El 
Tiempo’s broader coverage: a Venezuelan citizen, who affirms the humanitarian motivations of 





The first Venezuelan interviewed notes, “Of course, we’ll be at the concert, but what 
interests us the most is the entry of humanitarian aid.” In turn, Ocampo claims,  
 
One, it’s a concert to save lives...it’s a concert of life, to pass humanitarian assistance into our 
brother country, because they are dying and there are 3 million displaced people...it’s a concert of 
brotherhood. 
 
These themes are evidenced in another video posted by El Tiempo, Thousands cross border on 
the eve of the concert130 (21 February, 2019), which highlights the perspectives of Venezuelan 
migrants to Colombia. The first migrant interviewed describes coming to Colombia every day for 
 
130 "Miles cruzan la frontera en víspera del concierto," YouTube video, 03:43, posted by 
      "El Tiempo," February 21, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_00NtlivZI&feature=emb_rel_pause. 
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groceries, which he states are cheaper in Colombia. Another migrant states that “everyone is 
leaving to other countries,” noting the scarcity of products in Venezuela and the inadequate 
minimum wage in Venezuela. Later, the host of the video, El Tiempo’s international subeditor, 
claims that “there is a lot of hope in relation to the humanitarian aid, but also a lot of fear as to 
what may happen this Saturday, February 23rd, the date chosen by Juan Guaidó for aid to enter 
Venezuela”; given the emphasis that has thus far been placed upon the opposition of the 
Venezuelan state to the entry of humanitarian assistance, this “fear” may be interpreted as fear 
that the Venezuelan state may respond with violence. Indeed, another Venezuelan citizen notes, 
“we are going to support the concert, because we believe it is a global message to the murderous 
regime of Nicolás Maduro that we want peace” (emphasis added). In turn, another couple of 
Venezuelan citizens, volunteering to deliver aid, claim “we need to do all that Guaidó says,” 
again legitimizing Guaidó’s status as the country’s leader. 
 
On the day of the concert, another video Venezuelans extend their welcome to the Venezuelan 
Aid Live concert131 (22 February, 2019) emphasizes the successful attendance of the event, 
highlighting the perspectives of Venezuelan citizens. Venezuelans speak to the camera, stressing 
the need for humanitarian aid to enter their country––and expressing confidence that the aid will 
pass––in between shots that evidence the massive crowd at the concert. The interviewee, shown 





While El Tiempo finds greater value in the stories of suffering told by Venezuelan citizens, El 
Espectador highlights the perspectives of Colombian border communities; through El 
Espectador’s coverage, these actors emerge as legitimate victims, too––yet, as victims of the 
 
131 "Venezolanos invitan al concierto Venezuela Aid Live," YouTube video, 03:25, posted by 
      "El Tiempo," February 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdnRinMnT-M. 
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Colombian state and allies such as the United States, who are characterized as responsible for the 
crises inaugurated by the attempts to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela. 
 
February 23rd, 2019: The attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela 
 
El Tiempo’s characterization of the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela continues to mobilize 
the narratives of Venezuelan citizens, as victims of the Venezuelan state, to legitimate the efforts 
to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela on February 23rd. Furthermore, during El Tiempo’s 
coverage of these events, the newspaper nurtures the hope of a military coup in Venezuela––or 
perhaps a military intervention by the United States––insisting, through the repetition of articles 
concerning military desertions, that a low-point in military support for Maduro draws near. 
 
Articles such as Mother and child protest together against the regime132 (24 February, 2019) 
reaffirm the clear lines between victims and victimizers that have thus far characterized the 
newspaper’s coverage, which emphasizes the suffering of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of 
their state. The article narrates the events of February 23rd through the perspective of a 
Venezuelan border resident, a mother who supports the entry of humanitarian aid into Venezuela 
on February 23rd alongside her son––who claims, “I prefer to receive harm in her place. I 
prefer, a thousand times over, receiving a gunshot over her.” Moreover, the article presents 
Juan Guaidó as “the president in charge of Venezuela” even though the efforts to introduce aid 
into Venezuela fail. In conclusion, the article notes that “dozens of [Venezuelan] military 
members ceased to be loyal to Maduro,” a point insisted upon earlier in the article, with the 
paratextual link to the article, In the guard ‘they feed us like dogs’, says runaway soldier133 (26 
February, 2019). By now, an emphasis on the phenomenon of army deserters in Venezuela has 
already become a focus of El Tiempo’s ongoing coverage. 
 
Indeed, reference to Venezuelan army desertions begins the video, This is how D-Day goes at 
the border134 (23 February, 2019), which frames the events of February 23rd as sparked by “the 
desertion of various members of the National Bolivarian Guard at the border.” The video centers 
upon the humanitarian personnel aligned with Guaidó, who is depicted in a characteristically 
triumphant manner: leading the caravan approaching the border with humanitarian aid. 
Accompanying articles, such as Chaotic: such was the day to deliver aid into Venezuela135 (26 
February, 2019) emphasize the harm done to protesters by the Venezuelan military, centering the 
perspectives of Venezuelan citizens present at the border to assist the delivery of humanitarian 
aid by Guaidó who attest to violence on the part of Venezuelan state forces as “routine” and 
“dream of a free Venezuela.” While the delivery of aid, at this point, has been unsuccessful, the 
article nonetheless affirms the sentiments of protestors who note “no one can say we failed if 
 
132 Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Madre e hijo protestan juntos contra el régimen,” El Tiempo, February 24, 2019, 
https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/madre-e-hijo-protestan-juntos-contra-el-regimen-330934. 
133 Gustavo A. Castillo Arenas, “En la Guardia ‘nos alimentan como perros’, dice militar fugado,” El Tiempo, 
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/testimonios-de-militares-que-
desertaron-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-de-nicolas-maduro-330920. 
134 "Así va el ‘Día D’ en la frontera," YouTube video, 03:18, posted by "El Tiempo," February 23, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAi3HDsro9w. 
135 Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Caótica: así fue la jornada para ingresar ayuda a Venezuela,” El Tiempo, 
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/asi-ha-sido-la-jornada-para-ingresar-ayuda-
humanitaria-a-venezuela-330558. 
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actually there was always an intent...this is the beginning of victory...tomorrow, Venezuela 
awakens differently.” 
 
Days after the failed attempt to deliver aid, articles in El Tiempo continue to assert Guaidó’s 
status as interim leader, citing his ongoing meetings between his cabinet and the Duque 
administration. From these conversations, the calls for Venezuelan military desertions from both 
leaders are reflected throughout the coverage, seen in headlines such as ‘I have told the military 
to put themselves on the side of the people’: Guaidó136 (26 February, 2019). While the attempt 
to deliver humanitarian aid has failed, such headlines imply that regime change is still possible, 
yet that declining military support––which ongoing coverage centered upon military desertions 
reflects––may present the final factor in Maduro’s fall. The emphasis on military desertions 





Ongoing references to military desertions, apparent throughout the coverage of the events of 
February 23rd, function to imply that–– given the failed attempts at peaceful protest––regime 
change in Venezuela depends upon the use of military force, either through an internal military 
coup or a US military intervention, a sustained threat included throughout El Tiempo’s coverage 
in the lead up to this moment. As such, the sub-headline to the article, Venezuelans wrestle with 
the guard to enter their country137 (26 February, 2019), notes “four Venezuelan soldiers 
defected, according to Migración Colombia,” followed by paratextual links that, once again, 
direct readers to articles concerning military defections. In the aftermath of the events on 
February 23rd, numerous articles continue to highlight the phenomenon of military defections, 
such as The number of Venezuelan soldiers in Colombia has reached 567138 (28 February, 
2019). In the article, military defections are presented as an accelerating process, influenced by 
the extension of amnesty by Juan Guaidó and the lifting of sanctions by the United States for 
deserting soldiers. The article also includes the perspective of an analyst who notes the 
“unlikelihood of the security apparatus defending strategic areas if desertions augment,” as the 
 
136 Gustavo Castillo, “‘Les he dicho a militares que se pongan del lado del pueblo’: Guaidó,” El Tiempo, 
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/declaraciones-de-juan-guaido-antes-de-
entrega-de-ayudas-humanitarias-330402. 
137 Sandra Ramírez, “Venezolanos forcejean con la guardia para entrar a su país,” El Tiempo, February 26, 
2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/venezolanos-forcejean-con-la-guardia-para-entrar-a-su-
pais-330398. 




article notes that “the fissures, although until now not determinant, are increasingly evident,” 
citing the example of “two generals” responsible for a 2018 attack on Maduro, “hunger in the 
barracks,” and “the fracturing of the fundamental pillars of the Armed Forces”––according to “an 
expert in military matters.” In conclusion, the article notes, 
 
The abandonment of soldiers from Maduro will continue, and for those who are 
compromised in grave violations of human rights, they are willing to continue supporting 
him…[yet] not without an exit Plan B, which all of the military high command has, since 
none will sacrifice himself for him. 
 
Thus, El Tiempo’s coverage allows its readership to cling to the hopes of a military coup––or 
perhaps a military intervention by the United States, once military support for Maduro reaches 
the significant low point that, according to its coverage, draws near. The reformulation of the 
failed attempts to deliver humanitarian aid as a success––as the breaking point from which 
military support for Maduro begins to crumble––contrasts El Espectador’s construction of the 
same events and their aftermath.  
 
Conversely, El Espectador’s coverage following the events of February 23rd characterizes the 
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela as a failure, casting doubt upon the 
viability of violent regime change. Specifically, El Espectador’s coverage gives no indication of 
violent regime change at the hands of the Venezuelan military––or external actors such as the 
United States––as a likely, nor legitimate option to resolve the political and economic crises in 
Venezuela. Rather, El Espectador’s coverage indicates that the failure to introduce humanitarian 
aid into Venezuela reflects Maduro’s hold on power. Therefore, in the aftermath of the failed 
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, and taking into account Maduro’s ongoing 
hold on power, El Espectador’s coverage highlights efforts to discuss regime change in 
Venezuela within organizations such as the Lima Group, which is presented as one possible 
arena to facilitate political change in Venezuela through peaceful, diplomatic negotiations. 
Furthermore, El Espectador’s subsequent coverage insists upon the victimhood of border 
communities. Through their perspectives, El Espectador attributes blame for the chaos, violence, 
and mounting insecurity at the border––understood as direct results of the humanitarian efforts––
to the Venezuelan Opposition, the Colombian state, and the United States. 
 
El Espectador’s commitment to broader and alternative narratives of victimhood is evidenced by 
articles such as, When Cúcuta was global news139 (22 February, 2019). The article, which very 
title implies that Cúcuta was at the center of global news, but that this temporary attention did 
not persist, centers the perspectives of Colombian border communities. First, the article notes, 
“taxi drivers and those who work in the city’s hotel industry don’t ever remember Cúcuta 
receiving this much attention.” In turn, another taxi driver refers to the days surrounding the 
concert as “better, because there is a little more work”; similarly, a hotel receptionist states, “she 
is happy with the large amount of visitors the city has received.” In turn, the sub-headline “From 
the party to the hangover” introduces a new theme: the climate of uncertainty and fear 
provoked by the concert and the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, which the article 
characterizes as part of “the international strategy to provoke the fall of Nicolas Maduro in 
 
139 Jesús Mesa Mosquera, “Cuando Cúcuta fue noticia mundial,” El Espectador, February 22, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/cuando-cucuta-fue-noticia-mundial-articulo-841328. 
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Venezuela.” The article notes that border communities fear the introduction of aid into 
Venezuela may “take a turn for the worst.” In conclusion, the article notes that efforts by 
“volunteers loyal to Guaidó...to convince [the Venezuelan military] that there is a humanitarian 
crisis in their country, which has been underestimated by Maduro...will be much more difficult 
than had been thought”––contrasting the narratives of hope and optimism highlighted by El 
Tiempo’s coverage. In this way, the article not only casts doubt upon the legitimacy of the 
humanitarian efforts––they are presented as part of a political project to provoke the downfall of 
the Maduro regime––but also upon their feasibility; irrespective of Guaidó’s hopes, US support, 
and Colombia’s cooperation, the article’s conclusion that the Venezuelan military, the key factor 
to Maduro’s hold on power, remains loyal, suggests that efforts to provoke regime change are ill-
fated. Furthermore, unlike El Tiempo, the article also emphasizes the political motivations 
behind the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert; Cúcuta is characterized as “the epicenter of the 
international pressure led by Colombia and the United States against the government of Nicolás 
Maduro,” and the concert is presented as the “climax” of this pressure campaign. In contrast to 
similar coverage in El Tiempo, the article also characterizes Maduro’s counter-concert, “Hands 
Off Venezuela,” in detail. The article notes that Maduro’s concert “convened thousands of 
people, according to television transmitted by the official television network” and notes the anti-
war and pro-peace messages of the Venezuelan concert, including images of official screens with 
messages like “for war, nothing”, while noting that “attendees rallied with slogans in favor of 
Peace and in rejection of foreign interference” (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, El Espectador’s coverage of the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela on 
February 23rd, by supporters of Juan Guaidó, is prefigured by a contextualization of these 
events, throughout the preceding coverage, as possible steppingstones to military intervention. 
Articles such as Did Maduro cross the red line?140 (23 February, 2019) affirm, indeed, the 
victimhood of Venezuelan citizens at the hand of their state, which fired “tear gas and shot 
rubber bullets” at protesters urging the Venezuelan state to allow trucks with humanitarian aid to 
cross the border. Yet, the article frames the repression of Venezuelan security forces and pro-
government militias, upon whom the article places primary blame for the violence against anti-
government protesters on February 23rd, as “anticipated” by the Venezuelan Opposition––part of 
a plan to provoke a violent reaction from the Venezuelan state in order to, in turn, justify a 
military intervention, likely with support from the United States. Indeed, following the claim, by 
an exiled Venezuelan, that violence against protesters by the Venezuelan state “could bring 
international consequences against Maduro,” the article includes a link to the article, Trump 
reaffirms that a military option is on the table141 (03 Feb, 2019); the reader is reminded that the 
effort to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela is motivated, in part, by the urge to provoke 
a reaction from the Venezuelan state that would provide the justification for a military 
intervention in Venezuela led by the United States, acting upon longstanding claims––with vocal 
backing from the Venezuelan Opposition and members of the Duque administration like 
Francisco Santos––of openness to violent regime change in Venezuela.  
 
 
140 Redacción Internacional, “¿Cruzó Maduro la línea roja?,” El Espectador, February 23, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/cruzo-maduro-la-linea-roja-articulo-841534. 




The article notes that the events of February 23rd have been marked by conflicting attributions of 
blame; the Opposition denounced violence by the Venezuelan military as the Venezuelan state, 
in turn, denounced these same claims. The article points, rather, to “Bolivarian militia forces,” 
armed pro-government groups, as the “out of control” actors most likely to blame for violence 
that weekend. These themes within El Espectador’s coverage resurface in articles such as Ureña 
and San Antonio: setting of the chaos and repression of aid in in Venezuela142 (23 February, 
2019), which reflect the chaos and uncertainty surrounding the events; the article notes that 
protesters––as well as members of the Venezuelan National Guard––were harmed, “three of 
them shot and the majority due to inhaling tear gas.” In conclusion, the article notes that “heavily 
armed” non-state groups, perhaps on both sides, may have also fueled violence.  
 
El Espectador’s coverage of the Lima Group summit following the events of February 23rd 
affirm the newspaper’s commitment to peaceful, democratic regime change in Venezuela, and its 
rejection of the humanitarian aid efforts led by the Venezuelan Opposition, the Colombian 
government, and the United States. Thus, the article, Why is a peaceful and negotiated exit the 
only option for Venezuela?143 (24 February, 2019) asserts that “the use of force, as suggested by 
the auto-proclaimed president [Juan Guaidó] would be the worst solution for a crisis that affects 
Colombia in a direct way.” Citing vocal support for military intervention from the United States, 
as well as from Juan Guaidó, who stated “all options are open to achieve liberation,” the article 
presents President Duque’s calls for an end to “belligerent discourses” as inattentive, given that 
tensions have reached new heights. The potential for violent conflict or military intervention is 
affirmed through the citation of an academic source who indicates a growing support for the use 
of force to unseat Maduro, from officials in Venezuela, the United States, and Colombia. 
Nevertheless, the academic notes that, within the Lima Group, there exists broad opposition to a 
military option. The article also notes that many world leaders––even from countries 
participating in the humanitarian efforts, such as Spain and Chile––have explicitly rejected 
military intervention. Citing another academic source, also at the Del Rosario University, the 
article notes that “a peaceful exit and dialogue are the only options.” Furthermore, the article 
condemns the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela as ineffective, given Maduro’s clear hold 
on power; this analysis, by implication, insists upon regime change as the motivation for the 
humanitarian aid campaign by the Venezuelan Opposition and its allies. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of February 23rd, El Espectador begins to characterize the attempt to 
introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela as a failure, noting that protestors felt “abandoned” by 
the Opposition and the politicians who called for the weekend’s events. On February 23rd, live 
coverage144 included a tweet that already established this key theme:  
 
 
142 Redacción Internacional, “Ureña y San Antonio: escenarios de caos y represión por ayuda en Venezuela,” 
El Espectador, February 23, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/urena-y-san-antonio-
escenarios-de-caos-y-represion-por-ayuda-en-venezuela-articulo-841510. 
143 Redacción Internacional, “¿Por qué la salida pacífica y negociada es la única opción para Venezuela?,” El 
Espectador, February 24, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/por-que-la-salida-pacifica-y-
negociada-es-la-unica-opcion-para-venezuela-articulo-841700. 
144 Redacción Internacional, “En vivo: ya serían 42 los heridos en puente fronterizo entre Colombia y 






The tweet states, “#23Feb The people on bridges ask themselves where are the politicians 
who convoked them. ‘We are putting everything on the line and they are hiding, like always.” 
This claim, a direct quote from a Venezuelan citizen, facilitates the construction of the day’s 
events in stark contrast to El Tiempo’s coverage, where Juan Guaidó, in particular, is depicted in 
a leadership role––alongside the humanitarian caravan, driving as the head of supporters towards 
the border with Venezuela. 
 
Similarly, the article Venezuelan migrants ask themselves where are those who convoked 
them145 (24 February, 2019) highlights the perspectives of “disillusioned” Venezuelan citizens, 
who crossed into Colombia to support the delivery of humanitarian aid and felt left behind by 
“the politicians who convoked them.” Venezuelan citizens are noted to have been made to 
believe “the thesis of the Venezuelan Opposition...that the government of Nicolás Maduro would 
be history come Sunday.” In the face of well-organized, well-equipped Venezuelan security 
forces, the article also indicates that protesters “can do little with a fistful of stones or bottles,” 
reflecting the broader emphasis within El Espectador’s coverage upon the tight grip on power 
held by Maduro and his forces. The article’s inclusion, as a paratextual, within numerous other 
 
145 Jesús Mesa, “Migrantes venezolanos se preguntan dónde están quienes los convocaron,” El Espectador, 
February 24, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/migrantes-venezolanos-se-preguntan-
donde-estan-quienes-los-convocaron-articulo-841643. 
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articles relevant to the events of February 23rd affirms the centrality of these critiques to El 
Espectador’s broader coverage of the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela.  
 
Subsequent articles establish a direct critique of the Colombian state, from the perspective of 
Colombian border communities that faced mounting insecurity and economic distress following 
the events of February 22-23rd, a theme that characterizes El Espectador’s construction of the 
aftermath of the turbulent weekend. Thus, articles such as Cúcuta, between tension and calm146 
(25 February, 2019) emphasize the fear and uncertainty felt by border communities, which are 
directly attributed to the binational tensions provoked by the concert and the subsequent, failed 
efforts to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela. The text accompanying the leading image 
notes, “Protestors at the Colombo-Venezuelan border reject an eventual military intervention;” 
the concert and attempt to deliver humanitarian aid are re-framed, from the perspectives of 
Colombian border communities, as events that may prefigure an external military intervention, or 
escalate tensions between the Colombian and Venezuelan states to the point of military conflict 
between the two countries. Moreover, the article draws a distinction between Colombian and 
Venezuelan border residents. Venezuelans appear to embrace the possibility of military 
intervention in Venezuela: 
 
“Military intervention now,” some affirm. “Mr. Donald Trump, do your thing,” yell 
others, placing in the United States their trust that the crisis in their country, which has 
forced nearly 3 million people to emigrate, will end. 
 
Colombians, however, are presented as cautious: 
  
But while [Venezuelan] migrants plead for and believe that the possibility of a military 
intervention with Washington’s help will resolve their problems, the Colombians who 
live at the border find themselves uneasy facing this option, which has made a lot of noise 
in the streets of Cúcuta (emphasis added). 
 
In turn, a Colombian resident of Cúcuta is interviewed, who states that since February 23rd, 
when Guaidó and his delegation of supporters and volunteers attempted to introduce US 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, “we are on edge. Asking for a war from the outside is easy, but 
we are the ones who have to shoulder the burden” (emphasis added). The legitimacy of these 
concerns is affirmed through the subsequent citation of a Colombian border representative, who 
stresses the need for “Colombia to opt for a passive attitude…[Maduro’s] exit must be 
negotiated, measured, cordial, and unspirited. We cannot become warlike nor enter that tone.” 
 
The centrality of Colombian border communities as victims of these events persists, as the article 
establishes links between worsening economic conditions in Cúcuta––and the border region as a 
whole––and the decline in Colombo-Venezuelan relations, which earlier coverage has already 
attributed to Colombia’s eagerness to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Thus, the 
article notes that “currency exchangers and businessmen [agree] that [Cúcuta] has taken a hit” 
following the concert and the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela. Similarly, the article 
quotes a shoe shiner from Cúcuta who notes, 
 




Here we also have problems. We are waiting for President Duque to fulfill his promises, 
because many of us here voted for him...we understand that things with the Venezuelans 
are tough, and we support them, but he is the president of Colombia and not Venezuela.  
 
As exhibited in earlier chapters, the construction of discourses surrounding international crises––
in this case, the diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Venezuela––offers an opportunity for 
border communities to highlight their own concerns and demands; the discourse constructed 
within El Espectador, in highlighting the perspectives of Colombian citizens who are 
marginalized by their own state, provides a platform for these citizens, and by extension their 
communities, to negotiate their relationship with the state.  
 
Moreover, the article attributes economic precarity in the border region to the decline in 
Colombo-Venezuelan relations. Specifically, the article notes that, while unemployment has 
largely declined at the national level, unemployment in Cúcuta has not decreased since 2009––
precisely when Colombo-Venezuelan relations began to deteriorate––while the informal 
economic sector has also grown during this period. In turn, an analyst from the Cúcuta Chamber 
of Commerce notes, “the economy of [North of Santander] [depends] solely and exclusively on 
the situation of [Venezuela].” Therefore, the article suggests that the transnational economies 
upon which border communities depend are directly harmed by the tensions between both the 
Venezuelan and Colombian states. The article’s conclusion casts doubt upon the claims of the 
Colombian state that “its interest in resolving [Venezuela’s] problems has to do, precisely, with 
that Colombia will improve as a result;” rather, the article notes that “residents of Cúcuta 
say...this has yet to be seen.” Thus, El Espectador filters criticism towards the Colombian state 
through the perspectives of border communities who present legitimate claims of marginalization 
and victimhood. 
 
Perhaps the most emphatic critique of the concert and attempt to introduce humanitarian aid 
surfaces in an article published months later, For what did the mega-concert in Cúcuta 
serve?147 (13 April 2019), in which the mayors of the Colombian border communities of Cúcuta, 
Los Patios, and Villa del Rosario claim that “nothing has changed” following the events of 
February 22nd and 23rd. Firstly, the article notes, “Between 2005 and 2016 the border between 
Colombia and Venezuela was closed 14 times. Six of them were ordered by Colombia and eight 
by Venezuela.” This statement is significant and reflects a broader characteristic of El 
Espectador’s coverage in which border closures, so maligned by locals from both sides for their 
negative economic and social consequences, are attributed to both the Colombian and 
Venezuelan states––by contrast, El Tiempo’s characterization of border closures, particularly 
during the weekend of February 22nd and 23rd, emphasizes the decision by Maduro to close the 
border, in order to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid into Venezuela.  
 
In turn, the article notes that the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert 
  
 
147 María Hernández Cárcamo, “¿Para qué sirvió el megaconcierto de Cúcuta?,” El Espectador, April 13, 2019, 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/para-que-sirvio-el-megaconcierto-de-cucuta-articulo-849392. 
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claimed to ask the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, to allow the entry of 
humanitarian aid that various countries had recollected to mitigate the crisis suffered by 
Venezuelans (emphasis added). 
 
The implication, here––that the concert did not achieve its intended purpose––is affirmed 
by the article’s declaration that “The concert passed. The aid didn’t enter. The trucks were 
incinerated (there is still no clarity as to who did this)...[we] continued to remain forgotten” 
(emphasis added). Here, the marginalization of border communities throughout the events is 
affirmed. To affirm this claim, the article cites the perspective of Juan Fernando Cristo, a native 
of Cucuta and ex-Minister of the Interior,  
 
who said on Twitter that “a month after the famous concert at the border and the 
frustrated show of humanitarian aid, the situation in Cucuta is worse than ever. No one 
from the Government returned to the city and no aid has been decided. Commerce fell by 
60%, hotel occupancy by 45%. The social crisis grows” (emphasis added). 
 
The inclusion of Cristo’s declaration that the concert failed to benefit Colombian border 
communities––and perhaps deepened pre-existing economic crises––is later supported by more 
official sources from the border, who affirm the discrepancy between the priorities of the 
Colombian state and those of their communities; the article notes that the three local mayors 
cited “agree that after the mega-concert nothing new happened in their regions, although the 
Government promised to help” (emphasis added). One of these mayors, Diego Armando 
González Toloza––who, the article stresses, is affiliated with centrist and conservative parties––
nevertheless departs from official characterizations of the humanitarian aid efforts; he criticizes 
the February 22nd “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the parallel attempt to introduce 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela as factors that deepened pre-existing economic and social 
crises for border communities. He notes that, following these events, insecurity and 
unemployment rose, while schools, hospitals, and public services became overburdened due to 
the border closure; that “for now, the government has not taken a stance. The difficult situation is 
not a present reality, rather it is one of many years.”  
 
Thus, the article centralizes the marginalization of Colombian border communities by the 
Colombian state. The article notes that the mayor of Cúcuta requested significant financial 
assistance from the state to alleviate the financial burdens generated by the total closure of the 
Colombo-Venezuelan border––yet, claims by state representatives, indicating official plans to 
“benefit and assist the region” are cast into doubt, as the article states, “the representatives of 
North Santander, although without much hope, continue to await the plan” (emphasis added). 
This lack of hope stresses a dominant narrative throughout El Espectador’s coverage: that the 
Colombian state’s support of the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the introduction of 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela is ultimately detrimental to border communities, who now 
suffer the consequences of a total border closure, generated by these events, which are 
understood as part of a pressure campaign against the Venezuelan state, supported by the Duque 
government and its international allies, the United States and the Venezuelan Opposition.  
 
The article’s conclusion reasserts a key theme of El Espectador’s broader coverage, as it casts 
doubt upon the positive implications of Colombia’s relationship to the United States, presented 
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as a key source of tension for Colombo-Venezuelan relations and, in turn, border communities. 
Thus, while the article notes that Pompeo will meet with President Duque to “present an Impact 
Plan to mitigate the effects generated by the migration crisis and the closure of the Colombo-
Venezuelan border,” the placement of this claim following the characterizations of official 
failures to mitigate these crises and the raising of doubt, by local leaders, that further plans to do 
so by the Colombian state will be successful, leads the reader to also interpret the claims of 
Pompeo and the Colombian state with skepticism; thus far, the article has emphasized the ways 
in which the imposition of pressure upon the Venezuelan state has only harmed border 
communities. Moreover, the benefits of strengthening the relationship between Colombia and the 
United States are put into question––in particular, if either party is committed to resolving 
tensions at the Colombo-Venezuelan border, or willing to consider the needs and priorities of 
border communities. 
 
In contrast, El Tiempo’s characterization of the events on February 23rd in light of local sources, 
reaffirms ongoing narratives that center the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens and assert the 
legitimacy of the humanitarian efforts, while sidelining the concerns of border residents 
regarding the consequences of these efforts upon local communities. The article, The strong 
critiques of the Mayor of Cúcuta against Duque after the 23F148 (28 February, 2019), includes 
the perspective of Cesar Rojas, mayor of Cúcuta––yet displaces his criticism of the Colombian 
state, the United States, and the Venezuelan Opposition, emphasizing instead the victimhood of 
Venezuelan citizens and the Colombian police, in contrast to the mayor’s repeated claims that 
Colombian border citizens have suffered greatly from the circumstances following the mega-
concert and the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela. The leading image for the 
article already establishes a main focus contrary to its title, which implies that the mayor’s 
criticism of the weekend’s events is the central subject of its content; the article emphasizes 
instead the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state, presented as the victimizer of its citizens and a 
barrier to the entry of humanitarian aid. The leading image excludes any reference to the mayor–
–or the Colombian border communities on whose behalf the mayor presents strong critiques of 





148 Gustavo A. Castillo Arenas, “Las fuertes críticas del Alcalde de Cúcuta a Duque tras el 23FEl Espectador, 




Thus, from the start, the article attributes the border closure, which has had detrimental effects 
upon Colombian border communities, to the Venezuelan state. The mayor is asked, “What effect 
does the closure of the border generate over Cúcuta and the surrounding metropolitan 
area?” This question, however, establishes the problematic event as the border closure itself, 
while neglecting its context––the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela and the 
accompanying US military presence, which led the Venezuelan state to close its border; the 
question does not address the source of the border closure: an impending violation of 
Venezuela’s national sovereignty marked by the threat of military intervention. Nevertheless, 
with respect to the consequences of the border closure, the mayor states, “it is a negative 
effect...with all due respect to the president Ivan Duque...it is necessary to find a formula to open 
the border.” The article does not, however, indicate that a formula may require a significant 
reparation of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela––and, likely, an open 
rejection of US claims that “all options are on the table” by the Colombian state, not to mention 
the Venezuelan Opposition. 
 
The article then centers its attention on the “moments of tension at the border between Colombia 





The Venezuelan Bolivarian National Guard is depicted throwing tear gas at civilians on 
the Colombian side. The presence of the Colombian and US military, however, is excluded; 
therefore the attribution of blame for violence against Colombia and Venezuelan citizens falls 
solely upon the Venezuelan state. By contrast to these dominant narratives––affirmed to a great 
extent by the images that accompany the text––later in the article, Mayor Rojas’ critiques finally 
surface. Rojas extends victimhood to the Venezuelan state forces; he clarifies that they are also 
responding to aggression: the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela––a violation of national 
sovereignty––and the accompanying US military presence. Furthermore, the mayor criticizes the 
permissive attitude of the Colombian state towards aggression against Venezuelan state forces, 
 94 
affirming that the tensions resulting from the collaboration between the Colombian state and the 
Venezuelan Opposition, particularly during the events of the February 22-23 weekend, function 
only to harm border communities. Specifically, Rojas condemns any collaboration between 
Colombian defense forces and Venezuelan “resistance” members, calling upon the Colombian 
state to suppress any aggression on the latter’s part against the Venezuelan National Guard, 
which “only looks to alter the harmony in the environment surrounding the city of Cúcuta.”  
 
Throughout the piece, however, large imagery, bolded questioning, and bolded sections continue 
to support narratives that––contrary to the Mayor’s––are consistent with the interests of the 
Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition, and, in turn, their ally the United States. The 
discrepancy between the narratives prioritized by the article, which reflect the tendencies of its 
broader coverage, and the criticism presented by Mayor Rojas is demonstrated by the 
implications of the paratextuals and links that appear throughout the article. One large and 
bolded paratextual states,  “Note that the Colombian police have the order to stay on those 
bridges without weapons, nothing. But when a Colombian police member is harmed, that 
could provoke a reaction.” This statement centers the victimhood of the Colombian police; this 
is not the focus of the mayor’s critique, in which he centers the victimhood of border citizens. 
Similarly, subsequent images and statistics, which follow Rojas’ assertion that border 
communities need “other kinds of help, such as promoting employment and resolving 
informality”––not temporary humanitarian aid––center the humanitarian aid, whose intended 









While Rojas affirms the victimhood of border communities––presented as a consequence 
of the humanitarian efforts, which he claims exacerbated informal economies, unemployment, 
and security concerns––these large images, which occupy disproportionate space in the article, 
center the victimization of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of their state, the legitimacy of 
humanitarian aid, and the positive, humanitarian role played by the United states, while the 
perspectives of border communities take a secondary role.  
 
It is only in the final paragraph that the mayor’s strong critiques are presented in full: 
 
I have never agreed with this…[these actions] harm the city of Cúcuta and don’t leave us 
anything. Here we need to take into account all the difficulties presented for Cucuteños, 
because those who live in the center of the country, this doesn’t affect them at all. We 
know the difficulty that the Venezuelan people live, and we are in solidarity with that, but 
for that reason we need to find other mechanisms. They (Nicolás Maduro and Juan 
Guaidó) must resolve their differences between the two governments, but involving us is 
difficult. As [mayor] I find myself affected by the lack of security and the lack of clear 
policies towards the difficulties of Cúcuta and its borders. 
 
At this point, Rojas affirms that the priorities of the Colombian state, allied with Juan 
Guaidó and the United States, have marginalized the needs of border communities. Moreover, 
Rojas notes that the introduction of humanitarian aid into Venezuela has generated further 
difficulties and insecurity for border residents, whose interests have been sidelined as the 
Colombian state has prioritized supporting the Venezuelan Opposition––and, in turn, 
strengthening its relationship with the United States. 
 
Within El Tiempo’s coverage, attempts to deflect criticism of the Colombian state, as well as the 
Venezuelan Opposition and the United States, are consistent with the coverage explored in 
earlier chapters, in which the newspaper places an emphasis upon the victimhood of Colombian 
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border communities only when this serves to fracture the legitimacy of the Venezuelan state––
and, in turn, affirm a conception of Colombian national identity rooted in military strength. 
Moreover, the attachment to military intervention in Venezuela, presented as a legitimate option 
to affect regime change throughout El Tiempo’s coverage reflects a broader commitment––
coincident with the ideological character of the newspaper’s leadership and audience––to 
conceptions of national identity rooted in militarism, evidenced by the affirmations of violence 
and the commitment to narratives of conflict characteristic to earlier coverage of binational 
tensions.  
 
By contrast, El Espectador’s emphasis upon the victimization of Colombian citizens–– framed as 
a consequence of Colombia’s eagerness to gain US support and a commitment, by the 
Colombian Right, to delegitimize the Left at any cost––reaffirms the ideological characteristics 
of the newspaper, observed in earlier chapters. Throughout the coverage of the concert and the 
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, military intervention or conflict are consistently 
accompanied by criticism from academics and experts, who affirm the impractical nature of 
violent regime change in Venezuela, and ultimately border residents––the victims of such threats 
and the accompanying response by the Venezuelan state. Moreover, El Espectador’s quick pivot, 
following the weekend of February 23rd, to examples of international negotiations to resolve the 
crisis in Venezuela––such as the meetings of the Lima Group that emphasize support for 
peaceful negotiation of regime change––reflect its characteristic focus upon a national 
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CONCLUSION: A FRAGMENTED NATION 
 
In this thesis, I have observed that both El Tiempo and El Espectador construct divergent 
nationalist discourses, which appeal to distinct communities, ideologies, and conceptions of 
national identity. I have examined the ways in which the discursive actor––and discursive 
construction––of Venezuela permits the “imagining” of the Colombian nation. Furthermore, I 
have suggested that the textual representation of the border and Venezuelan migration operates 
to obscure the internal tensions of the Colombian nation.  
In this conclusion, I want to consider the ways in which the nationalistic discourses constructed 
within both newspapers converge. In both cases, the Venezuelan state functions as an antithesis 
to the Colombian state––either rooted in military strength or a commitment to democratic values. 
Moreover, the nationalistic discourses constructed by El Tiempo and El Espectador are coherent 
insofar as they define the Colombian nation in relation to the Venezuelan state. In Chapter 1, El 
Tiempo provides a platform for border communities to narrate their victimhood at the hands of 
the Venezuelan state––to the extent that these narratives of victimhood are coherent with the 
newspaper’s conception of the Colombian state as a protector. Similarly, in Chapter 2, El 
Espectador presents the Venezuelan state as a failed state, which affirms the exceptional, 
democratic character of the Colombian state––presented also as a protector of vulnerable 
migrants, fleeing authoritarianism and economic distress. However, when both newspapers 
define the Colombian nation in relation to Colombian citizens, their respective discourses 
become incoherent.  
Within El Tiempo’s discourse, Colombian citizens are only legitimate victims at the hands of the 
Venezuelan state. Thus, as we can see in Chapter 3, when border communities are antagonized 
by the Colombian state––which is not considered a legitimate victimizer––their narratives of 
victimhood are excluded from El Tiempo’s coverage, or obscured and reformulated to the extent 
that these narratives may be coherent with El Tiempo’s ideological commitments to militarism 
and conflict with Venezuela. Conversely, as illustrated in Chapter 1, El Tiempo’s mobilization of 
border communities’ narratives of victimhood––which supports its conception of the Colombian 
state as a protector and functions to legitimate militarization in rural border zones––obscures the 
legacy of state, or state-sponsored violence experienced by indigenous and peasant communities 
at the hands of military and paramilitary forces––a crucial factor behind ongoing internal 
displacement in Colombia.  
Similarly, in Chapter 3 we observe how El Espectador highlights the victimhood of Colombian 
border communities at the hands of the Colombian state and its international allies, as these 
narratives of victimhood facilitate the newspaper’s appeals for an inclusive, democratic 
Colombian nation; however, throughout El Espectador’s discursive construction of the arrival, or 
“encounter” with Venezuelan migrants, analyzed in Chapter 2, the concerns of Colombian 
citizens are excluded, marginalized, or reformulated––as they are incoherent with El 
Espectador’s conception of national identity––which reveals the fragmented, broken character of 
the Colombian nation.  
Nevertheless, as the popular rejection of Venezuelan migrants mounts it becomes obvious that 
Colombian citizens are not easily compelled by official appeals for inclusion, and that 
competition for resources among other conflicts are unavoidable in the context of an unequal 
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society in which the relationship between Colombian citizens and their state is marked by 
distrust, violence, and the failure of the Colombian state to follow through with the promises of 
inclusion of their own “Others”––as constitutional commitments to multicultural inclusion are 
fractured by violence against ethnic minorities, and vulnerable Colombians, particularly in rural 
regions, continue to live under threat from paramilitaries, narcotrafficking groups, and state 
military forces alike. While both El Tiempo and El Espectador construct Venezuela as an enemy, 
or an anti-democratic counterpoint, both newspapers reject a broader representation of 
Colombian victimhood, which would require the contextualization of popular distrust in the idea 
of the Colombian state as both a protector and a democratic actor. Such a contextualization 
would necessitate a discussion of the Colombian conflict. Beyond the legacy of state and state-
sponsored violence, it would be necessary to ask why a purportedly democratic and inclusive 
nation has struggled to achieve internal peace. Failures by the state, institutions, and civil society 
to grapple with these contradictions may result from the “comfortable perception of political and 
economic stability,” as the Colombian Group of Historical Memory describes the indifference 
and passivity to quotidian violence characteristic to a society that remains fractured by the 
Colombian conflict and its roots––and suspended by “the negation of the possibility of 
coexistence…the radical negation of democracy.”150 It is this perception of “political and 
economic stability” to which the nationalist discourses in El Tiempo and El Espectador 
contribute, through the externalization and displacement of violence, victims, and victimizers, 
and both newspaper’s constructions of the Colombian nation. 
The recent focus on border crises and migration within the national media, centered upon 
violence, crime, and conflict, and the centrality of Venezuela as an antithesis to Colombia, may 
function to shift public attention away from the human costs of a country undergoing neoliberal 
reforms that will only exacerbate the structural inequality at the root of the 60-year long 
Colombian conflict. Moreover, the construction of Venezuela as a national “other”––either a 
failed state or a national enemy––may divert attention from internal failures, such as the 
hesitation, on the part of the Colombian Right, to support the Colombian Peace Process, which 
entails the demobilization and political reincorporation of the FARC guerilla. Indeed, in 2016, 
50.2% of voters rejected the national referendum to end the conflict between the state and the 
FARC, although the peace accord was revised and ultimately ratified by the Colombian Congress 
later that year. Despite the peace accord, violence against community leaders, activists, peasants, 
and indigenous communities has been on the rise, particularly in rural Colombia. Colombian 
think-tank INDEPAZ reports that 138 former guerrillas have been killed since the peace accord, 
largely at the hands of former or current members of right-wing paramilitary groups.151 Between 
2018 and 2019, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office registered a 47% increase in threats against 
social leaders: union activists, human rights advocates, and environmental defenders.152 
According to the United Nations, 107 human rights advocates were murdered in 2019, and at 
 
150 “¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad,” Grupo de Memoria Histórica, accessed May 13, 2020, 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta-ya-colombia-memorias-de-
guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf. 
151 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Murder of hundreds of Coombian activists casts shadow over peace process,” Reuters, 
August 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-feature/murder-of-hundreds-of-colombian-
activists-casts-shadow-over-peace-process-idUSKCN1VF0IK. 
152 Adam Veitch, “59 of Colombia’s social leaders assassinated in first four months of 2019: report,” Colombia 
Reports, May 14, 2019, https://colombiareports.com/59-of-colombias-social-leaders-assassinated-in-first-four-
months-of-2019-report/. 
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least 10 activists have reportedly been killed in the first two weeks of 2020.153 Furthermore, 
during the summer of 2019, as the Duque government attributed the rise in rural violence to the 
still-active ELN and the dissident FARC guerillas, Colombia entered a renewed controversy over 
“false positives,” the Colombian military’s practice of identifying civilians as enemy combatants 
to inflate kill counts––information that had been withheld from the public. At the same time, 
Colombia was reeling from a series of protests in 2018 and in the spring of 2019: multiple 
national strikes brought about by a mass mobilization of students, indigenous groups, teachers, 
public workers, and organized labor that took place all over the country. In general, the national 
strike was set against the implementation of President Duque’s National Development Plan, or 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND). Mobilization against the PND criticized its potential 
informalization of labor and reduction of labor protections, its commitment to an extractive 
economy near-half dependent on mining and oil, its failure to refinance public education, 
guarantee healthcare, raise stagnant public wages, and expand access to education.  
While taking these events and Colombia’s current political climate into account, the redirection 
of national attention towards Venezuela may also reflect an involuntary blindness on the part of 
media producers. Editorial staff are members of distinct knowledge communities, whose 
ideological commitments may not be consciously understood as beliefs; the communicative 
situations expressed within newspapers such as El Tiempo and El Espectador affirm, necessarily, 
social knowledge specific to groups and individuals with personal experiences, assumptions, and 
criteria that do not necessarily reflect the Colombian nation, as a whole. The notion of the 
Colombian state as a protector may be a legitimate one, for a rural landowner, yet unreasonable 
for an indigenous leader protesting state-sponsored mineral extraction. Similarly, the notion of 
Colombia as a democratic nation may ring hollow for those who have been excluded from 
democratic processes. 
Nevertheless, El Tiempo’s construction of events in a manner that so often forms implications 
contrary to the text––and the clear connections between editorial and political leadership––
indicate that there may be a more conscious editorial project to conform events, and their 
interpretation by readers, to adhere to the newspaper’s commitment to militarization and conflict 
with Venezuela. Conversely, in the case of El Espectador, the commitment to an aspirational 
conception of the Colombian nation observed within its discourse concerning Venezuela may 
reflect an editorial blindness to the experiences of the Colombian working class and internally 
displaced people. The newspaper’s own commitment to broader sourcing practices, which 
indicates a lesser fidelity to one “truth,” itself engenders the dissonance observed within its 
discourse; as the discourse progresses––and evidence against the notion of Colombia as an 
inclusive, democratic nation emerges––this aspirational notion becomes contradictory in the 
context of the Colombian conflict and its roots. 
These observations affirm that nations are limited, fragile projects, which involve both memory 
and forgetting. As Benedict Anderson noted in Imagined Communities, nations are ongoing, 
flexible, and creative projects that, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail in each,” sustain myths of “deep, horizontal comradeship.”154 Anderson indicated that 
 
153 Associated Press, “UN Says ‘Staggering’ Deaths of Rights Activists in Colombia,” January 14, 2020, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-01-14/un-says-staggering-deaths-of-rights-activists-in-colombia. 
154 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. 
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newspapers represent cultural products through which individuals relate to their imagined 
national communities, pointing towards a driving premise to this thesis: that nations are 
constructed through discourse––another imagined realm. The construction of nationalistic 
discourses within El Tiempo and El Espectador is marked by repetition, even redundancy––
necessary to sustain themes and dominant narratives of the Colombian nation. One would think 
that, given the mass-produced and fleeting value of the news, both news producers and 
consumers would prioritize news products that were characterized by novelty and difference. 
Yet, repetition and redundancy are crucial techniques for the interpellation of national subjects; 
as this thesis affirms, news products––while mass-produced and of rapidly depreciating 
monetary worth––have significant social and political value; their discursive techniques make 
greater sense if they are understood as such––if the news media are understood as mechanisms in 
the reproduction of power relations, sites of socialization, and instruments that both reflect the 
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Figure 2.2: Iván Duque, #Socorro I Estamos haciendo presencia en nuestras fronteras. El 
ministro @CarlosHolmesTru visitó la Guajira y Norte de Santander, y nos informó sobre la 
liberación de recursos regionales para atender a los migrantes provenientes de Venezuela. 




Figure 2.3: AFP, Se espera una oleada migratoria antes de las elecciones en Venezuela, el 
próximo 20 de mayo., 2018, El Espectador, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-
mundo/cada-venezolano-suma-articulo-753100. 
 








Figure 2.6: Rodolfo Hernández, Hernández declaró que, por falta de dinero, solo han podido 
ofrecer servicios esenciales de atención médica a las mujeres venezolanas en la capital 




Figure 2.7: Daniel Samper Ospina, #CuandoNosInvadanLosGringos les regalamos al alcalde de 




Figure 2.8: Gustavo Torrijos, Imágenes: así fue el traslado de venezolanos a un nuevo albergue 
en Bogotá, 2018, El Espectador, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/imagenes-asi-
fue-el-traslado-de-venezolanos-un-nuevo-albergue-en-bogota-galeria-823440. 
 
Figure 2.9: Gustavo Torrijos, Este martes se llevó a cabo el traslado del grupo de venezolanos 
que se encontraba asentado desde hace dos meses en inmediaciones de la terminal del Salitre., 
2018, El Espectador, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/imagenes-asi-fue-el-
traslado-de-venezolanos-un-nuevo-albergue-en-bogota-galeria-823440. 
 
Figure 2.10: Gustavo Torrijos, El traslado hacia el centro hogar ‘El Camino’, ubicado en la 
localidad de Engativá, empezó hacia las 5:00 a.m. cuando llegaron al lugar funcionarios de las 
secretarías General y de Integración Social, acompañados por representantes de la Personería, 




Figure 2.11: Secretaría de Integración Social, Dentro del grupo de trasladados había menores de 




Figure 2.12: Secretaría de Integración Social, Las pertenencias de los migrantes fueron llevadas 




Figure 2.13: Secretaría de Integración Social, Pero el grupo de vecinos también mostró razones 
xenófobas para impedir el arribo de los extranjeros. También decían que los venezolanos iban a 
traer problemas de salud e inseguridad a la zona. Debido a la obstrucción, que duró casi una 
hora, el Esmad hizo presencia y en pocos minutos despejó la zona. Así continuó el paso de los 
buses., 2018, El Espectador, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/imagenes-asi-fue-el-
traslado-de-venezolanos-un-nuevo-albergue-en-bogota-galeria-823440. 
 
Figure 2.14: Gustavo Torrijos, Tras el despeje del centro de paso, los migrantes ingresaron 




Figure 2.15: Gustavo Torrijos, Hacia las 9:00 a.m., los buses de los migrantes llegaron al centro 
de paso. Fueron recibidos por algunos residentes de la zona, quienes protestaron por la decisión 
del Distrito, que consideraron "arbitraria". El grupo, de máximo 30 personas, intentó bloquear 
el paso de los buses y demoró aún más el proceso de reubicación. Su primera razón para 





Figure 2.16: Gustavo Torrijos, Además de la restricción de montar fogones, los migrantes 
tampoco podrán fumar, consumir sustancias psicoactivas, lavar ropa, estar en los alrededores 








Figure 3.2: AP, El presidente estadounidense, Donald Trump, recibe a su homólogo colombiano, 




Figure 3.3: Francisco Pacho Santos, Aterriza el primer avión de ayuda humanitaria para los 
hermanos venezolanos. Dios bendiga a todos los que hicieron posible este alivio. @IvanDuque 




Figure 3.4: Francisco Pacho Santos, Llegó el segundo avión. Que sea el comienzo de una 




Figure 3.5: Archivo particular, Los mandatarios sostuvieron una charla en la tarde de este 
viernes., 2019, El Tiempo, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/ee-uu-envia-aviones-
militares-con-ayuda-humanitaria-para-venezuela-327624. 
  
Figure 3.6: El Tiempo Casa Editorial, “A paso acelerado se prepara todo en la frontera para el 
concierto por Venezuela,” YouTube video, 2:37, February 20, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pf67oDhewf0. 
  
Figure 3.7: El Tiempo Casa Editorial, “A paso acelerado se prepara todo en la frontera para el 
concierto por Venezuela,” YouTube video, 2:37, February 20, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pf67oDhewf0. 
  




Figure 3.9: Jesús Mesa, #23Feb La gente en los puentes se pregunta en dónde están los políticos 





Figure 3.10: Pablo Cozzaglio, 2019, El Tiempo, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-
ciudades/entrevista-con-alcalde-de-cucuta-sobre-ayudas-humanitarias-332062. 
  
Figure 3.11: AFP, El sábado se volvieron a vivir momentos de tensión en la frontera entre 
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